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During the 2000s, budget support had been a preferred 
aid modality for implementing the principles of effective 
aid formulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration. While the 
literature attested to the positive effects of the modality, 
the 2010s have been marked by the withdrawal of many 
donors from the modality. The modality had increasingly 
come under criticism due to scandals in the recipient 
countries and accountability pressures at home. 
 
This evaluation used a theory-based approach comprised 
of comparative case studies in Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda 
and Zambia, which were complemented by an innovative 
process tracing approach. The results of the evaluation 
show that the exit from budget support increases frag-
mentation in aid portfolios and lowers harmonization 
and coordination among donors. The exit led to negative 
developments in most areas that had benefited from the 
introduction of budget support, for example in public ex-
penditure for social sectors and macroeconomic perfor-
mance.  
 
These findings are not only relevant for the launch of new 
policy-based modalities similar to budget support, but 
also provide lessons learned for the exit from integrated 
policy-based approaches. This evaluation is one in a row 
of three DEval budget support evaluations (Orth et al. 
(2017), What We Know about the Effectiveness of Budget 
Support; Krisch et al. (2015), Accompanying Measures to 
Budget Support in Sub-Saharan Africa). 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Hintergrund 
Um die Jahrtausendwende kam die internationale Gemeinschaft zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass es für 
eine wirksame Entwicklungszusammenarbeit innovativer Ansätze bedürfe, die eine Reihe von Kern-
prinzipien berücksichtigen und umsetzen sollen, wie zum Beispiel die Eigenverantwortung der Emp-
fängerländer, Koordinierung unter den Gebern und gegenseitige Rechenschaftspflicht. Diese Prinzi-
pien wurden 2005 in der Erklärung von Paris über die Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (OECD 
DAC, 2005) und anderenorts als Antwort auf die Lehren aus mehr als fünf Jahrzehnten Entwicklungszusam-
menarbeit formuliert. Es entwickelte sich ein Konsens, dass wirksame Ansätze der Entwicklungszusammen-
arbeit die Lücke zwischen Interventionen auf Makro- und Mikroebene durch Nutzung der gesamten Palette 
der verfügbaren Instrumente (d.h. finanzielle Unterstützung, Technische Zusammenarbeit, politischer Dia-
log und Konditionalität) schließen müssten. Weiterhin sollten zukünftige Ansätze die Paris-Prinzipien der 
Eigenverantwortung, Partnerausrichtung, Harmonisierung, gegenseitigen Rechenschaftspflicht und Ergeb-
nisorientierung einhalten. 
Diese Lehren wurden von der internationalen Gemeinschaft dahingehend interpretiert, dass der neue 
Ansatz den integrierten Einsatz von finanzieller und technischer Unterstützung einhergehend mit 
einem Politikdialog auf höchster politischer Ebene und Bestimmungen zu gegenseitiger Rechen-
schaftspflicht der Geber- und Partnerregierungen beinhalten sollte. Eine Modalität zur Umsetzung die-
ser integrierten, an den Politiken der Partner orientierten Entwicklungszusammenarbeit war die Budget-
hilfe, die sich zur wohl meist diskutierten Modalität der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) in den 2000er 
Jahren entwickelte.1 Allgemeine Budgethilfe wird  oft gemeinsam von mehreren Gebern2 angeboten, um 
gemeinsam nationale Strategien zur Armutsbekämpfung und Entwicklungspläne der Partnerregierung zu 
unterstützen. Der Haushalt des Partnerlandes wird durch einen Ressourcentransfer unterstützt, der entwe-
der ungebunden (allgemeine Budgethilfe) oder für spezifische Sektoren (Sektor-Budgethilfe) bereitgestellt 
wird. Dieser finanzielle Beitrag wird durch einen Politikdialog, Konditionalität, Technische Zusammenarbeit 
und Kapazitätsentwicklung3 ergänzt. Der Politikdialog befasst sich auf einer hohen politischen Ebene mit 
übergreifenden Fragen, wie z.B. Budgetentscheidungen, wie auch auf technischer Ebene mit spezifischen 
Sektorpolitiken und Reformprogrammen. Die Konditionalitäten bestehen in der Regel aus sogenannten 
grundlegenden Prinzipien (underlying principles) als Voraussetzung für die Zahlung von Budgethilfe und 
einer regelmäßigen Leistungsüberprüfung in Form eines Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). Die 
underlying principles setzen Mindeststandards zu Themen wie makroökonomische Stabilität, demokrati-
sche Grundprinzipien oder Menschenrechte. Der PAF wird in Zusammenarbeit mit der Partnerregierung 
entwickelt, um den Fortschritt in gemeinsam vereinbarten Reformen festzustellen. Die Kapazitätsentwick-
lung bietet technische Hilfe an zu Themen, die im Rahmen der Budgetunterstützung behandelt werden, wie 
öffentliches Finanzmanagement (PFM) oder innerstaatliche Rechenschaftspflicht. 
Budgethilfe wurde als am besten geeignete Modalität zur Umsetzung der Wirksamkeitsprinzipien und 
zum Abbau einer hohen Fragmentierung in der EZ angesehen. Zwischen 2006 und 2010 gaben allein 
europäische Geberländer (bilateral und Europäische Kommission) rund 15,5 Mrd. EUR an Budgethilfe für die 
Partnerländer (Orth et al., 2017). Der Interventionslogik von Budgethilfe folgend sollte die Budgethilfe 
Transaktionskosten senken und die Vorhersagbarkeit von EZ-Mitteln steigern. Außerdem ist der Anspruch, 
dass die nationale Souveränität gewahrt bleibt, politische Reformen eigenverantwortlich entwickelt und 
nicht von den Gebern diktiert werden. Dieser Eingriff in die Souveränität von Entwicklungsländern war in 
 
1  In einer parallelen Entwicklung hatten Geber wie Deutschland auch mit der Umsetzung eines ganzheitlichen bzw. „mehrstufigen“ Ansatzes zur 
projektbasierten Hilfe in Kombination mit Interventionen auf Mikro-, Mittel- und Makroebene begonnen, um die diagnostizierten Lücken zwi-
schen den früheren Ansätzen auf Mikro- und Makroebene zu schließen. 
2  Die Europäische Kommission und die europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten boten oft eine gemeinsame Budgetunterstützung von mehreren Gebern an, 
während die Weltbank, der IWF und einige bilaterale Geber auch Budgethilfe alleine zur Verfügung stellten. 
3  In Annex 7.2 ist ein Glossar zur Budgethilfe-Terminologie zu finden. 
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der Vergangenheit ein häufiger Kritikpunkt an Strukturanpassungsprogrammen gewesen. In Verbindung 
mit diesen nun souveränen Budgetentscheidungen der Regierung sollte diese verstärkt Rechenschaft über 
Erreichtes gegenüber den Bürgern und durch die Beurteilungen im Rahmen der PAF auch gegenüber den 
Gebern ablegen.  
Trotz der Erfolge und belegten Wirkungen begannen die Geber gegen Ende der 2000er aufgrund von 
Skandalen in den Empfängerländern und Rechenschaftszwängen zuhause die allgemeine Budgethilfe 
auszusetzen oder ganz zu beenden. Zahlreiche Evaluierungen und einige Synthesestudien belegen, dass 
Budgethilfe in der Tat wichtige entwicklungspolitische Wirkungen fördert, z.B. die Steigerung von Staats-
ausgaben in den sozialen Sektoren oder die Verbesserungen des öffentlichen Finanzwesens. Dennoch nahm 
die Bereitschaft, Budgethilfe bereitzustellen, aufgrund von politischen Veränderungen in den Geberländern 
hin zu konservativeren Regierungen ab und wurde mit Korruptionsskandalen, politischen Rückschlägen, 
makroökonomischer Destabilisierung und Verletzungen der Menschenrechte in verschiedenen Empfänger-
ländern begründet. Bis 2013 hatten fast alle bilateralen Geber ihre Budgethilfe-Programme eingestellt. 
Ziele - Evaluierungsfragen 
Ziel dieser Evaluierung war es zu analysieren, ob die Effekte von Budgethilfe4 den Ausstieg aus dieser 
Modalität überdauern und nachzuvollziehen, wie sich die EZ-Portfolios seit dem Ausstieg aus der 
Modalität verändert haben. Die Folgen des Ausstiegs aus EZ-Instrumenten auf Entwicklungsfortschritte 
werden erst seit Kurzem untersucht und bleiben generell unzureichend erforscht. In Kombination mit einer 
vorangegangenen Evaluationssynthese, die vorhandene Literatur zu Effekten der Budgethilfen systematisch 
analysiert (Orth et al., 2017), ist ein Vergleich der Auswirkungen der Budgethilfe vor und nach dem Ausstieg 
möglich. Die beiden zentralen Fragen dieser Evaluierung sind: 
 Wie verändern sich EZ-Portfolios und die Beziehungen zwischen Gebern und Partnern durch die 
Beendigung der allgemeinen Budgethilfe? 
 Überdauern die nachgewiesenen Effekte der Budgethilfe den Ausstieg aus der Modalität?5 
Die Zielgruppen dieser Evaluierung sind politische Entscheidungsträger in Deutschland und anderen 
Geberstaaten, bilaterale und multilaterale Geber sowie Durchführungsorganisationen. 
Methodik 
Diese theoriebasierte Evaluierung nutzt ein vergleichendes Fallstudiendesign, ergänzt durch einen 
innovativen Process Tracing-Ansatz. Vergleichende Fallstudiendesigns zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass 
sie zur umfassenden Analyse komplexer Interventionen geeignet sind, jedoch schwächer in Bezug auf die 
Prüfung der Kausalzusammenhänge sind. Um diese Einschränkung zu reduzieren, wurde die Methode dieser 
Evaluierung um Process Tracing erweitert. Das Process Tracing unterteilt die Kausalkette in kleinere Teile, 
die dann einfacher zu überprüfen sind. Es ist ein Ansatz, der besonders dazu geeignet ist, Fragen des ‚ob und 
wie‘ zu beantworten und eine große Zuverlässigkeit bei der Bestimmung von Kausalzusammenhängen zu 
bieten. 
Das Evaluierungsteam wählte kriterienbasiert Malawi, Uganda, Ruanda und Sambia als Fallstudien-
länder aus. Die Datenquellen waren semi-strukturierte Interviews, Budgetanalysen, Verwaltungsda-
ten und Länderberichte. Das Team führte 106 Interviews mit 145 Repräsentanten der Partnerregierungen, 
Gebern und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen (CSOs). Beraterinnen und Berater vor Ort erstellten in-
dividuellen Budgetanalysen. Sie verfügen über den bestmöglichen Zugang zu Budgetdaten. Die Länderfal-
 
4 In diesem Evaluierungsbericht beinhaltet der Begriff ‚Effekt ‘ alle Ergebnisse der Budgethilfe auf Output, Outcome und Wirkungsebene der Inter-
ventionslogik von Budgethilfe. 
5 Die Bewertungsgruppe verwendet eine eingeschränkte Definition von Nachhaltigkeit aus den Kriterien zur Bewertung der Entwicklungshilfe des 
Entwicklungshilfeausschusses der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (OECD DAC). Nach dieser Definition wird Nachhaltigkeit 
erreicht, wenn der Nutzen eines Programmes oder Projektes nach dem Ende der Gebermittel weiterbesteht (OECD DAC, 1991:2). 
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lauswahl wurde in einem zweistufigen indikatorbasierten Verfahren getroffen. Die Ergebnisse aus den Fall-
studien wurden im Anschluss an die Auswertung mit den Ergebnissen der Evaluationssynthese zur Wirk-
samkeit von Budgethilfe verglichen (Orth et al., 2017). 
Ergebnisse 
Der Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe in den vier Fallstudienländern erfolgte zwischen 2012 und 2014 als 
Reaktion auf Verletzungen grundlegender Konditionalitäten (underlying principles). Der ‚Ausstieg’ ist 
in dieser Evaluierung als die Aussetzung der Budgethilfezahlungen von mehreren Gebern über mehr als 
einen Budgethilfezyklus definiert. In Malawi führte 2013 eine massive Veruntreuung öffentlicher Mittel, be-
kannt unter dem Namen „Cashgate“, zu einem Ausstieg aller Geber aus der Budgethilfe. In Ruanda beende-
ten die meisten Geber ihre allgemeine Budgethilfe nachdem ein Bericht der Vereinten Nationen (UN) der 
ruandischen Regierung vorwarf, die Tutsirebellen in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo (DRC) finanziell 
zu unterstützen. In Uganda löste ein Korruptionsskandal im Amt des Premierministers den Ausstieg aller 
Geber aus. In Sambia war der Ausstieg ein allmählicher Prozess, der als Folge sich verschlechternder Leis-
tungen in Bezug auf die PAF-Indikatoren und durch Korruptionsskandale ausgelöst wurde. Alle diese Fälle 
hatten gemeinsam, dass eine Verletzung der zugrundeliegenden Prinzipien der Budgethilfe die Begründung 
der Geber für den Ausstieg war. Unter diesen Umständen war eine vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit mit 
den Partnerregierungen nicht länger möglich. Eine allgemein sinkende Bereitschaft Budgethilfe zu zahlen, 
könnte einen schnellen Ausstieg befördert haben. 
Allgemeine Budgethilfe war in allen vier Ländern von großer finanzieller Bedeutung, da sie den bud-
getären Spielraum der Regierungen erweiterte. Der Ausstieg aus dieser Modalität stellte daher einen 
spürbaren finanziellen Einschnitt dar. Im Jahr 2010 machte die allgemeine Budgethilfe mindestens 5% des 
Staatshaushalts der Partnerregierungen in den vier Ländern aus, in Malawi lag dieser Wert bei 21%. 2014 lag 
der Anteil der allgemeinen Budgethilfe am Haushalt in allen vier Ländern fast bei null. 
Politikdialog 
Der Ausstieg der Geber aus der allgemeinen Budgethilfe hat den Politikdialog zwischen Gebern und 
Partnern systematisch geschwächt und zu einem stark reduzierten oder fehlenden Austausch auf ho-
her politischer Ebene geführt. Der Politikdialog brach mit dem Ausstieg auf hoher politischer Ebene zu-
sammen und fand nur noch auf der technischen Ebene statt. Das Fehlen eines politischen Dialogs auf hoher 
politischer Ebene führte nicht nur zu weniger Austausch insgesamt, sondern beeinträchtigte auch die Qua-
lität des Dialogs auf der technischen Ebene. Auch die Beteiligung der Partnerregierungen an Geberprogram-
men und der Einfluss von Gebern auf die Politik der Partnerseite reduzierte sich. 
Harmonisierung 
Durch allgemeine Budgethilfe hatte sich die Harmonisierung zwischen den Gebern verbessert.6 Seit 
dem Ausstieg nahm die Geber-Harmonisierung in allen untersuchten Ländern ab und die EZ-Portfo-
lios wurden fragmentierter. Gebergemeinschaftliche Ansätze und programmbasierte Ansätze7 kamen nur 
noch in wenigen Bereichen zum Einsatz, obwohl die Partnerregierungen solche Ansätze bevorzugen. Die 
hohe Fragmentierung der EZ-Portfolios und Rebilateralisierung der EZ sind als problematisch einzustufen, 
da sie eine wirksamere EZ behindern. 
 
6 Die Intensivierung der Harmonisierung war jedoch nicht so ausgeprägt wie erwartet (Orth et al., 2017). 
7 Das Development Assistance Committee der OECD definiert programmbasierte Ansätze als eine Art von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, die auf 
den Prinzipien einer koordinierten Unterstützung der partnereigenen Programme basiert, wie nationale Entwicklungsstrategien, Sektorprogramme, 
thematische Programme oder Programme einer spezifischen Organisation (OECD DAC, 2008, p. 148). 
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Öffentliche Ausgaben 
Potentiell armutsrelevante Sektoren (z.B. Gesundheit, Bildung und Landwirtschaft) erhielten nach 
dem Ausstieg in den Fallstudienländern einen niedrigeren Anteil des Staatshaushaltes, mit der Aus-
nahme Sambias. Die Veränderung in der Budgetzusammensetzung wurde verursacht durch einen verstärk-
ten Fokus auf Wirtschaftswachstum im Falle Ugandas und Ruandas und hohe Schuldendienstverpflichtun-
gen im Falle Malawis. In Sambia blieb der Anteil von öffentlichen Ausgaben in sozialen Sektoren seit dem 
Ausstieg konstant. Eine Erklärung für diese Ausnahme ist, dass die Wahlkämpfe im Zeitraum 2014-2016 ei-
nen Anreiz geschaffen hatten, die Ausgaben in diesen Sektoren hoch zu halten. 
Öffentliches Finanzwesen 
Der Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe und der damit entstandene Handlungszwang hielt die Reforman-
strengungen im öffentlichen Finanzwesen in Malawi hoch, in Sambia und Uganda sanken die Refor-
manstrengungen als Folge des Ausstiegs. Die Reform des öffentlichen Finanzwesens blieb in Ruanda 
vom Ausstieg unberührt. In Malawi verursachte der Skandal, der zum Ausstieg aus der allgemeinen Budge-
thilfe geführt hatte, und die Aussicht auf einen möglichen Wiedereinstieg in die Budgethilfe bei Erfüllung 
der Konditionalität internen und externen Druck, der zur Verbesserung des öffentlichen Finanzwesens 
führte. Für Uganda und Sambia führte der Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe aufgrund fehlender externer Anreize 
zu einem Rückgang der Reformanstrengungen im öffentlichen Finanzwesen. Die Regierung Ruandas be-
trachtet das öffentliche Finanzwesen weiterhin als wichtiges Instrument zur Regierungsführung und treibt 
die Reform ungeachtet des Ausstiegs aus der Budgethilfe voran. 
Innerstaatliche Rechenschaftspflicht und Budgettransparenz 
Der Ausstieg aus der allgemeinen Budgethilfe führte dazu, dass die Regierungen Ugandas und Sam-
bias ihrer innerstaatlichen Rechenschaftspflicht weniger nachkamen, während in Malawi der Anreiz 
durch einen möglichen Wiedereinstieg in die Budgethilfe dafür sorgte, dass der Rechenschaftslegung 
etwas stärker nachgekommen wurde. Mit dem Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe nahm der Druck Externer, 
insbesondere der Geber, auf die Rechenschaftspflicht der Partnerregierung ab. In Uganda und Sambia führte 
der Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe dazu, dass der Einfluss zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen und des Par-
laments auf Haushaltsentscheidungen nachließ. In Malawi sorgte der Skandal und die Möglichkeit des Wie-
dereinstiegs bei Erfüllung von Vorbedingungen zu ausreichend externem Druck zu einer, wenn auch gering-
fügigen Verbesserung der innerstaatlichen Rechenschaftslegung. 
Gemessen an der Anzahl der veröffentlichten Dokumente verbesserte sich die Haushaltstransparenz 
in allen vier Ländern. Die Qualität der bereitgestellten Informationen verschlechterte sich jedoch in 
Folge des Ausstiegs. Die Qualität und Relevanz der Haushaltsinformation ging in Ruanda, Uganda und 
Sambia aufgrund fehlender Daten über Budgetausgaben durch den Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe zurück. In 
Malawi führte die Hinarbeit auf die Erfüllung von Konditionalität zum Wiedereinstieg in die Budgethilfe zu 
aufgearbeiteten Rückständen in Audit Berichten, welche die Basis für Haushaltstransparenz verbesserten. 
Bereitstellung öffentlicher Leistungen und Nicht-Einkommensarmut 
Die Befunde bezüglich der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Leistungen seit dem Ausstieg aus der Budget-
hilfe sind gemischt, von negativen über unveränderte bis hin zu positiven Auswirkungen des Aus-
stiegs. Die Ergebnisse basieren alle auf einer schwachen Datengrundlage und eine Kausalität kann 
nicht nachgewiesen werden. Für Malawi und Sambia weisen die wenigen verfügbaren Statistiken über 
Dienstleistungserbringung im Bereich Bildung auf negative Wirkungen des Ausstiegs hin. In Uganda zeigen 
sich nach dem Ausstieg gegenläufige Ergebnisse für Bildung je nach Indikator und in Ruanda verbesserte 
sich die Dienstleistungserbringung im Gesundheits- und Bildungsbereich nach dem Ausstieg leicht. 
Die Nicht-Einkommensarmut hat sich seit dem Ausstieg nicht verändert, allerdings sind Daten hierzu 
nur bis 2015 verfügbar und Langzeiteffekte noch nicht sichtbar. Die bisherigen Ergebnisse suggerieren, 
dass sich die Veränderungen in den armutsrelevanten öffentlichen Ausgaben als Folge des Ausstiegs bisher 
kaum oder gar nicht in Indikatoren für Nicht-Einkommensarmut niederschlagen. 
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Makroökonomische Leistung 
In allen vier Ländern sank das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) durch den Ausstieg kurzfristig und der 
Schuldenstand stieg an, da das durch den Wegfall der Budgethilfe-Zahlungen entstandene Defizit 
ausgeglichen werden musste. Die jährlichen BIP-Wachstumsraten sanken in allen Ländern (mit Aus-
nahme Malawis) nach dem Ausstieg in 2012 und 2013 und erreichten eine Rate nahe dem Durchschnitt 
für Sub-Sahara Afrika, während die Raten in den Vorjahren und den Folgejahren deutlich über dem 
regionalen Durchschnitt lagen. Die BIP-Wachstumsraten erholten sich rasch bei Ergreifung geeigneter 
Maßnahmen. Die Antwort der Regierungen auf den Ausstieg aus der allgemeinen Budgethilfe war die Erhö-
hung der inländischen Kreditaufnahme, um die ausgefallenen Zahlungen der allgemeinen Budgethilfe zu 
kompensieren. Nur Sambia erweiterte die externe Finanzierung nach dem Ausstieg. Für das stark EZ-abhän-
gige Malawi (15% des Haushalts wurden im Jahr vor dem Ausstieg durch die allgemeine Budgethilfe finan-
ziert) entstanden durch den Schuldenanstieg sehr hohe Schuldendienstkosten, die öffentliche Investitionen 
verdrängten. Finanzpolitische Anpassungen, d.h. Senkung der Ausgaben und/oder Steigerung der Einnah-
men, halfen Ruanda und Uganda bei der Minimierung des Haushaltsdefizits und einer schnellen Erholung 
nach dem Ausstieg. In Malawi und Sambia stiegen die Haushaltsdefizite weiter an und das Wachstum blieb 
niedrig. 
Robustheit der Budgethilfe-Effekte 
Die Analyse, basierend auf der Kombination aus vergleichendem Fallstudiendesign und Process Tra-
cing, zeigt, dass der Ausstieg aus der allgemeinen Budgethilfe meist negative Auswirkungen auf Po-
litiken und Strukturen hatte, die zuvor von der Einführung der allgemeinen Budgethilfe profitiert hat-
ten. Die Folgen des Ausstiegs aus der allgemeinen Budgethilfe sind besonders stark ausgeprägt in Bezug 
auf die verschlechterte Harmonisierung zwischen den Gebern, die erhöhte Fragmentierung der EZ-Portfo-
lios und den geschwächten Politikdialog. Die Wirkungen der Budgethilfe waren durchweg positiv in diesen 
Bereichen, wohingegen die Auswirkungen des Ausstiegs in allen vier Fallstudienländern negativ waren. Die 
Analyse zeigt außerdem große Differenzen in Bezug auf die öffentlichen Ausgaben, das öffentliche Finanz-
wesen und die makroökonomische Leistung auf. Die Folgen des Ausstiegs in diesen Bereichen variieren je-
doch zwischen den Ländern. Zum Beispiel blieben Reformen im öffentlichen Finanzwesen im Falle Ruandas 
stabil, während es in Uganda und Sambia zu Rückschlägen kam, aber in Malawi der mögliche Wiedereinstieg 
in die Budgethilfe Anreiz für Reformen schuf. Insgesamt nimmt der Reformfortschritt im öffentlichen Fi-
nanzwesen mit dem Wegfall von externer Beeinflussung ab. Bei der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Leistungen 
und Nicht-Einkommensarmut sind die Auswirkungen des Ausstiegs weniger deutlich, da die Evidenzbasis 
vor und nach dem Ausstieg nicht ausreichend ist (siehe Figure 1). 
Schlussfolgerungen 
Die Exit-Evaluierung zeigt, dass der umfassende und oftmals ungeplante Ausstieg von Gebern aus der all-
gemeinen Budgethilfe in den vier Fallstudienländern einen Großteil der meist positiven Effekte der Budge-
thilfe zunichtemachte. Die Ergebnisse zeigen auch, dass der Ausstieg und die damit verbundenen Verände-
rungen in den EZ-Portfolios Konsequenzen haben, die weit über die reine Aussetzung oder Reprogrammie-
rung finanzieller Unterstützung für Partnerregierungen hinausgehen: die Beziehungen zwischen Gebern 
und Partnerregierungen sowie zwischen den Gebern werden durch den Ausstieg erheblich negativ beein-
trächtigt, was wiederum negativ auf die Qualität und Effektivität der EZ in den Fall-Ländern wirkt.  
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Figure 1 Vergleich der Ergebnisse der Evaluationssynthese (links) mit der Exit-Evaluierung (rechts) 
 
 
Quelle: Eigene Darstellung, Icons von Dave Gandy, www.flaticon.com.  
Hinweis: Die Pfeile zeigen die Richtung und das Ausmaß der Effekte an. Senkrecht nach oben / unten weisende Pfeile zeigen einen 
stark positiven / negativen Effekt an. Diagonale Pfeile zeigen an, dass der Effekt überwiegend positiv / negativ ist. Waagerechte 
Pfeile zeigen an, dass es dort keine oder gegenläufige Effekte gab. Die Schattierung der Balken geben Auskunft über die Qualität 
der Evidenzbasis, von gut (blau), mittel (stark schraffiert) bis schwach (schwach schraffiert). 
Die Evaluierung zeigt zudem eine deutliche Verschlechterung der Geber-Koordinierung und -Harmonisie-
rung in den vier Fallstudienländern auf. Die Fragmentierung der EZ-Portfolios stellt eine Rückkehr zu alten 
Mustern dar, die z.T. zur Einführung von Budgethilfe geführt hatten. Projektansätze sind die vorherrschende 
Modalität in bilateralen EZ-Portfolios, gebergemeinschaftliche Ansätze hingegen sind selten und oftmals 
auf wenige Bereiche und Programme beschränkt. Gleichzeitig sind gebergemeinschaftliche Ansätze weiter-
hin erklärtermaßen die bevorzugte Modalität der Partnerregierungen, um externe Unterstützung für ihre 
Entwicklungsstrategien und -politiken zu erhalten. Die negativen externen Effekte und Kosten einer hohen 
Fragmentierung der EZ erschweren es den Gebern, auf systemische und übergeordnete Regierungsfragen 
einzuwirken und die Eigenverantwortung der jeweiligen Partnerregierung zu fördern. 
Als eine direkte Folge der Fragmentierung sank der Gebereinfluss auf die strategische Politikgestaltung und 
Reformagenden der Partnerregierungen. Darüber hinaus brach nicht nur der Dialog auf hoher politischer 
Ebene nach dem Ausstieg ab, sondern es verschlechterte sich auch die Qualität des Dialogs auf technischer 
Ebene als Folge des Ausstiegs. 
Die Beteiligung von Gebern in Politikformulierung und –monitoring der Partnerregierungen sank durch den 
Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe. Verstärkt durch den Wegfall der gegenseitigen Rechenschaftspflicht führte 
dies zu vermindertem Reformwillen der Partnerregierungen. Geber mit großer Finanzkraft haben größeren 
Einfluss als kleinere Geber, aber das Ausmaß variiert erheblich und hängt in erster Linie von der Höhe der 
finanziellen Beiträge der Geber ab bzw. von der zentralen Rolle des Gebers bei der Erbringung von Dienst-
leistungen, zum Beispiel im Gesundheitswesen.8 
 
8Nur im Falle des sehr von der EZ-Hilfe abhängigen Malawis brachte die Möglichkeit einer Wiedereinführung der allgemeinen Budgethilfe genügend 
Impulse um Reformen voranzutreiben. In den anderen drei Ländern gingen die Reformanstrengungen weiter, waren aber nicht dem Einfluss der 
Geber zuzuschreiben.  
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Im Durchschnitt machte Budgethilfe lediglich 10% der EZ-Zusagen (Official Development Assistance) der 
OECD-DAC-Geber aus. Dennoch wurden durch die Modalität positive Effekte in einer Reihe entwicklungs-
politisch relevanter Bereiche erzielt (z.B. öffentliche Ausgaben, öffentliches Finanzwesen, Umfang bereit-
gestellter öffentlicher Dienstleistungen und innerstaatliche Rechenschaftspflicht). Die Modalität schaffte 
zudem formalisierte Strukturen für den Politikdialog und Rahmenbedingungen für gegenseitige Rechen-
schaftspflicht (Orth et al., 2017). Andere Hilfsmodalitäten, die einen weitaus größeren Anteil der ODA aus-
machen, haben kaum ähnliche Erfolge auf systemischer Ebene aufzuweisen bzw. keine ähnlichen Erfolge bei 
vergleichbaren Kosten erreicht. Mit dem Ausstieg aus der allgemeinen Budgethilfe brachen die so etablier-
ten Strukturen jedoch größtenteils zusammen und der Großteil der positiven Wirkungen der Budgethilfe 
wurde negativ beeinträchtigt bzw. teils vollständig revidiert, obwohl die Gesamthöhe der EZ-Zahlungen na-
hezu konstant blieb. Die EZ-Portfolios der Geber sind seit dem Ausstieg aus der allgemeinen Budgethilfe 
stärker fragmentiert und schaffen offenbar keinen ausreichend großen Anreiz, um ähnlich formalisierte 
Strukturen für den Politikdialog und die gegenseitige Rechenschaftspflicht wie unter der Budgethilfe auf-
recht zu erhalten.  
Diese Entwicklungen stehen im Widerspruch zu den kürzlich verabschiedeten Agenden und Zielen der EZ, 
wie z.B. dem vierten hochrangigen Forum zur Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (OECD DAC, 
2011), den Zielen für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDG 17) (UN, 2017) und der Aktionsagenda von Addis Abeba 
zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung (UN, 2015). Diese Dokumente unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit von inklusi-
ven Partnerschaften, mehr Eigenverantwortung der Partnerregierungen und stärkerer Ausrichtung der Ent-
wicklungsstrategien am Partnerland.  
Einzelne Geberstrategien, wie z.B. Deutschlands ‚Marshallplan mit Afrika‘, bestätigen ebenso die Notwen-
digkeit „zu einer gemeinsamen, internationalen Strategie und einem abgestimmten Vorgehen [zu] kom-
men“ (BMZ, 2017, p. 13) und damit die Harmonisierung zwischen Gebern und die Eigenverantwortung der 
Partnerländer zu fördern.   
Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint es sehr unwahrscheinlich, dass Geber in der Lage sein werden, diese ehr-
geizigen Ziele und Prinzipien einzuhalten, ohne sich wieder verstärkt gemeinsamen integrierten Ansätzen 
der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zur Unterstützung partnereigener Strategien und Politiken zuzuwenden. 
Empfehlungen 
1 Das BMZ und andere bi- und multilaterale Geber sollten (wieder) gemeinsam integrierte politik-
basierte Ansätze zur Unterstützung der Entwicklungsstrategien der Partner nutzen. 
Das BMZ und andere bi- und multilaterale Geber sollten sich (wieder) an Ansätzen beteiligen, die die nati-
onalen Entwicklungspläne und Strategien zur Armutsbekämpfung der Partnerregierungen gemeinschaftlich 
und durch integrierten Instrumenteneinsatz unterstützen. Dies würde die Eigenverantwortung der Partner-
regierungen und die Ausrichtung der Geberprogramme an politischen Strategien der Partner stärken und 
damit eine auf Politiken der Partner gestützte Vorgehensweise fördern. Diese Ansätze sollten die gesamte 
Bandbreite der EZ-Instrumente in einem integrierten Ansatz kombinieren. 
Um die Agenda 2030 sowie bilaterale Geberstrategien, wie zum Beispiel Deutschlands „Marshallplan mit 
Afrika“ umzusetzen, die ein koordiniertes und gemeinsames Vorgehen vorsehen, sollten diese gemeinsa-
men politikbasierten Ansätze vom BMZ und anderen bi- und multilateralen Gebern verstärkt genutzt wer-
den. 
1a Das BMZ und andere bi- und multilaterale Geber sollten die Ansätze zur integrierten Bereitstel-
lung von Finanzierung, Technischer Zusammenarbeit, Politikdialog und gegenseitiger Rechen-
schaftspflicht so gestalten, dass eine gemeinsame koordinierte Umsetzung gewährleistet wird. 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Evaluierung bestätigen die vorhandene Evidenz, die besagt, dass die Kombination von 
finanziellen und nicht-finanziellen Beiträgen im Rahmen der Budgethilfe zu wichtigen Entwicklungsergeb-
nissen führt. Zukünftige EZ-Modalitäten sollten daher mindestens die folgenden Komponenten umfassen 
und integriert einsetzen: 
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 Formalisierte Dialogstrukturen 
 Technische Zusammenarbeit und Kapazitätsaufbau, um Engpässe in den Partnersystemen zu adres-
sieren, die eine effektive Formulierung und Umsetzung von Politiken und Reformen behindern. Die 
Zusammenarbeit mit den Partnerregierungen über die Beseitigung dieser Engpässe kann einerseits 
wesentliche Informationen hervorbringen, die den gemeinsamen Politikdialog befördern können. 
Gleichzeitig dient der Politikdialog dazu, die Technische Zusammenarbeit gezielter auf die Bedürf-
nisse des Partners ausrichten zu können und ihre Akzeptanz zu erhöhen. 
 Regeln für gegenseitige Rechenschaftspflicht, um die Koordinierung zwischen Gebern bei der Ent-
scheidungsfindung zu erhöhen. Gleichzeitig erlauben diese Regeln der Partnerregierung, ihre Ver-
pflichtungen besser bewältigen zu können. 
Außerdem sollte ein integrierter Ansatz fest auf den Prinzipien der Harmonisierung, Koordinierung und ge-
meinsamer Planung und Umsetzung beruhen. 
1b  Um die Effektivität einzelner Komponenten dieser integrierten Ansätze zu erhöhen, sollten die 
Geber und Partner daran arbeiten, die Evidenzlücken hinsichtlich der Wirkung einzelner Kompo-
nenten zu schließen. 
Die Evidenz zur Wirksamkeit von Budgethilfe zeigt, dass die Bestandteile von Budgethilfe-Programmen als 
Gesamtpaket positive Effekte mit sich bringen. Allerdings liegen weniger Erkenntnisse darüber vor, wie ge-
nau die einzelnen Komponenten wirken und damit auch darüber, wie deren Effektivität erhöht werden 
könnte. Zukünftige empirische Arbeiten sollten sich daher auf die Analyse kausaler Mechanismen der Teil-
komponenten konzentrieren, so dass integrierte politikbasierte Ansätze entwickelt werden können, die ef-
fektiver als bisherige allgemeine Budgethilfeprogramme sein können. 
2 BMZ, KfW, GIZ, andere bi- und multilaterale Akteure und Partnerregierungen sollten Strategien 
für einen koordinierten und sorgfältig gesteuerten Ausstieg aus integrierten politikbasierten An-
sätzen wie der Budgethilfe entwickeln. Dies ist insbesondere relevant, wenn z.B. aufgrund einer 
Verletzung der underlying principles ein plötzlicher und ungeplanter Ausstieg für erforderlich 
gehalten wird. 
Das Ziel einer Ausstiegsstrategie sollte sein, einen koordinierten und strukturierten Ausstieg zu gewährleis-
ten, um die Nachhaltigkeit der bisher erzielten Effekte nach Programmende sicherzustellen und negative 
Auswirkungen des Ausstiegs zu minimieren. Ein solcher Ausstieg sollte gleichzeitig so organisiert werden, 
dass das mit dem Ausstieg beabsichtigte politische Signal nicht abgeschwächt wird. Etablierte Prozesse und 
Strukturen, vor allem der Politikdialog und die Regelungen zur gegenseitigen Rechenschaftspflicht, sollten 
auch nach einem Ausstieg jedoch weitergeführt werden. 
2a  Auch während des Ausstiegs aus politikbasierten Ansätzen sollten das BMZ, andere bi- und mul-
tilaterale Geber und Partnerregierungen den Politikdialog weiterführen. 
Eine frühzeitige Kommunikation mit Interessenvertretern und ihre Beratung und Beteiligung, insbesondere 
der Partnerregierungen, zur Sicherstellung eines koordinierten Geberausstiegs ist während des Ausstiegs-
prozesses entscheidend. Der Politikdialog ist zwar formell an politikbasierte Modalitäten wie die Budget-
hilfe gebunden, jedoch kann ein Dialog inhaltlich und konzeptionell auch unabhängig von der Modalität 
erfolgen, um Indikatoren und Ziele der nationalen Entwicklungsstrategie des Partners aufzugreifen. 
Ohne integrierte politikbasierte Ansätze wie die Budgethilfe fehlt jedoch das verbindende Element zwi-
schen dem politischen und technischen Dialog. Das BMZ und andere bi- und multilaterale Geber sollten 
daher sicherstellen, möglicherweise durch Benennung eines den Dialog-führenden Gebers, dass der Dialog 
auf beiden Ebenen auf koordinierte Weise weitergeführt wird. 
2b  Während des Ausstiegs aus integrierten politikbasierten Ansätzen sollten das BMZ, andere bi- 
und multilaterale Geber und Partnerregierungen sicherstellen, dass die Regelungen zur gegen-
seitigen Rechenschaftspflicht weiterhin in Kraft bleiben. 
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Regelungen zur gegenseitigen Rechenschaftspflicht (z.B. Performance Assessment Framework) helfen bei 
der Definition von Verantwortlichkeiten und Zielen während des Ausstiegsprozesses. Das kann dabei hel-
fen, negative Auswirkungen des Ausstiegs zu minimieren. 
2c  Das BMZ und andere bi- und multilaterale Geber sollten bereit sein, mit kurzfristigen Sofortmaß-
nahmen akuten Finanzierungslücken, besonders in den sozialen Sektoren, zu begegnen. 
Ein plötzlicher Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe - bspw. aufgrund einer Verletzung der underlying principles - 
oder ähnlichen Modalitäten kann bedeuten, dass die Partnerregierung kurzfristig nicht in der Lage ist, un-
verzichtbare Ausgaben zu leisten, wie z.B. für Medikamente oder die Stromversorgung in Krankenhäusern. 
In solchen Fällen sollten die Geber bereit sein, Sofortmaßnahmen zum Ausgleich dieser Finanzierungslü-
cken zu ergreifen. Über eine effektive Zweckbindung der Maßnahmen muss gleichzeitig verhindert werden, 
dass das politische Signal des Ausstiegs aus der Modalität abgeschwächt wird. Beispielweise könnten Geber 
gemeinsame Kompensations-Fonds einrichten (etwa geberübergreifend für das jeweilige Land oder länder-
übergreifend für den jeweiligen Geber), mit denen diese Ausgaben - nicht zwingend über Regierungskanäle 
- finanziert werden können. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
By the turn of the millennium, the international community had begun to realize that to be effective 
development cooperation needed to take a multilevel and multidimensional approach, which should 
respect and implement a number of core principles such as country ownership, coordination and mu-
tual accountability. These principles were formulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(OECD DAC, 2005) and elsewhere in response to lessons learned from more than five decades of develop-
ment cooperation. A consensus emerged in the international community that effective approaches to de-
velopment cooperation had to bridge the gap between macro- and microlevel interventions by using the full 
range of instruments available (i.e. financial support, technical assistance, policy dialogue, and conditional-
ity). Further, they should comply with the Paris principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, mutual 
accountability and managing for results. 
These lessons were interpreted by the international community to imply that a new and more effec-
tive approach to development cooperation had to be in the form of an integrated application of fi-
nancial and technical support in tandem with high-level political and policy dialogue, which would 
ensure mutual accountability of donors and partner governments. One approach to implement this form 
of integrated policy-based development cooperation was in the form of multi-donor general budget support 
(GBS), which soon evolved into arguably the most prominent, but also most heatedly debated aid modality, 
in the 2000s.9 It is an aid modality, often provided by multiple development partners,10 to jointly support the 
partner government’s national poverty-reduction strategy and national development plan. It finances a part-
ner country’s budget through a transfer of resources into the general budget (GBS) or for specific sectors – 
so-called sector budget support (SBS)11. This financial input is supplemented by policy dialogue, condition-
ality, technical assistance and capacity development – the non-financial inputs. Policy dialogue addresses 
overarching issues such as budget decisions at a high political level. The conditionality consists of the un-
derlying principles and the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). Underlying principles, for example, 
include macroeconomic stability or policies with respect to democratic principles and human rights. The 
PAF is developed in collaboration with the partner government to measure the reform progress. Capacity 
development provides technical assistance on issues addressed through budget support, such as public fi-
nancial management (PFM) or domestic accountability. 
Budget support was considered best suited to implement the principles for effective aid and to avoid 
its fragmentation. Between 2006 and 2010, European donor countries alone (either bilaterally or through 
the European Commission) provided some EUR 15.5 billion in budget support to partner countries (Orth et 
al., 2017). According to the modality’s intervention logic, budget support was expected to reduce transaction 
costs and increase the predictability of aid flows. It would also maintain national sovereignty because policy 
reforms are autonomously developed and not dictated by donors, which was a common criticism of struc-
tural adjustment programmes. In this way, the government is held accountable to the citizens through 
budget decisions and to donors based on the PAF. A number of evaluations and synthesis studies provided 
evidence that budget support indeed positively supports important development outcomes, e.g. increases 
in pro-poor spending and improvements in public financial management. 
Despite its benefits and successes, donors started to suspend and exit from GBS around 2010 due to 
scandals in the recipient countries and accountability pressures at home. Owing to a shift towards more 
 
9 In a parallel development, aid donors such as Germany also had begun to implement a much more holistic – or ‘multilevel’ – approach to project-
based aid by combining interventions at micro-, meso- and macrolevel in order to bridge the diagnosed gaps between earlier approaches. 
10 The European Commission and the European Member States often provided joint or multi-donor budget support, while the World Bank, IMF and 
some bilateral donors provided budget support also as a single donor. 
11 See Annex 2 for a glossary on budget support terminology. 
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conservative governments in the donor countries and corruption scandals, political setbacks, macroeco-
nomic destabilization and human rights violations in various recipient countries, the appetite for budget 
support started to decline. By 2013, nearly all bilateral donors had stopped their GBS programmes. 
Objective – evaluation questions 
The aim of this evaluation is to understand whether effects of budget support12 are robust against the 
exit from this modality and to understand how the aid portfolios are changing after the exit. The 
consequences of ending aid for sustaining development effects have only recently started to gain attention, 
and potential effects of the exit from aid modalities on programme results remain generally under-re-
searched. The two central questions for this evaluation are: 
 How do aid portfolios and the relationship between donors and partners change in the context of 
ending GBS? 
 Are proven effects of budget support robust against the exit from the modality?13 
The target audience of this evaluation is policymakers in Germany and other donor countries, bilat-
eral and multilateral donors, as well as implementing agencies. 
Methodology 
This theory-based evaluation uses a comparative case study design, complemented by an innovative 
process tracing approach. Comparative case study designs are known to be comprehensive and suitable 
to evaluate complex interventions, but weaker regarding testing causal attributions. To address this limita-
tion the method of this evaluation, the team augmented it with process tracing. Process tracing breaks the 
causal channel into smaller ‘pieces’ which are then easier to test. It is an approach particularly suited to 
answer ‘if’ and ‘how’ questions and provides higher confidence in the attribution of the effect. 
The evaluation team selected Malawi, Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia as case study countries. The team 
collected evidence through semi-structured interviews, tailored-made budget analysis, administra-
tive data and country reports in these countries. The team conducted 106 interviews with 145 represent-
atives of the partner government, donors and civil society organizations (CSOs). Local consultants created 
custom-made budget analysis so that access to budget data was possible. The country cases were selected 
in a two-step criteria-based process. . In combination with a previous evaluation that synthesized the liter-
ature on the effects of budget support (Orth et al., 2017), a before-and-after exit comparison of budget sup-
port effects is possible. (Orth et al., 2017). 
Results 
The exit occurred between 2012 and 2014 in the four case study countries in response to breaches 
budget support conditionality (underlying principles). ‘Exit’ is defined as a suspension of more than one 
budget support cycle – usually a fiscal year – by several donors, so that suspensions can be differentiated 
from single delays in payment. In Malawi, a massive theft of public funds, known as the Cashgate scandal, 
led in 2013 to the exit of all donors. Donors suspended their GBS in Rwanda after a United Nations (UN) 
report exposed Rwanda’s support of a Tutsi rebel movement in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In 
Uganda, a corruption scandal in the Office of the Prime Minister triggered the exit of all donors. In Zambia, 
the exit was a gradual process that occurred in response to declining performance in the PAF indicators and 
corruption scandals. All these cases had in common that a breach of the underlying principles of budget 
support served as a justification for the exit. Under these circumstances, a trustful cooperation with the 
 
12 In this evaluation report, the term ‘effect’ integrates all budget support results on output, induced output, outcome and impact level of the budget 
support intervention logic. 
13 The evaluation team employs a narrow definition of sustainability from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) criteria for evaluating development assistance. According to this definition, sustainability is achieved 
if the benefits of a programme or project ‘continue after donor funding ceased’ (OECD DAC, 1991:2). 
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partner governments was no longer possible. Political factors and declining appetite for budget support 
might have spurred a fast exit. 
The importance of GBS for the national budgets was high in all four countries, as it expanded the 
fiscal space for governments; the exit from the modality therefore had noticeable financial conse-
quences. In 2010, GBS covered at least 5% of the central government expenditure in all four countries; in 
Malawi, this value was as high as 21%. By 2014, the share of GBS in the budget had virtually become zero in 
all four countries. 
Policy dialogue 
The exit from multi-donor GBS has weakened the policy dialogue between donors and partners, lead-
ing to a strongly reduced or absent exchange of ideas at a high political level. The high-level policy 
dialogue collapsed and the dialogue shifted to a technical level. This absence of a high-level political dia-
logue not only led to fewer opportunities for dialogue but also impaired the quality of the dialogue at the 
technical level. In addition, government involvement in donors’ programmes declined and the influence of 
donors on policies was minimal or not structured. 
Harmonization 
During the GBS period, harmonization increased,14 but since the exit, donor harmonization declined 
across all studied countries and donor approaches and programmes became more fragmented. Aid 
became fragmented as joint funding or programme-based approaches15 only occurred in few sectors, in spite 
of the governments’ preference for such approaches. The high fragmentation in donors’ aid portfolio and 
re-bilateralization of development cooperation is problematic because it undermines aid effectiveness. 
Public expenditure 
Potentially poverty-relevant sectors (i.e. health, education and agriculture) received a lower share of 
the total budget after the exit from GBS in the case study countries, except for Zambia. The change in 
the budget composition was caused by policy changes towards productivity growth in the case of Uganda 
and Rwanda and huge debt service obligations in the case of Malawi. In Zambia, the share of public expendi-
ture remained constant since the exit. One explanation, but possibly not the only one, for this exception is 
that ongoing election campaigns throughout the 2014-2016 period created an incentive to keep the expendi-
ture high. 
Public financial management 
The exit from GBS and the resulting need for action led to increases in PFM reform efforts in Malawi, 
while the PFM reform efforts declined in Zambia and Uganda in consequence of the exit. In Rwanda, 
PFM reform efforts were not influenced by the exit from GBS. In Malawi, the scandal leading to the exit 
from GBS and the potential relaunch of budget support given the fulfilment of conditionality, caused inter-
nal and external pressure. This internal and external pressure led to improvements of the PFM system. For 
Uganda and Zambia, the omission of external pressure as a consequence of the exit from GBS led to a de-
terioration of the PFM reform efforts. The Rwanda government continues to regard PFM as a key govern-
ance tool and is the main driver of the reform regardless of the exit from GBS. 
 
14  The increase in harmonization, however, was not as high as expected (Orth et al., 2017). 
15  The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) defines PBA as ‘a way 
of engaging in development co-operation based on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such 
as a national development strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation’ (OECD DAC, 2008, p. 
148). 
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Domestic accountability and budget transparency 
The exit from GBS led to a decrease in domestic accountability in Uganda and Zambia, while the 
incentive for a potential relaunch of budget support caused higher domestic accountability efforts in 
Malawi. The exit from GBS reduced the pressure from external actors, particularly donors, on the compli-
ance with domestic accountability requirements. The exit also negatively affected the demand-side in 
Uganda and Zambia as the influence of CSOs and parliament on budget decisions decreased in consequence 
of the exit. In Malawi, the scandal and a possible re-entry into GBS given the fulfilment of preconditions led 
to sufficient pressure to slightly increase domestic accountability.  
Budget transparency improved in all four countries if measured by the quantity of published docu-
ments. However, the quality of the provided information decreased due to the exit from GBS. The 
quality and relevance of budget information in Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia declined due to a lack of access 
to accurate budget expenditure data or easy-to-interpret data in consequence of the exit. In Malawi, efforts 
to fulfil the conditionality linked to the possible relaunch of GBS led to the removal of the backlog in audit 
reports, which helped to improve the basis for future budget transparency and hence the quality of the 
provided information. 
Service delivery and non-income poverty 
Results for service delivery are mixed since the exit from GBS, ranging from negative over negligible 
effects to slightly positive effects, but are from a thin data base and do not allow for conclusions on 
causality. For Malawi and Zambia, the few available statistics on education service delivery hint towards a 
negative development after the exit. In Uganda, results for education are diverging depending on the indi-
cator and in Rwanda service delivery in health and education is improving. 
Non-income poverty has so far been robust to the exit from GBS, but data on non-income poverty is 
only available up until 2015, and long-term effects are not yet visible. It appears that changes in poverty-
relevant public expenditure due to the exit only had a negligible or no effect on non-income poverty thus 
far. 
Macroeconomic performance 
In all four countries, the gross domestic product (GDP) growth declined in the short run due the exit 
and the level of debt increased to offset the shortfall in multi-donor GBS payments. The annual GDP 
growth rates fell in all countries (except for Malawi) following the exit in 2012 and 2013 and reached 
growth rates close to the sub-Saharan average, while in previous and subsequent years the growth 
rates had been much higher than the regional average. The GDP growth rates recovered quickly if the 
government took adequate measures. The common response to the exit from GBS was to increase domestic 
borrowing to substitute the GBS payments. Only Zambia expanded external financing after the exit. For the 
highly aid-dependent Malawi (15% of the budget was financed through GBS in the year before the exit), the 
debt increase created extremely high debt service costs, which crowded out other public investment. Fiscal 
adjustment, that is, decreasing expenditure and/or increasing revenues, helped Rwanda and Uganda to min-
imize the fiscal deficit and recover quickly after the exit. Malawi and Zambia accumulated high fiscal deficits 
and their GDP growth remained low. 
Robustness of effects 
The analysis, based on the combination of the comparative case study design and process tracing, 
shows that the exit from GBS led to negative developments in most policies and structures that had 
benefited from the introduction of GBS. The consequences of the exit from GBS are most pronounced 
for a decrease in harmonization, higher fragmentation of the aid portfolio and weakened policy dialogue. 
Effects of budget support during the budget support period are consistently positive, whereas after the exit 
these effects became negative in all of the four case studies. The analysis further shows large differences 
for public expenditure, PFM and macroeconomic performance; but for these areas, the outcomes after the 
exit vary between the countries. For example, PFM remained constant in the case of Rwanda, while Uganda 
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and Zambia experienced a decline and the possible relaunch of GBS in Malawi stimulated the reform effort. 
Overall, the PFM reform effort decreased due to a lack of external pressure since the exit. For service deliv-
ery and non-income poverty, the repercussions are less clear, because the evidence base before and after 
the exit is not sufficient (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Comparison of results of the evaluation synthesis (left) with the exit evaluation (right) 
 
Source: own, icons provided by Dave Gandy from www.flaticon.com.  
Note: The arrows indicate the effect direction and effect magnitude. Arrows facing vertically up/down indicate a strong posi-
tive/negative effect. Diagonal arrows indicate that the effect is predominantly positive/negative. Horizontal arrows indicate that 
there were no or contradictory effects. The shading of the bars indicated the quality of the evidence base from good (solid), me-
dium (darker shade) to weak (lighter shade). 
Conclusions 
This evaluation finds that the broad and mostly unplanned exit from multi-donor GBS in the four case study 
countries undid most positive effects associated with the provision of budget support in those countries. 
The findings also show that the exit from multi-donor GBS and the associated changes in aid portfolios have 
implications that reach far beyond the mere suspension or reprogramming of financial support for partner 
governments: the exit negatively affects the overall relationship between donors and partner governments 
as well as between donors and thus the overall quality and effectiveness of development cooperation in 
those countries. 
The evaluation observes a substantial deterioration of donor coordination and harmonization across the 
four case studies, with an almost full reversal to levels of aid fragmentation that most development experts 
on both sides of the aid relation had believed to be a thing of the past. Stand-alone project-type funding is 
the prevailing modality in bilateral aid portfolios. Joint funding, in turn, is rare and limited to a few sectors 
and programmes, despite budget support still being the preferred modality for partner governments to re-
ceive external support for their development strategies and policies. The negative externalities and costs of 
high fragmentation of aid make it difficult for donors to create ownership of the partner government and 
to address systematic and broader governance issues. As a direct consequence of this, there was a substan-
tial decrease in donors’ influence on partner governments’ strategic policy formulation and reform agendas. 
The diminished involvement of donors in policy planning and monitoring, in combination with the absence 
of a framework for mutual accountability since the exit, translates into a more limited reform commitment 
of partner governments to combat poverty. Large providers of external assistance still have some leverage, 
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but the extent of this varies substantially and hinges primarily on the amount of the donors’ financial con-
tributions or the donors’ central role in the provision of services, for example in health.16 
Budget support on average only accounted for 10% of official development assistance (ODA) across all DAC 
donor countries. Yet it achieved positive effects in a number of important areas for development (including 
public expenditure, PFM, service delivery quantity and the supply-side of domestic accountability); man-
aged to create formalized structures for policy dialogue; and established a framework for mutual accounta-
bility (Orth et al., 2017), which other aid modalities that account for much larger shares of ODA have not 
been able to achieve in a similar way and at comparable cost. With the exit from GBS, although the total 
level of aid receipts remained constant in most countries, the established structures largely disappeared 
and the majority of positive achievements of budget support were negatively affected or even reversed. 
Donors’ aid portfolios are more fragmented since the exit from GBS and apparently do not provide sufficient 
incentive to maintain similar formalized structures for policy dialogue and mutual accountability. 
These developments are at odds with recently adopted agendas, including the Fourth High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness (OECD DAC, 2011), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 17) (UN, 2017) and the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda on financing the SDGs (UN, 2015), underscore the need of inclusive partnerships, 
enhanced ownership of partner governments and stronger alignment of strategies.  
Individual donor strategies, such as Germany’s ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’ – also acknowledge the need to 
‘develop a common, international strategy and take a coordinated approach’ (BMZ, 2017, p. 13) and thus aim 
to increase harmonization among donors and ownership of the partner countries.   
It seems highly unlikely that donors will be able to live up to the ambitious goals and principles formulated 
in these agendas unless they jointly re-engage in integrated approaches to development cooperation. 
Recommendations 
1 Bilateral and multilateral donors should jointly (re)engage in integrated policy-based approaches 
to support partner development strategies. 
Bilateral and multilateral donors should (re)engage in joint approaches that support the national develop-
ment plans and poverty-reduction strategies of the partner government to ensure ownership and better 
alignment of donors’ programmes to these strategies, thus being policy based. The approaches should com-
bine the whole spectrum of instruments in an integrated approach. 
The global agenda 2030 as well as individual donors’ strategies, such as Germany’s Marshall Plan with Africa, 
that focus on coordination and concerted action will have to rely on such joint policy-based approaches to 
be successfully implemented. 
1a  Bilateral and multilateral donors should design such approaches around the integrated provision 
of funding, technical assistance, policy dialogue and mutual accountability that ensure jointly 
coordinated implementation. 
The findings from this exit evaluation support the existing evidence that the integrated mix of inputs as is 
provided through budget support lead to important developmental outcomes. Future aid modalities should 
thus integrate at least the following inputs: 
 A formalized dialogue. 
 Targeted technical assistance and capacity development that addresses the main bottlenecks in 
partner systems that hinder the effective formulation and implementation of policies and reforms. 
Technical assistance and policy dialogue generate important synergies. On one hand, working with 
partner governments on the bottlenecks generates important information that feeds into the joint 
 
16  Only in the case of highly aid-dependent Malawi did the possibility of a relaunch of GBS provide sufficient incentives to push for reforms. In the 
other three countries, reform efforts continued, but were not attributable to donor influence. 
xxii    Executive summary   
policy dialogue, and on the other hand, the policy dialogue strengthens the targeting and ac-
ceptance by partners of the technical assistance activities. 
 A framework for mutual accountability that serves to enhance donors’ coordination in decision mak-
ing. At the same time, this framework allows the partner government to predict the volume of dis-
bursements and assume its responsibilities. 
Furthermore, any such integrated approach should be based on the principles of harmonization, coordina-
tion, and joint planning and implementation. 
1b  In order to improve the design of such integrated approaches and its’ individual components, 
donors and partners should invest in closing evidence gaps regarding the effectiveness of indi-
vidual inputs. 
While evidence strongly suggests that the described ‘package’ of inputs works to produce important devel-
opment outcomes, there is less understanding how exactly the individual inputs work together and, there-
fore, how to improve this interaction. Future empirical work should thus focus on the analysis of causal 
mechanisms for specific inputs so that integrated policy-based approaches can be designed to be even more 
effective than previous GBS programmes. 
2 Bilateral and multilateral donors together with partner governments should develop strategies 
for the coordinated and carefully managed exit from integrated policy-based approaches such as 
budget support, even and especially for those cases when a sudden and unplanned exit is war-
ranted, e.g. due to a breach of underlying principles. 
The goal of an exit strategy should be to structure a coordinated exit, ensure sustainable programme effects 
even after the programme ends, and minimize negative repercussions of the exit. Such an exit should be 
organized as a coordinated withdrawal of donors and without diluting the political signal intended with the 
exit. Established processes and structures, most importantly the policy dialogue and the arrangements for 
mutual accountability, should be continued. 
2a  Throughout the exit from integrated policy-based approaches, bilateral and multilateral donors 
and partner governments should continue the policy dialogue. 
Early communication, consultation and involvement of stakeholders – most importantly of the partner gov-
ernment – is crucial throughout the exit to ensure a coordinated retreat of donors. The policy dialogue was 
formally tied to policy-based modalities such as budget support, but content-wise and on a conceptual level, 
the dialogue can take place independently of the modality. It could serve to discuss aims and indicators of 
the national development strategy. 
However, without integrated policy-based approaches such as budget support, the connectional element in 
the policy and technical dialogue is lacking. Bilateral and multilateral donors, possibly by nominating a lead 
donor, have to ensure that dialogue at the policy and technical levels continues in a coordinated manner. 
2b  Throughout the exit from integrated policy-based approaches, bilateral and multilateral donors 
and partner governments should ensure that arrangements for mutual accountability remain in 
place. 
To minimize negative repercussions of the exit, the arrangements for mutual accountability (e.g. a Perfor-
mance Assessment Framework) help to define responsibilities and targets throughout the exit. 
2c  Bilateral and multilateral donors should be prepared to adopt immediate, short-term measures 
to deal with acute shortfalls in indispensable spending, particularly in the social sectors. 
Where the sudden exit from budget support (e.g. because of a breach of underlying principles) or similar 
modalities means that the partner government would in the short run not be able to fund crucial expendi-
tures, such as for medication and electricity in hospitals, bilateral and multilateral donors should be pre-
pared to adopt immediate measures to counterbalance these shortfalls in indispensable spending. Through 
effective earmarking this should be done in a way as not to dilute the political signal intended to be given 
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with the exit. This might imply that donors would need to jointly build compensation funds (either jointly at 
the country level or across countries) from which to fund such expenditure, not necessarily through govern-
ment channels. 
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By the turn of the millennium, the international community had begun to realize that for development co-
operation to be effective, it had to take a multilevel and multidimensional approach, and respect and imple-
ment a number of core principles such as country ownership, coordination and mutual accountability. These 
principles were formulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD DAC, 2005) and else-
where. 
Earlier approaches to development cooperation had attempted to overcome the multidimensional develop-
ment challenges in poor countries from two angles. First, by intervening through project-type interventions 
aimed at tackling financial and technical resource constraints at individual or institutional level, which held 
back the poor from engaging in more productive economic activities. Second, by providing support at a 
macrolevel (in particular through so-called structural adjustment programmes) in order to rectify economic 
fundamentals and foster economic growth in the hope that economic gains would ‘trickle down’ to the gen-
eral population in the medium run. 
Both approaches had limited success in bringing about sustainable large-scale socioeconomic development 
in aid recipient countries. The blame for this was soon laid at the highly fragmented donor landscape that 
had emerged over the decades as a result of these approaches being applied in isolation by each donor 
country. It was further criticized that each approach failed to take the multidimensional and multilevel na-
ture of development challenges sufficiently into account and involved only a limited set of instruments; and 
that both approaches had largely failed to respect the aforementioned principles. In extension of this in-
sight, a consensus emerged in the international community that effective approaches to development co-
operation had to do both. They should bridge the gap between macro- and microlevel interventions by using 
the full range of instruments available (i.e. financial support, technical assistance, policy dialogue and con-
ditionality). Further, they should apply to the largest degree possible the lessons learned from more than 
five decades of development cooperation by respecting the Paris principles ownership, alignment, harmo-
nization, mutual accountability and managing for results. 
Taken together, these lessons were interpreted to imply that a new and more effective approach to devel-
opment cooperation had to be in the form of an integrated application of financial and technical support in 
tandem with high-level political and policy dialogue and provisions to ensure mutual accountability of do-
nors and partner governments. One approach to implement this form of integrated policy-based develop-
ment cooperation was in the form of multi-donor general budget support (GBS), which soon evolved into 
arguably the most prominent, but also most heatedly debated, aid modality in the 2000s.17 Between 2006 
and 2010, European donor countries alone (either bilaterally or through the European Commission) provided 
some EUR 15.5 billion in budget support to partner countries (Orth et al., 2017). At the same time, donor 
governments came under increasing domestic pressure in view of commonly assumed risks associated with 
the provision of budget support, which many perceived as a way of providing large sums of money to corrupt 
governments with no control or accountability over the use of these funds. 
Despite the fact that numerous evaluations and synthesis studies of budget support provide strong evi-
dence that the integrated provision of financial and non-financial inputs was effective in supporting im-
portant development outcomes and in implementing the principles for effective aid (see Orth et al., 2017), 
most bilateral donors in recent years as a consequence withdrew from the aid modality. By the time of exit, 
however, GBS had already profoundly changed development cooperation and budget composition in the 
countries receiving it, potentially leading to significant disruptions. Not only was the share of central gov-
ernment expenditure covered by GBS of major importance for the national budgets of many recipient coun-
tries, extensive accompanying structures – most prominently the policy dialogue18 – were established as 
well. The consequences of ending aid for sustaining developmental effects have only recently started to 
 
17 In a parallel development, aid donors such as Germany also had begun to implement a much more holistic – or ‘multilevel’ – approach to project-
based aid by combining interventions at micro-, meso- and macrolevel in order to bridge the diagnosed gaps between earlier approaches. 
18 See Annex 2 for a glossary on budget support terminology. 
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gain attention in the literature.19 The potential effects of the exit from aid modalities on programme results 
remain generally under-researched despite this recent raise of awareness (Slob and Jerve, 2008). 
It is therefore important to understand the consequences of the exit,20 and its implications for the future of 
an integrated policy-based development cooperation. Against this background, this evaluation analyses the 
effects21 of ending GBS on development outcomes and provides recommendations for an exit strategy and 
for a policy-based development cooperation. 
This analysis of exit effects builds on the results of a comprehensive evaluation synthesis on the effective-
ness of budget support conducted by DEval (Orth et al., 2017). Based on the systematic analysis of 95 
sources, this evaluation synthesis finds that the integrated combination of financial and non-financial inputs 
in multi-donor GBS is an adequate instrument to achieve important development outcomes. Those positive 
effects include increased levels of public spending in the health and education social sectors, improved PFM, 
a strengthened supply-side of domestic accountability and a rise in service delivery quantity. 
This evaluation assesses the effects of ending GBS at two levels: 
1 The consequences of ending GBS; and 
2 The robustness of budget support effects by comparing the effectiveness of budget support with 
the effects that remain after the exit by asking the following two evaluation questions: 
Question 1: How do aid portfolios and the relationship between donors and partners change in 
the context of ending GBS? 
Question 2:  Are proven effects of budget support robust against the exit from the modality?22 
To answer the evaluation questions, a case specific-approach was chosen, analysing the effects of the exit 
from GBS in four country case studies – Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. 
While this evaluation sheds light on the consequences of the exit and the robustness of budget support 
effects, the exit from the modality can also serve as a means to confirm that budget support programmes 
were responsible for the observed changes in the first place (quasi-counterfactual). Due to methodological 
difficulties, the attribution of effects to budget support programmes is normally a challenge in evaluations. 
Although the exit from the modality is not a real counterfactual, it can provide more certainty that budget 
support programmes caused or at least contributed to the observed effects. The team can infer the origin 
of the effects by comparing outcomes during ongoing budget support programmes with the effects after 
the exit. To illustrate this with an example: there is very strong evidence of a positive correlation between 
budget support and improvements in countries’ public financial management (PFM), yet in theory, a third 
variable might be causing the improvements in PFM. Now, if the exit-effect on PFM is negative, this provides 
additional confidence that the correlation between budget support and PFM is positive and causal, i.e. 
budget support leads to improvements in PFM. 
In conjunction, the evaluation synthesis mentioned above (Orth et al., 2017) and this evaluation on the exit 
from GBS aim to contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness and robustness of the modality, 
and the consequences of donors’ exit from GBS. Budget support successes, failures and the exit case are 
used to provide recommendations on suitable design and implementation for future integrated policy-based 
approaches as well as strategies for an exit from on-budget aid instruments. 
The findings and recommendations from this evaluation are directed towards policymakers in Germany, 
other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions, as well as towards implementing agencies. The results 
 
19  See for example the evaluation by de Kemp and Lobbrecht, 2015 on the effects of cuts in bilateral aid and the withdrawal of countries. 
20  Situation in countries where GBS has been suspended for a prolonged period or completely stopped while other forms of programme and/or 
project-type interventions are still provided. 
21  The term ‘effects’ comprises all levels of the intervention logic for budget support: outputs, induced outputs, outcomes and impacts. 
22  The evaluation team employs a narrow definition of sustainability from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) criteria for evaluating development assistance. According to this definition, sustainability is achieved 
if the benefits of a programme or project ‘continue after donor funding ceased’ (OECD DAC, 1991:2). 
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of this evaluation are also relevant for stakeholders in partner countries who may need to proactively man-
age donors’ exit from budget support or other forms of integrated policy-based development cooperation, 
as well as academia, in the wider field of aid effectiveness research. 
Structure of the report 
In order to understand both history and current situation of budget support, Chapter 2 provides context 
information on the modality as well as the results on the effectiveness of it as found by DEval’s systematic 
evaluation synthesis (Orth et al., 2017). Chapter 3 explains the evaluation design and the methodology of 
the evaluation. The exit from GBS in the four case study countries and its impact are described in Chapter 
4. Chapter 5 presents summary findings, discusses the consequences of the exit from GBS along main the-
matic areas and analyses which proven budget support effects were robust against the exit across the four 
case studies. Conclusions and recommendations for future forms of integrated policy-based approaches are 
presented in Chapter 6. To provide a summary of relevant background information and findings per country, 
the evaluation team further produced ‘country sheets’ for each of the four country case studies. These coun-
try sheets can be found on DEval’s website at www.deval.org. 
This evaluation addresses a large variety of readers ranging from policymakers, to bi- and multilateral donors 
and implementing agencies. Therefore, some chapters might be more relevant for some readers than other 
chapters. To facilitate a more efficient reading experience, this report can be read from beginning to end or 
selectively according to the reader’s prime interest. Figure 3 provides reading instructions for the selective 
reader. 
Figure 3 Reading manual 
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To date, the most widely used aid modality designed in line with the idea of providing closely coordinated 
integrated policy-based support to partner countries is multi-donor general budget support, or GBS. This 
section outlines the general characteristics of budget support and the evolution of this aid modality. 
The debate on aid effectiveness 
In response to insufficiencies in the effectiveness of international development, Western donors around the 
turn of the millennium began to fundamentally rethink the way aid should be provided in the future 
(Koeberle et al., 2006; OECD DAC, 2005). 
Up until the late 1990s, approaches to development cooperation had attempted to overcome the multidi-
mensional development challenges in poor countries from two angles: (a) by intervening through project-
type interventions at individual or institutional level; and (b) by providing support at a macrolevel, in partic-
ular through so-called structural adjustment programmes (SAP). 
Both approaches, however, had come under increasing criticism. The blame for this was laid at the highly 
fragmented donor landscape that had emerged over the decades as a result of the two approaches – project-
type interventions and SAP – being applied in isolation by each donor country. Further, SAPs – devised by 
the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) – offered conces-
sional loans to indebted or bankrupt countries. These loans were based on the condition that the recipient 
government implements a pre-defined set of macroeconomic and political reforms. However, the SAPs did 
not achieve their goals to reshape economic governance in the recipient countries. This was often explained 
by the intrusive nature of the sometimes harsh SAP conditionality, but also the failure to support the nec-
essary ownership and political, administrative and technical capacity necessary to implement and follow 
through with the prescribed reforms (Easterly, 2005; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998; OECD DAC, 2005). 
By the late 1990s, therefore, the increasingly heated debate on the potential and real effectiveness of inter-
national aid had slowly found its way from academic circles on to the international policy arena, increasing 
the pressure on Western donors to devise a new model of cooperation, building on the lessons learned from 
previous decades of development aid. This learning process cumulated in the formulation of the Paris Dec-
laration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 (OECD DAC, 2005) that prescribes five principles for effective aid:23 
 ownership of partner governments 
 alignment of donor programmes with partner governments’ goals and priorities 
 harmonization of programmes among donors 
 results-orientation 
 mutual accountability 
The Paris Declaration identified the so-called programme-based approaches (PBAs) as most suitable to im-
plement the effectiveness criteria.24 PBAs had been developed in the 1990s, but were only marginally used 
before the Paris Declaration in 2005 (Sida, 2008). 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Commit-
tee (OECD DAC) defines PBA as ‘a way of engaging in development co-operation based on the principles of 
 
23  The international community, under increasing participation of the partner countries, reconfirmed their commitment to an effective and results-
based development cooperation in the conferences of Accra (2008), Busan (2011), Mexico (2014) and Nairobi (2016). To track the progress in the 
implementation of the principles and the use of suitable approaches to development cooperation, a monitoring system was established after the 
Paris Declaration in 2005. In the meantime, the international community, under increasing participation of the partner countries, confirmed their 
commitment to an effective and results-based development cooperation in the conferences of Accra (2008), Busan (2011), Mexico (2014) and 
Nairobi (2016). The monitoring system of the Paris Declaration was replaced by the monitoring of the Global Partnership for Effective Develop-
ment Cooperation, tracking progress in effective development cooperation until today (OECD/UNDP, 2016). 
24  In parallel, further reforms and adaptations to development cooperation were pursued by many donors, including the more stringent alignment 
of project-based cooperation to partner priorities and the increasing use of ‘multilevel’ approaches. These approaches combine simultaneous 
interventions at micro, meso- and macrolevel in order to address systemic development challenges in partner countries (for an example, see OECD 
(2015, 65) on Germany’s multilevel approach to capacity development. 
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co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such as a national development strat-
egy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation’ (OECD DAC, 
2008, p. 148). 
At the heart of this new approach to development cooperation lies the integrated policy-based support to 
partner countries’ own development strategies priorities. Among the modalities and instruments subsumed 
under the term ‘programme-based approaches’, GBS offered the most stringent implementation of the five 
principles to effective aid introduced above. It does so by offering an integrated package of financial and 
technical support combined with high-level political and policy dialogue and a formalized framework to en-
sure mutual accountability through dialogue and regular performance assessments. It would also maintain 
national sovereignty because policy reforms are autonomously developed and not dictated by donors, which 
was a common criticism of SAPs. This way, the government would be accountable to the citizens through 
budget decisions and to donors based on the performance assessment framework (PAF). 
Conceptual features of budget support 
Budget support is an aid modality, often provided by multiple development partners to jointly support the 
partner governments’ national poverty-reduction strategy and national development plan (Dijkstra and de 
Kemp, 2015). The OECD defines budget support as ‘a method of financing a partner country’s budget 
through a transfer of resources from an external financing agency to the partner government’s national 
Treasury’ (OECD DAC, 2006a, p. 26). GBS is disbursed as a non-earmarked funding, while SBS is earmarked 
for the utilization in a specific sector. 
Under the assumption that budget support is implemented according to the principles of effective aid,25 it 
is expected to create higher predictability of external funds and/or reductions in transaction costs as direct 
outputs. Budget support is thus believed to increase aid effectiveness in the recipient country. Expected 
induced outputs of budget support are improved macroeconomic management, increased quantity and 
quality of public services, and strengthened systems of PFM. These outputs are assumed to lead to out-
comes such as publicly provided goods and services and impacts income and non-income poverty in the 
recipient countries (OECD DAC, 2012; Orth et al., 2017). Besides the function to finance the implementation 
of the national poverty-reduction strategy of the partner (financing function), budget support contributes 
to the policy reforms in the partner country (governance function). To this aim, the budget support package 
comprises four elements: 
1 Financial support 
2 Policy dialogue 
3 Accountability framework, including conditionality 
4 Technical assistance and capacity development (TA/CD) 
While the debate evolving around budget support focused on the financing function in the early years of its 
programmes, later the governance function gained increasing importance. The term ‘budget support’ is mis-
leading insofar it only highlights the financial input in the package of budget support inputs. Some donors 
addressed this misconception by establishing terms that also include the policy aspect of budget support, 
such as the World Bank’s ‘Development Policy Financing’ or as the broader term used in this evaluation: 
integrated policy-based approach. 
Policy dialogue is a central part of budget support programmes and takes place on both political and tech-
nical levels. The technical level dialogue primarily evolves around technical issues, for example in PFM, while 
the political dialogue addresses overarching issues, like budget decisions. 
The mutual accountability framework in the form of budget support conditionality has two components: (a) 
so-called underlying principles, such as macroeconomic stability, respect for human rights, commitment to 
 
25  The intervention logic lists three of the five Paris principles of aid effectiveness – ownership, harmonization and alignment – as direct outputs, 
and assumes further that budget support increases predictability and reduces transaction costs of aid in the recipient country. 
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democratic governance and poverty reduction; and (b) disbursements or new commitments based on a reg-
ular performance assessment. The partner government’s adherence is the precondition for the provision of 
budget support. The regular performance assessment is usually based on a PAF developed jointly by devel-
opment partners and partner government to measure reform progress of the government against a set of 
performance indicators. 
TA/CD complements the financial inputs by strengthening capacities in the partner government. By design, 
the combination of financial and non-financial inputs is assumed to have reciprocal effects, thus increasing 
the effectiveness of financial and non-financial inputs in budget support programmes . 
Proven effects of budget support 
In 2004, Lawson and Booth (Lawson and Booth, 2004) developed a methodological framework for the eval-
uation of budget support (see Annex 7.1), which was revised and augmented in 2008 by a working group 
under the lead of the European Commission (EC, 2008a). This framework proposes a comprehensive inter-
vention logic for budget support. 
The common approach to evaluating budget support was applied in a series of pilot evaluations, in countries 
such as Mali, Tunisia and Zambia (DRN, 2011; de Kemp et al., 2011; Lawson et al., 2011). The evaluation frame-
work was revised in 2012 and since then has been applied in various budget support evaluations. Overall, 
these evaluations find clearly positive effects with regard to budget support’s financing function, and mixed 
results regarding the instrument’s impact on fostering good governance and policymaking (ADE, 2015; Bar-
tholomew et al., 2006; Batley et al., 2006; Bogetic et al., 2015; Booth et al., 2005; Caputo et al., 2013; Claussen 
et al., 2006; Dijkstra and Grigsby, 2010; DRN, 2011; Gosparini et al., 2006; de Kemp et al., 2011; Lanser et al., 
2006; Lawson et al., 2007, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016; Lister et al., 2006; Purcell et al., 2006; Thunnissen and 
Morillon, 2014). First synthesis studies were conducted, aggregating the findings of available budget sup-
port evaluations (Lawson et al., 2003; Lister, 2006; Williamson and Dom, 2010). However, so far, the evi-
dence on budget support has only examined selected parts of the available evidence. 
Recently, a systematic evaluation synthesis by DEval (Orth et al., 2017) analysed 95 sources, the hitherto 
most comprehensive study on the effectiveness of budget support. 
From the overall evidence on budget support effects analysed in the evaluation synthesis, five main findings 
emerge: 
 Most of the expected effects of budget support materialized, thus budget support leads to improve-
ments of: (a) the level and composition of public spending; (b) PFM; (c) the quantity of service de-
livery; and (d) the supply-side of domestic accountability. 
 For these outputs, the attribution of observed changes to budget support is plausible. Regarding 
the impacts – namely good governance, inclusive growth and poverty reduction – the evidence is 
not sufficient nor compelling to attribute improvements to the existence of budget support (alone). 
 Other effects are highly dependent on context factors, e.g. (a) high number and quality of donors’ 
common interests; (b) institutional capacity; and (c) political will for reform of the recipient govern-
ment. 
 The attribution to the individual budget support inputs (financial input, conditionality, policy dia-
logue and TA/CD) is in most cases insufficient and hence the effects can only be attributed to the 
whole ‘budget support package’. 
 The analysed evidence inadequately researches important risks of budget support, for example on 
corruption. While there is no negative effect on corruption, there is insufficient evidence to tell 
whether the effect is positive or simply non-existent (Orth et al., 2017). 
Figure 4 shows the findings of the synthesis study on the effectiveness of budget support in aggregate form. 
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Figure 4 Expectation and reality of budget support effects 
 
Source: Orth et al., 2017, p. 69 
The rise of budget support to increase aid effectiveness 
The World Bank, the European Union (EU) and a few larger EU Member States set up the first budget support 
programmes in the late 1990s. The specific configuration of budget support programmes varied between 
donors, some taking a more selective approach than those using stricter governance indicators. Together, 
EU Member States and the EC disbursed around EUR 15.5 billion as GBS between 2006 and 2010 (DFID, 
2004; EC, 2008b; European Parliament et al., 2005; OECD DAC, 2005). 
At its peak around 2008/2009, total budget support disbursements accounted for up to 50% of official de-
velopment assistance (ODA) spending in the case of individual donors. On average among all budget sup-
port donors, total budget support disbursements comprised about 20% of ODA. Yet the modality was never 
used exclusively in donors’ aid portfolio and project-type interventions always prevailed alongside budget 
support (see Figure 5; OECD, 2018a). 
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Figure 5 Budget support to developing countries as share of total DAC and multilateral ODA 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
The decline of budget support 
Corruption scandals, political setbacks and human rights violations in various recipient countries and a shift 
towards more conservative governments in Western donor countries reduced the donors’ appetite for 
budget support. The new governments were especially sensitive to the political risks of budget support – 
such as reputational risks by supporting potentially corrupt or authoritarian regimes. As a reaction to these 
developments, bilateral donors started to emphasize the political conditionality of budget support and be-
came more alert to the instrument’s potential fiduciary risks (Faust and Koch, 2014). Both developments – 
political difficulties in the recipient countries and changes in the political landscape in Europe – led to re-
peated suspensions of budget support disbursements (Faust et al., 2011, Molenaers et al., 2015; Orth et al., 
2017). 
In consequence to many bilateral development partners withdrawing their budget support funding, the vol-
ume of multi-donor GBS funding provided by European Member States and the EC fell from EUR 2.9 billion 
in 2010 to EUR 1.3 billion in 201526 (see Figure 6). Many bilateral development partners – e.g. Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) – either suspended or stopped GBS altogether. The EC changed 
their approach and used more SBS instead of GBS and, in response to the requests by Member States, also 
imposed stricter entry criteria for the implementation of GBS programmes (EC, 2012). From all budget sup-
port programmes funded by the EC in 2015, 82% are provided in the form of SBS (EC, 2015a). During their 
peak in 2010, budget support programmes accounted for 23% of Germany’s bilateral aid and reached EUR 96 
million in sub-Saharan Africa, which was by far the largest recipient region (Krisch et al., 2015). By 2014, this 
share had decreased to only 2%27 and as of 2017, Germany has stopped its bilateral GBS almost completely; 
however, it still contributes indirectly through the programmes of the EC. 
 
26  Data obtained from the OECD DAC CRS databank. 
27  Own calculations based on CRS (OECD, 2018a). 
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Figure 6 Budget support disbursements – comparison between bilateral EU donors and EC 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
What followed GBS? 
Around 2009, when a wave of budget support suspensions started, the share of project-type interventions 
in total ODA receipts began to rise substantially from levels of 1–40% between 2000 and 2005 to levels of 
60–90% since 2010 (see Figure 7). On average, project-type intervention accounted for about 20% of ODA 
between 2000 and 2005 and reached an average of over 70% from 2010 onwards (OECD, 2018a). 
As discussed in the Introduction to this report, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was inspired and 
based on evidence of what did not work from over five decades of Western development cooperation 
(Koeberle et al., 2006; OECD DAC, 2005). This evidence pointed to failures in the way aid was provided, 
among them a high fragmentation of aid, which created high transaction costs and undermined ownership 
of the partner governments (Aldasoro et al., 2009; Bigsten, 2006; Frot/Santiso, 2009; Halonen-Akatwijuka, 
2004; Knack/Rahman, 2007; OECD DAC, 2009). PBAs were the suggested cure and considered best to ad-
dress the effectiveness principles (Koch et al., 2016). 
However, other PBAs did not replace GBS. Recent figures from the development cooperation report 2017 
show that donors spend only 15% of country programmable aid in (on-budget) PBAs: 5% in budget support 
and 10% in contributions to pooled programmes and funds. By far the largest share is spent in the form of 
project-type interventions (77% of country programmable aid) (OECD, 2017) (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 7 Project-type interventions as share of ODA28 for budget support receiving countries29 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
Figure 8 Composition of DAC country programmable aid (CPA), 2015, gross disbursements 
 
Source: Development Co-operation Report 2017 (OECD, 2017) 
 
28  It should be noted, that the share of not specified modalities (called “not applicable“) in the CRS database was quite large between 2000 and 
2006, however the picture is strikingly similar even when “not applicable” ODA is excluded from the denominator. 
29  The listed countries build the group of possible cases for this evaluation: all countries for which a budget support evaluation exists that uses the 
‘state of the art’ methodological design for budget support evaluations (see section 3.1.2). 
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Although critics might argue that the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was always strongly driven by 
donors and by now is considered largely outdated (Deutscher and Fyson, 2008), the focus on aid effective-
ness and a results-oriented approach in development cooperation was further revived in Busan, 2011 (OECD 
DAC, 2011), Mexico, 2014 (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2014) and lately Nai-
robi, 2016 (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2016). 
Further, current jointly defined goals and strategies among partner governments and donors, such as the 
United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), demand a stronger focus on ownership of 
the partner governments (UN, 2015), being one of the aid effectiveness principles. Specifically, the UN’s 
third financing for development conference in Addis Ababa defined ways to finance the ambitious, and thus 
costly, SDGs. The solutions include the strengthening of public policies and regulatory frameworks, and 
ownership for the countries’ social and economic development (strategies). The report of the third Interna-
tional Conference on Financing for Development affirms that the role of ‘national policies and development 
strategies cannot be overemphasized’ (UN, 2015, p. 5). 
Metaphorically speaking, the symptoms of ineffective aid that were denounced in Paris 2005 are still pre-
sent in many places, but the remedy has largely been banned. A question on the broader developmental 
context, which is going beyond the exit from budget support and the scope of this evaluation, thus is quo 
vadis development finance? What are adequate instruments to provide the necessary resources and incen-
tives to reach the SDGs, and what is the future of integrated policy-based approaches? 
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To analyse losses that result from the exit of multi-donor GBS and to identify features that are of importance 
for future integrated policy-based approaches, this evaluation focuses on the exit from GBS. Besides the 
primary aim to understand the consequences of ending GBS, the exit case can serve as a quasi-counterfac-
tual (before-and-after comparison) to measure the effectiveness of GBS programmes. The existing evidence 
that has been synthesized in Orth et al. (2017) looked at effects during the time GBS was disbursed, so before 
the exit. This evaluation adds the ‘after dimension’ to the picture. Taken together, the before-and-after di-
mensions can serve as a quasi-counterfactual.30 
In addition, with the exit of most bilateral donors from GBS, it remains questionable whether the proven 
positive effects of budget support are robust against the exit and how potential negative effects can be 
mitigated. One of the major challenges in answering these questions is to attribute observed post-exit 
changes to the exit from budget support. To approach this challenge, this evaluation uses a comparative 
case study design, based on the country cases Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. In-depth analysis is 
added to the comparative case study design through process tracing. This specific combination allows for a 
comparison across cases, but also ensures internal validity through process tracing. The comparison of 
budget support effects prior to exit with the consequences post-exit enabled the evaluation team to assess 
the robustness of budget support effects. The robustness of effects against an exit from the modality is a 
necessary condition for the sustainability of effects. 
Exit is defined as a suspension of more than one budget support cycle – usually a fiscal year – by several 
donors, so that suspensions can be differentiated from single delays in payment. 
3.1 Comparative case study design 
3.1.1 The intervention logic 
The exit evaluation follows a theory-based approach and uses a slightly revised form of the EC/OECD 
DAC’s intervention logic as the overall analytical framework to generate hypotheses on the robust-
ness of budget support effects. The latest form of the Comprehensive Evaluation Framework (CEF) serves 
as the theoretical foundation for most multi-donor evaluations of budget support (OECD DAC, 2012) (see 
Annex 7.1). The evaluation team slightly adapted the CEF. The rationale for these adjustments was to better 
trace interdependencies between financial and non-financial elements of budget support on the level of 
inputs and direct outputs, and to include the quality of aid relations as a context element, as well as political, 
economic and social conditions. All these factors play a potentially important role in the analysis of the exit 
from the aid modality. 
According to the intervention logic, effects of budget support programmes unfold in a sequence 
across five levels, namely: inputs, direct outputs, induced outputs, outcomes and impacts. The inputs 
consist of financial inputs, i.e. funding that is transferred directly into the Treasury of the partner govern-
ment, and non-financial inputs (conditionality, policy dialogue and TA/CD). The combination of financial 
and non-financial inputs is expected to reinforce the effectiveness of the individual inputs. Direct outputs 
are the result of improved linkages between external funding and the national budget and/or policy process, 
such as improved harmonization among donors. Induced outputs are – among others – sound policies, re-
form progress, efficient and transparent PFM, and accountability and democratic control. Expected out-
comes of budget support provision are improved budget allocation and improved use of and benefit from 
public services as well as improved confidence in government performance. These outcomes lead to inclu-
sive growth and poverty reduction and good governance as impact. While the state of aid relations between 
donors and partner governments strongly influences inputs and direct outputs, induced outputs, outcomes 
and impacts are primarily dependent on political, economic and social conditions (see Figure 9). 
 
30  The idea behind the quasi-counterfactual is that results after the exit can confirm or not confirm (which does not mean disconfirm) the synthesized 
evidence from before the exit. Effects are confirmed if the introduction of budget support had positive effects (before) and the exit from budget 
support had a negative effect (after), or vice versa. Effects are not confirmed if positive (or negative) effects before the exit remain positive (or 
negative) after the exit. 
16    3.  |  Methodology 
Figure 9 Revised generic theory of change 
 
Source: own, revised form of CEF (OECD DAC, 2012)  
3.1.2 Case selection 
The revised theory of change forms the common basis for the country case study design used in this 
evaluation. The four country case studies in Malawi, Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia have contributed to the 
comparative case study design of this evaluation, which aims to identify consequences of ending multi-
donor GBS that can be generalized across cases. The evaluation team analysed according to the (revised) 
intervention logic, in combination with the evaluation synthesis on budget support (Orth et al., 2017). The 
resultant changes in proven budget support effects resulted from suspending or terminating budget sup-
port disbursements. Detailed evaluation questions were developed for each level of the theory of change, 
covering nearly all expected budget support outputs and outcomes (see the evaluation matrix in Annex 7.2) 
to enable the comparison of effects during and after the GBS period. It is a particular challenge to attribute 
observed effects to budget support programmes at the impact level (i.e. expected effects on income poverty 
and non-income poverty). Own data collection on changes in income poverty was not possible and thus not 
included as a topic of this evaluation. Non-income poverty was part of country-specific budget analyses and 
therefore included in data collection and analysis, but results have limited explanatory power due to the 
problems in attribution. 
To achieve a high comparability across case study countries and high external validity of the findings, 
the evaluation team applied a two-step procedure for the selection of cases, using preconditions and 
rating criteria. In step one, those countries fulfilling a set of five general eligibility criteria (preconditions) 
were identified as potential country cases (see Table 1). In step two, these potential country cases were rated 
against four selection criteria. The countries best fulfilling the selection criteria are best suited to serve as 
country case studies for the evaluation (see Table 2). 
For this evaluation, the group of possible cases consists of all countries for which a budget support 
evaluation exists that uses the ‘state of the art’ methodological design for budget support evalua-
tions. This specific methodology was designed for evaluating budget support (EC, 2008a) and has since 
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been applied in more than 20 budget support evaluations. In contrast, evaluations that use a standard eval-
uation approach are often not specified for budget support and are written from the perspective of an indi-
vidual agency. Such evaluations are not considered in the range of possible cases. The rationale behind the 
criterion is that budget support evaluations serve as a baseline regarding the impact of budget support in 
the respective countries. 
This range of 15 countries is geographically concentrated to the African continent, predominantly 
sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Nicaragua and Vietnam (see Figure 10). The following 15 coun-
tries’ budget support evaluations met the selection criteria: Burkina Faso (Lanser et al., 2006), Burundi (ADE, 
2015), Ghana (Lawson et al., 2007), Malawi (Claussen et al., 2006), Mali (Lawson et al., 2011), Morocco (Thun-
nissen and Morillon, 2014), Mozambique (Batley et al., 2006; Lawson et al., 2014), Nicaragua (Gosparini et 
al., 2006), Rwanda (Purcell et al., 2006), South Africa (Caputo et al., 2013), Tanzania (Booth et al., 2005; 
Lawson et al., 2013), Tunisia (DRN, 2011), Uganda (Bogetic et al., 2015; Lister et al., 2006), Vietnam 
(Bartholomew et al., 2006) and Zambia (de Kemp et al., 2011). Annex 7.4 shows a classification by income 
group of the cohort of possible cases. 
Figure 10 Geographical distribution of budget support evaluations 
 
Source: own 
Step One: Preconditions 
In order to exclude cases that do not fit the purpose of this evaluation, the sample was narrowed 
down to countries that meet five preconditions (see Table 1): 
 Precondition 1: Provision of GBS for at least three consecutive years 
Rationale: Long-term outcomes and impacts of budget support provision can only develop when 
GBS has been disbursed for several years.31 
 Precondition 2: Provision of GBS by multiple donors32 
 
31  The threshold of three years was chosen to balance that budget support overall was not disbursed for a long period of time (around ten years), 
but should have been paid for at least a couple of years to generate medium- to long-term effects. 
32  For the purpose of this evaluation we set a threshold of at least five donors providing GBS within a period of three years. 
18    3.  |  Methodology 
Rationale: The involvement of multiple donors in GBS provision confirms the importance of the 
finance instrument in the country and allows the observation of different effects for each donor 
when GBS disbursements have stopped. 
 Precondition 3: Involvement of Germany in the GBS provision 
Rationale: The involvement of Germany was defined as precondition for the country case selection 
because of the high relevance for the stakeholders of this evaluation and the access to information 
during the data collection process.33 
 Precondition 4: Termination and/or sustained suspension34 of GBS by several donors, including 
Germany and the EC 
Rationale: Reason for the required termination by Germany and the EC is once again the high rele-
vance for the stakeholders of this evaluation. 
 Precondition 5: Absence of severe armed conflict jeopardizing development results 
Rationale: In the face of such armed conflicts, the robustness of GBS measures cannot be properly 
evaluated. 
Eight countries fulfil these preconditions for a potential case study and are rated in step two. For 
background information on the exclusion of the remaining seven countries, please refer to Annex 7.5. The 
set includes Ghana, Malawi, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia. 
Table 1 Case selection based on preconditions (step 1) 
 Several years of 
GBS 
Provision by mul-
tiple donors 
Involvement of 
Germany 
Suspension/ ter-
mination 
Absence of ar-
med conflicts 
Burkina Faso    x (x) 
Burundi   x x x 
Ghana     
Malawi     
Mali     x 
Morocco  x x x 
Mozambique    x 
Nicaragua     
Rwanda     
South Africa x  x x 
Tanzania     
Tunisia  x x x x 
Uganda     
Vietnam     
Zambia     
Source: own 
Step Two: Selection criteria 
To rate the fit of the remaining eight countries in step two, four selection criteria were applied. The 
underlying assumption was that countries best fulfilling the selection criteria represent the most suitable 
cases for answering the evaluation questions (‘most likely cases’) (Rohlfing, 2012). 
 
33  Due to Germany’s selective approach in implementing budget support programmes, this precondition possibly leads to a bias towards already 
good performing countries. 
34  The term ‘sustained suspension’ in this evaluation is defined as a suspension of more than one budget support cycle (usually a fiscal year), so that 
suspensions can be differentiated from single delays in payment. A minimum amount suspended is not required. 
3.  |  Methodology    19 
 Selection criterion 1: Time period covered by GBS evaluation35 
Rationale: The longer the time period covered, the better is the evidence base for the evaluation. 
 Selection criterion 2: Provision of a substantial amount of GBS36 
Rationale: It is assumed that a higher amount of disbursed GBS leads to stronger effects, which can 
be more easily observed also when looking at consequences of the exit on those effects. 
 Selection criterion 3: Provision of a substantial amount of GBS from Germany and the EC 
Rationale: With more funding from Germany and the EC, the relevance is higher for the stakehold-
ers of this evaluation (see Table 2). 
 Selection criterion 4: Significance of suspensions and terminations of GBS 
Rationale: Significance of suspension or termination was defined as the financial cutback to the 
national budget due to GBS suspension or termination. Effects of suspending or ending budget sup-
port are likely to be more severe and better observable in countries where the missing financial 
contribution led to a significant reduction of the national budget. 
For the rating, a five-level scale was used, ranging from best fulfilment of the criterion (++), good fulfilment 
(+), average fulfilment (~), weak fulfilment (-) to least fulfilment (--). Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda and Malawi 
were chosen as country case studies for the exit evaluation because of the, in sum, best fulfilment of the 
selection criteria (see Table 2). For background information on the ratings for the different countries, please 
refer to Annex 7.5. 
Table 2 Case selection based on a rating (step 2) 
 Coverage of GBS eva-
luation 
Substantial amount 
of GBS 
Substantial amount 
of GBS from Germany 
and EC 
Significance of sus-
pensions / termina-
tions 
Ghana ~ ~ + ~ 
Malawi - + + + 
Nicaragua - - ~ + 
Rwanda - + ++ + 
Tanzania ++ ~ - - 
Uganda ++ ~ ++ + 
Vietnam - - - ~ 
Zambia + + ++ ++ 
Source: own 
 
3.1.3 Data collection and analysis 
A detailed evaluation matrix, based on the intervention logic (see section 3.1.1), served as central 
element to operationalize the two evaluation questions and the data collection process (see Annex 
7.2). Aiming to triangulate all evidence, the data collection process included the following types of sources: 
 
35  Again, the methodology of the evaluation must be specifically designed for evaluating budget support and the methodology must have been 
jointly agreed in a multi-donor setting. 
36  Measured as total GBS payments in percentage of government expenditure in the respective country for the years in which GBS was disbursed. 
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 evaluation synthesis on budget support 
 budget support evaluations 
 administrative data and statistics 
 country reports 
 semi-structured interviews 
 tailor-made budget analysis 
As discussed above, the evaluation synthesis on budget support and the budget support evaluations pro-
vided the necessary data to assess the budget support effect during its disbursement. 
Review of administrative data and statistics, and country reports 
A review of administrative data and statistics from the recipient governments, such as annual reviews 
and budget documentation, as well as country reports by the international community,37 was one com-
ponent of the data collection. This review was deliberately chosen as the starting point to use the findings 
in preparation of the interview guideline for the country case studies and as background information for 
hypothesizing the mechanisms as an important element of process tracing. The evaluation team reviewed 
around 80 reports for data and relevant statements related to the detailed evaluation questions. They coded 
the information using the qualitative software for data analysis MaxQDA, building a solid basis of the anal-
ysis. 
Semi-structured interviews 
To ensure the coverage of important topics while allowing flexibility in the structure of respondents’ an-
swers, the evaluation team chose semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions as a central 
method for data collection. An interview guideline built the basis for the interviews in four countries and 
was developed based on the evaluation matrix. It was refined with findings from the review of reports and 
government statistics, and first explorative interviews with different stakeholders. However, the specifica-
tion and sequence of questions was adjusted from interview to interview to ensure a natural flow of con-
versation (Gläser and Laudel, 2006). 
Topics covered in the interview guideline include: 
 Changes in aid portfolios (e.g. volumes, modalities) as a result of ending budget support 
 Changes in form, function, and content of dialogue forums as a result of ending budget support 
 Harmonization of programmes and projects among donors during and after ending budget support 
 Changes in technical assistance and capacity development as a result of ending budget support 
 Robustness of budget support effects 
See the interview guidelines in Annex 7.6 for the full list of topics. 
To account for different perspectives on the subject matter, the team conducted interviews with rep-
resentatives from different stakeholder groups, including bilateral and multilateral donors, imple-
menting agencies, ministries, government agencies, CSO’s, faith-based organizations and media. With 
the aim to acknowledge the different perspectives of interview partners adequately, three versions of the 
interview guidelines were developed: one for donor representatives, one for partner representatives and 
one for civil society representatives. 
In sum, the team conducted 106 interviews with 145 interview partners (see Annex 7.7) in the four 
case study countries between 2016 and 2017, providing a broad evidence base on the exit effects. 
These interviews took place in person mostly during the field phase. Some of the interviews were conducted 
by telephone and some of the interviews took place before and after the field phase. Interviews before the 
 
37 Such as Regional Economic Outlooks (IMF), Fiscal Monitors (IMF), Economic Briefs (World Bank), Poverty Outlooks (World Bank), Economic Up-
dates (World Bank), African Economic Outlooks (AfDB), Africa Competitiveness Reports (AfDB), African Statistical Yearbook (AfDB), PEFA Re-
ports, WHO Statistics, Mo Ibrahim Index, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Freedom House Reports, Open Budget Surveys, UNICEF Reports. 
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field phase helped to identify further related topics; while interviews after the field phase were of im-
portance to clarify unexpected or contradictory results. Afterwards, the evaluation team coded the inter-
view protocols along the evaluation matrix, using the software MaxQDA. The evaluation matrix was then 
filled with the findings for each covered topic (e.g. change in aid portfolio, dialogue, harmonization) and the 
conclusion(s) for each set of findings. The matrix further includes the data sources, from which the findings 
and conclusions stem, to check for triangulation of sources. 
Budget analysis 
The evaluation team decided to create ‘custom-made’ budget analysis for each country to broaden 
the evidence base and triangulate the results. Due to the technical nature of budget-related evaluation 
questions, it appeared useful to verify and expand the information gathered in interviews with budget data. 
The budget analyses helped to draft better-targeted interview questions that address issues and particular-
ities arising from the budget analysis. Since data availability is problematic in some of the countries and 
inside-knowledge on the specifics of the budget process is crucial to understand the developments, the 
evaluation team subcontracted the budget analysis to national budget experts for each of the four countries. 
The budget analysis specifically examined whether budget support effects related to improved 
budget transparency, budget management and overall PFM were robust. The analysis also assessed the 
development of how budget support outcomes related to improved public administration, public service 
delivery, the reduction of non-income poverty and improved macroeconomic performance. The analysis was 
based on government statistics and budgetary data. In a last step, the findings from the budget analysis 
were incorporated in the countries’ evaluation matrix. 
3.1.4 Limitations 
In the literature, theory-based approaches, such as the comparative case study design of this evalua-
tion, are described as a comprehensive method suitable to evaluate complex interventions but they 
often remain weak in theorizing and testing the causal mechanisms. Although mechanisms are already 
widely used in theory-based approaches, they seem to remain in the ‘grey box’, where they are untheorized 
or relegated to assumptions. This under-theorization of the causal mechanism inadvertently undermines 
the potential to make causal inferences on the contribution of the intervention to the observed outcome 
(Schmitt and Beach, 2015). 
In the context of this evaluation, in relying on causal inferences on the contribution of the exit from budget 
support to the observed effects, the need to theorize and test the causal mechanisms is strong. Therefore, 
the evaluation team supplemented the approach of comparative case studies with process tracing (see sec-
tion 3.2). 
Other limitations of theory-based approaches are the transferability of the results to other contexts. 
The evaluation aims at generating findings, conclusions and recommendations that are transferable to re-
lated cases. However, some findings are specific for the individual country case and do not generally offer 
valid explanations on the effects of ending budget support. In such cases, the comparability of findings 
between country cases is limited. Nevertheless, through a targeted country case selection of three lower-
income countries and one lower-middle-income country (LMIC) in sub-Saharan Africa, four country cases 
were selected that are comparable among the set of possible case study countries. Thus, most results are 
transferable to similar country contexts (i.e. low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa) and external va-
lidity is given for these contexts. 
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3.2 Process tracing 
This evaluation employs process tracing38 to test a theorized causal mechanism39 on how multi-donor 
budget support effects have either been robust or not robust against the exit from the modality.40 
While the comparative case study design facilitates cross-case comparability, this design alone is insuffi-
cient to assess the causal inference on the contribution of the exit from budget support to the observed 
outcomes. This limitation is addressed by adding process tracing to the comparative case study design, 
which can provide valid results regarding the causal relationship between exit and outcome (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013). Process tracing allows for more analytical depth and, by systematically testing theorized 
causal mechanisms, increases the inferential strength of individual case studies. The strength of the ap-
proach lies in the detailed and rigorous analysis of the causal mechanism in a very specific context. Com-
bining the two elements helped to establish a broad and strong evaluation approach of high internal and 
external validity. 
Process tracing further allows to quantify the certainty about the hypothesis in a transparent and 
systematic manner using Bayesian logic (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). The Bayesian logic helps to deter-
mine the probability of the hypothesis to be true after all information has been gathered and analysed – 
known as ‘posterior confidence’. Prior to gathering the information, it is necessary to record how likely it 
appears that the hypothesis of the mechanism part at hand is true. This prior confidence in each mechanism 
part is then updated, either upward or downward, through the information gathered. This process is called 
‘Bayesian Confidence Updating’. The posterior value is the result of the combination of the prior confidence 
and the updating, which stems from a series of tests. 
In this evaluation, the evaluation team applied the process tracing approach to three induced outputs 
of the intervention logic (public expenditure, public financial management, domestic accountability) 
in Zambia and Malawi. The process tracing applied to key impact areas of the intervention logic for which 
the assumed link between the exit from GBS and observed outcomes was particularly strong. The process 
tracing approach involves four successive steps (Punton and Welle, 2015a), which are presented in the fol-
lowing sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4. 
3.2.1 Step 1: Developing hypothetical causal mechanisms 
For testing the theory, the team developed a hypothesized causal mechanism before conducting the 
interviews that outlined what was assumed to be the most likely scenario leading from the interven-
tion (exit) to the result (e.g. robust PFM). In developing the hypothetical causal mechanism, the evalua-
tion team used extensive background information available from reports and statistics of both government 
and bi- and multilateral donors. The two previously conducted case studies for Uganda and Rwanda offered 
important insights into how the causal mechanism might look like in reality. Based on the background in-
formation, each hypothesized mechanism assumes the most likely outcome of the exit: either the robust or 
not robust budget support effects. 
The mechanism itself includes several interlinked parts in which actors engage in activities leading in 
logical consequence to the anticipated outcome (see Table 3). The mechanism parts build seamlessly on 
each other and thereby create a logical chain of events leading to the expected outcome. In addition, scope 
conditions were defined, under which the hypothesized causal mechanism is taking place. The scope condi-
tions play a central role because even a mechanism that is confirmed by the tests only holds true in this 
particular context. 
  
 
38  Process tracing is defined as a ‘method that attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism between 
an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206). 
39  The process tracing scholars define mechanisms as a system that transfers causal forces from intervention to outcome (Machamer et al., 2000). 
40 This is one of the few evaluations to use process tracing (see: Busetti and Dente (2017); Bamanyaki and Holvoet (2016); D’Errico et al. (2017). 
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Table 3 Hypothetical causal mechanism: Malawi’s public financial management as an example 
Entity Activity Mechanism part 
Donors 
 
Suspend BS, but signal willingness to relaunch BS or similar financing modalities … 1 
… conditional to relaunch of (IMF) structural reform programme 2 
GoM addresses Cashgate scandal issues through PFM Action Plan 3 
IMF provides suggestions on further PFM reforms and monitors performance of IMF 
structural benchmarks regarding PFM to assess relaunch 
4 
GoM 
 
Implements PFM Action Plan and IMF reform suggestions … 5 
… exerts higher discipline in budget execution 6 
NAO Provides a higher number and detail of audits 7 
 The dynamic of PFM reform is robust Outcome 
 
Source: own 
3.2.2 Step 2: Operationalization of mechanisms 
To confirm or disconfirm the entire hypothetical causal mechanism, the evaluation team applied a 
sequence of tests to assess whether the individual mechanism parts were present or not. The hypoth-
esis is split into different mechanism parts and those parts are tested with different test questions. In de-
veloping the tests, the team indicated prior to the case study what kind of evidence would be necessary to 
determine if the mechanism part is present in the case – ‘predicted empirical evidence’. Second, the team 
listed potential sources or ‘means of verification’ in which this evidence might be found, such as programme 
documents or government strategies. 
To use Bayesian updating it was necessary to assign a value to each hypothesis reflecting the proba-
bility for each hypothesis to be true before any test was conducted, the so-called prior. The assessment 
of the trust level in a hypothesis depends on the knowledge the team attained from thorough background 
analysis of accessible literature on the subject. If the team had no evidence other than common sense to 
support the hypothesis, the prior is rated 0.5, which is known as the ‘no information’ situation in Bayesian 
statistics (Fairfield and Charman, 2015). If some background knowledge supported the hypothesis the prior 
was given a value higher than 0.5 (see Table 4), ranging from 0.6 if it appears theoretically plausible to 0.9 
if credible country reports clearly suggest it. The prior value is updated in the analysis process (step 4) and 
serves as basis for the calculation of the post value, i.e. the confidence in the hypothesis after all information 
was gathered. 
Table 4 Scale for assessing the value of the prior 
 No information 
or plausible as-
sumption avail-
able 
Plausible hypothesis 
can be derived from the 
literature 
Information from 
the literature indi-
cate a confirmation  
Information from 
the literature con-
firm the hypothesis
Prior41 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.90 
 
Source: own 
The tests are rated in two dimensions to assess their confirmatory or disconfirmatory power: certainty 
and uniqueness. Ideally, the combination of tests used to assess the hypothesis contains both dimen-
sions. High certainty of a test means that passing the test is necessary for the hypothesis to hold; thus being 
able to disconfirm the hypothesis if the evidence is not observed – referred to as hoop test. Tests with high 
 
41  The values have to be treated as approximations, as process tracing attempts to ‘quantify’ qualitative categories. 
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uniqueness on the other hand help to strengthen the confirmatory evidence for a particular hypothesis. If 
not passing the test has no disconfirmatory power, the test is called ‘smoking gun’; if not passing has dis-
confirmatory power it is called a ‘doubly decisive’ test (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Befani and Mayne, 2014; 
Schmitt and Beach, 2015; Van Evera, 1997). A test with neither confirmatory nor disconfirmatory power is 
called a ‘straw in the wind’, because it gives only a weak indication but it is not a proof (see Table 5). 
Table 5 Overview of test types and their characteristics 
Test type Confirma-
tory  
Discon-
firmatory  
Explanation 
Straw in the 
wind test   If the evidence is observed, this is not sufficient to confirm the hy-pothesis. If the evidence is not observed, this is not sufficient to re-
ject the hypothesis 
Hoop test   If the evidence is not observed, the hypothesis is rejected. If the ev-idence is observed, the hypothesis is not rejected, but it is not con-
firmed either 
Smoking gun 
test   If the evidence is observed, the hypothesis is confirmed. If the evi-dence is not observed, the hypothesis is not confirmed, but it is not 
rejected, either 
Doubly deci-
sive test   If the evidence is observed, the hypothesis is confirmed. If the evi-dence is not observed, the hypothesis is rejected 
 
Source: based on Befani and Stedman-Bryce, 2016, p. 4 
3.2.3 Step 3: Collecting evidence 
Data collection for the tests was taking place in interviews with partner governments, development 
partners and civil society. The interviews were based on an interview guideline with specific questions 
to test the hypothesized causal mechanism. The team developed target-group specific evaluation ques-
tions for each mechanism (see questionnaire in Annex 7.8). To prepare for a systematic analysis, the team 
coded the interviews per mechanism part, using the software MaxQDA. The innovative feature of process 
tracing in data collection is that the causal mechanism is explicitly theorized ex ante as well as the test 
question. The data collection then focuses on these hypothetical causal mechanisms. 
3.2.4 Step 4: Analysis and assessing the inferential weight of evidence (Bayesian updating) 
The aim of this step is to analyse the gathered information in order to update (upward or downward) 
the confidence in each hypothesis to calculate the post confidence. The evaluation team allocated all 
relevant statements and findings from the field study to the relevant hypothesis and its tests (see Figure 11). 
These pieces of information should be aggregated into a table to operationalize and systematically analyse 
the evidence (see Annex 7.11 and 7.12 for a detailed depiction). 
The updating of the confidence – upward or downward – is an approximation, but the ‘quantification’ 
of qualitative results allows comparisons for confidence in all the mechanism parts and the team 
gathered, before and after the information. The before-and-after difference (prior and post value differ-
ence) indicates by how much the confidence in the hypothesis changed through the collected evidence.42 
The value of the posterior indicates the final confidence in the mechanism part. The comparison across 
mechanism parts helps to identify the weaker or debatable parts of the mechanism. Overall, these ad-
vantages increase the transparency of the assessment. 
 
 
42  An increase in the post value compared to the prior shows that we should put more trust in the hypothesis and that we are more likely to confirm 
it. If the post value is lower than the prior, the confidence in this mechanism part is reduced or even the entire hypothesis has to be reflected. If 
the post value is equal to the prior, the confidence was neither increased nor decreased through the gathered data (Schmitt and Beach, 2015). 
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Figure 11 Schematic representation of the evidence coding process 
 
Source: own 
The updating of the confidence in each mechanism partly depends on the probability that the pro-
vided information is biased (type I error) and on the probability that the source knows the true answer 
and is willing to reveal it (sensitivity). (See Annex 7.8 for a more detailed and technical discussion.) The 
confidence in each mechanism part is calculated using the average of the post values of each test. As a 
robustness test a weighted average of the test is applied, to account for differences in test types and ex-
planatory power. Due to the high confirmatory power of a doubly decisive test, this test was weighted high-
est, while a straw in the wind test was assigned the lowest weight. (For a detailed overview of the calculation, 
see Annex 7.10. and for the results of the robustness check, see Annex 7.11 and Annex 7.12) The quantitative 
level of confidence can be mapped to qualitative confidence categories. Table 6 below provides an orienta-
tion on how to interpret the values used in the evaluation, which is based on Befani and Stedman-Bryce 
(2016). 
Table 6 Categories for different levels of confidence 
Category Level of confidence 
Practical certainty 0.99+ 
Reasonable certainty 0.95 – 0.99 
High confidence 0.85 – 0.95 
Cautious confidence 0.70 – 0.85 
More confident than not 0.50 – 0.70 
No information 0.50 
Source: Befani and Stedman-Bryce, 2016, p. 14 
3.2.5 Limitations 
One limitation of the process tracing approach is its high time requirements in the preparation and 
analysis of the interviews (see Table 7 for an overview). The development of a hypothetical mechanism 
that is plausible and likely, given the prior knowledge, requires substantial time investment. In addition, 
each mechanism part consists of several tests that have to be designed and the most relevant information 
sources for these tests have to be identified. Once the evidence is collected, the time commitment is again 
substantial given that every single piece of evidence has to be matched to its respective tests. In other 
qualitative approaches, the analysis is less detailed and leaves these tasks to the reader. In this evaluation, 
it was possible to limit the time investment thanks to the experience gained in previous surveys in Uganda 
and Rwanda, strong background knowledge on interests and positions of different stakeholder groups, and 
an efficient coding method using coding software. 
Mechanism
Test 1
(Hoop test)
Piece of evidence I 
(e.g. donor report)
Piece of evidence II 
(e.g. CSO 
statement)
Test 2
(Smoking gun)
Piece of evidence III 
(e.g. government 
statement)
Piece of evidence IV 
(e.g. budget data)
Piece of evidence V 
(e.g. donor 
statement)
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Another limitation is the high knowledge requirement to design a plausible hypothesized mechanism 
for testing later in the field. Process tracing is a rather narrow approach, in the sense that it usually focuses 
on one specific mechanism. Hence, developing the causal mechanism requires knowledge and understand-
ing of the subject; otherwise, there is a high risk of drafting a mechanism that is later rejected (Punton and 
Welle, 2015b). In this evaluation, the experience from previous field studies and strong background 
knowledge on the topic helped to address this issue. 
Confirmation bias is an almost inherent limitation of process tracing as the goal of the approach is to 
confirm a causal mechanism. Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for, interpret and favour infor-
mation in a manner that confirms pre-existing beliefs or hypotheses and a common phenomenon in science. 
By looking only at evidence that is regarded relevant for the hypothesized mechanism, important findings 
might be overlooked or disregarded because they appear less interesting or less fitting for the mechanism. 
This evaluation confronted the risk by preparing alternative mechanisms, and by testing the alternative 
mechanisms in conducting open interviews (semi-structured). 
A practical limitation of the approach is that disconfirmation of a hypothesized mechanism can create 
substantial sunk costs and thereby increases the incentives for a confirmation bias. Sunk costs can 
occur because of substantial time investments before the survey and during the analysis. If only one mech-
anism part is unconfirmed, it means that the entire hypothesized mechanism is not true, even though a 
causal relationship might still exist. In the pursuit of avoiding such sunk costs, the risk for a confirmation 
bias can be amplified. To circumvent these risks it is helpful if disconfirmation of mechanism parts does not 
terminate the analysis. Confirmed mechanism parts themselves can be insightful and the approach can be 
switched from a theory testing to a theory building approach. This evaluation used both techniques. 
Lastly, two challenges for process tracing are the access to information and unknown outcomes. Com-
prehensive access to information, e.g. interview partners or unpublished documents, is key for process trac-
ing, because if the assessment of one mechanism part is impossible, the analysis of the entire mechanism 
would become impossible. In this evaluation, there was extensive access to information thanks to good local 
contacts. Unknown outcomes, on the other hand, increase the costs of the process tracing methodology 
because for every potential outcome the researchers have to design a hypothetical mechanism, which re-
quires additional time investment. This means that process tracing is better suited to evaluations where the 
outcome is known or at least binary (e.g. robust or not robust). 
Overall, the process tracing allows for explicit testing of causal links. The results were assessed carefully to 
avoid the mechanism being only a proxy for covariate alternative mechanisms or dependent on context 
factors. 
Table 7 General limitations of process tracing and solutions found in this evaluation 
General limitation Solutions found in this evaluation 
High time costs during the preparation and analysis 
stage 
Experience from two previous surveys in Uganda and 
Rwanda; coding software to facilitate analysis 
High knowledge requirement prior to the surveys Experience from two previous surveys in Uganda and 
Rwanda; drawing on knowledge and experience in the team 
Confirmation bias because the objective is to confirm 
an explicit theory 
Alternative mechanisms; triangulation; open interview 
questions; willingness to adapt the mechanism if necessary 
Disconfirmation can lead to sunk costs and creates ad-
ditional incentives for confirmation bias 
Willingness to adapt the mechanism if necessary  
Access to the information (e.g. stakeholders and docu-
ments) is key to answer the tests 
Good network through local consultants 
Unknown outcomes increases the number of potential 
mechanisms which increases the time investment 
Did not apply 
Source: own, based on Punton and Welle (2015b)  
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This chapter presents the events leading to the abrupt43 exit from multi-donor budget support and 
the impact of the exit in each of the four countries – Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. Sections 
4.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 form the basis for understanding the detected effects of the exit from budget sup-
port in the sections 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 4.3.2 and 4.4.2 and outline the context in which they occurred. As the eval-
uation concentrates on changes in aid portfolios and the relation between the partner and bilateral and 
multilateral donors, the context description focuses primarily on the donor and partner actions around the 
exit and less on reactions from civil society or other actors.44 Depicting the evolution of the aid portfolio as 
well as an outlook on future donor activities serves to further enhance the understanding of the context. 
Readers interested in country-specific findings and detailed methodology should focus on this chapter. The 
country-specific findings also explain in detail the process tracing methodology for PFM, public expenditure 
and domestic accountability. 
Figure 12 GBS disbursements as share of central government expenditure (in %) 
 
*Approximation under the assumption that GNI and central government expenses move in parallel 
Source: World Development Indicators for Net ODA Received (World Bank, 2017a), and CRS for share of GBS (OECD, 2017a) 
Note: Dependency on GBS was calculated by multiplying ‘Net ODA received (percentage of central government expense)’ with 
‘Share of GBS in total ODA disbursements’. To approximate missing data in Zambia and Rwanda, in a first step, the share of ‘Net 
ODA received (% of GNI)’ in ‘2010 Net ODA received (percentage of GNI)’ was calculated. This value was then multiplied with the 
‘Net ODA received (% of central government expense)’ of 2010 to get an approximation of the ‘Net ODA received (percentage of 
central government expense)’ of the respective year. For other missing values, GBS disbursement was not reported in the respec-
tive year and hence an approximation was not possible. 
All four cases had in common that a breach of the underlying principles of budget support served as 
justification for the exit. Under these circumstances, a trustful cooperation with the partner governments 
was no longer possible. Political factors and declining appetite for budget support might have spurred the 
early exit. 
The dependence on or importance of GBS for the national budgets was significant in the years before 
the exit in all four countries and therefore the exit from this instrument had noticeable financial 
consequences. In 2010, GBS covered at least 5% of the central government expenditure in all four countries, 
while in Malawi this value was as high as 21% (see Figure 12). Since 2014, at the latest, GBS has virtually lost 
importance in all four countries. 
 
43  Except for Zambia, the exit has been the reaction to a singular event. 
44  The context is especially relevant for the applied process tracing methodology as it defines the scope condition of the mechanism. Scope condi-
tions are the ‘relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads ... to an outcome 
of a defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal mechanisms’ (Falleti and Lynch, 2009, p. 1152). 
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4.1 Malawi 
4.1.1 The exit from budget support in Malawi 
Budget support started in Malawi in 2000 but as a reaction to macroeconomic and human rights 
concerns, donors suspended it three times before the actual exit in 2013. The first suspension occurred 
in 2001/0245 as the government’s fiscal deficit exceeded the limit defined by the budget support perfor-
mance indicators. In 2010, the UK suspended parts of their budget support payments to protest against the 
government of Malawi’s purchase of a new luxurious presidential jet for GBP 8 million. Germany repro-
grammed part of its budget support in the same year in reaction to a deterioration of press freedom and 
minority rights. One year later, in 2011, Germany and the UK decided to withdraw entirely from budget 
support in Malawi, whereas other donors – EC, World Bank, Norway, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and African Development Bank (AfDB) – only suspended their budget support payments. The reasons for 
this suspension were deterioration of human rights, governance and macroeconomic policies. The suspen-
sion was quickly lifted after the surprising death of President Mutharika in 2012 and the presidential election 
of the opposition party candidate Joyce Banda (Molenaers et al., 2013). Budget support and aid in general 
reached a new high in that year but came to a sudden halt with the Cashgate scandal. 
A massive scandal of theft of public funds – commonly referred to as Cashgate – led donors to ab-
ruptly withdraw or suspend GBS to Malawi at the end of 2013 (see Figure 13). Approximately USD 50 
million of funds were stolen through illegal transactions via the Integrated Financial Management Infor-
mation System (IFMIS), making it one of Malawi’s largest financial scandals in history (World Bank, 2017a). 
This massive scandal not only exposed the profound deficiencies of Malawi’s PFM system; it also shook 
donors’ trust in the cooperation with Malawi. This led to Norway, the EC and the AfDB suspending budget 
support in the latter half of 2013, the UK to withholding part of its SBS in the health sector, and Germany to 
postponing its negotiations with the Malawian government about reinstating budget support (Molenaers 
et al., 2016). 
Figure 13 Timeline of budget support in Malawi 
2000    2010  2012  2014  2017 
 Budget support is in-
troduced 
   UK suspends BS be-
cause of an expensive 
presidential jet pur-
chase 
President Bingu wa 
Mutharika dies in of-
fice and Joyce Banda 
takes over. 
BS is re-established 
and donor aid 
reaches an all- time 
high 
Peter 
Mutharika be-
comes new 
president 
The World 
Bank signs 
an agree-
ment to re-
sume BS  
   
BS is suspended 
due to a large fis-
cal deficit 
   
All major donors sus-
pend BS due to hu-
man rights, macroe-
conomic and govern-
ance concerns  
Cashgate scan-
dal leads to exit 
of all donors 
Drought and flood-
ing cause a humani-
tarian crisis 
EC and World Bank 
conditionality to 
unfreeze funds are 
not met 
 2002    2011  2013 2015  
Source: own 
Note: For a summary of country-related information and findings, see also the Malawi country-sheet on DEval’s website at 
www.deval.org. 
  
 
45  By the EU, Sweden, Denmark and the UK. 
30    4.  |  The exit from budget support and its impact: four case studies 
The year before the exit, GBS from six development partners46 financed more than 15% of Malawi’s 
budget but this number plummeted to 3% in the year of the exit (see Figure 12). Hence, it was evident 
that the suspension or withdrawal of budget support would have massive negative repercussions on the 
Malawian economy. Malawi received almost USD 1 billion in GBS between 2000 and 2013, and USD 500,000 
million in SBS. The largest shares came from the World Bank, the EC and the UK. Germany’s contribution to 
GBS was 4.13% of the total GBS disbursements (for details see Annex 7.13); SBS was not provided by Ger-
many (OECD, 2018a). 
The Cashgate scandal had implications beyond the suspension of GBS; it increased public scrutiny of 
public sector performance, while at the same time private sector confidence along with Malawi’s in-
ternational reputation dropped. Thanks to a free press and an active civil society, pressure on the govern-
ment to prosecute corrupt civil servants and to improve PFM systems was maintained. Against the backdrop 
of trust in the government systems, the government of Malawi (GoM) committed itself to rebuilding confi-
dence in public institutions and correcting macroeconomic imbalances. The reform dynamic has been im-
proving between 2015 and 2017, although so far only rudimentary aspects of PFM have been addressed and 
the quality of PFM in absolute terms remains low (World Bank, 2017a). 
Changes in the aid portfolio 
Figure 14 Malawi’s aid inflows: lower level of total aid inflows since exit from GBS47 
 
Source: own, based on GoM data 
Note: ‘Dedicated grants’ include grants provided for the financing of sector-wide approaches, pooled arrangements and basket 
funds; other grants received that are disbursed outside of the budget, through for example non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), are not included (World Bank, 2015a).48 
Since the exit from GBS in 2013, the level of donor support to the GoM declined compared to the GBS 
period (2000-2013),49 and the aid portfolio became more fragmented. Figure 14 confirms what one would 
expect: the total amount of aid inflows to the MoF is significantly lower after the exit than it used to be 
 
46  World Bank, IMF, AfDB, UK, Belgium and Norway 
47  The data provided by the GoM diverts from the CRS data from the OECD. 
48  In the terminology of the GoM’s budget, grants are divided into three categories: (a) ‘program grants’, which includes grants provided as budget 
support; (b) ‘dedicated grants’, which includes grants provided for the financing of sector-wide approaches, pooled arrangements and basket 
funds; and (c) ‘project grants’, which includes regular project assistance that is included as part of the budget (World Bank, 2015a). 
49  This excludes the year 2011 when donors temporarily suspended budget support. 
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before (between 2005 and 2010). The overall ODA support to Malawi, however, declined only very moder-
ately as shown by the ODA commitment and disbursement during that time (see Figure 15 and Annex 7.14).50 
This demonstrates that the donors’ portfolio consists predominantly of off-budget activities to support Ma-
lawi. From Figure 16, which displays aid modalities that gained in importance since the exit from budget 
support, it becomes evident that mainly project-based activities gained in relevance after the exit. Pooling 
arrangements such as basket funding or SBS were only used after the exit in some sectors like health and 
education.51 With these modalities, the donors aimed to compensate for lacking service delivery and to main-
tain harmonization. In sum, the portfolio became more fragmented as budget support funds were repro-
grammed towards project-based activities. 
The World Bank decided to resume budget support in Malawi in 2017 after the IMF had signalled their 
return to the country. The first tranche of the World Bank GBS credit amounts to USD 80 million and is 
linked to conditionality. The conditions focus mainly on reform in two areas – agriculture and PFM. The IMF 
programme focused on the strengthening of PFM and the implementation of prudent fiscal policies (IMF, 
2017a). The conditionality from both programmes is likely to shape and influence Malawi’s PFM policies in 
the near future. It appears that GBS from bilateral donors is very unlikely to resume in the near future re-
gardless of policy changes in Malawi; this will therefore remain an option only for multilateral donors. 
Figure 15 Donor commitments for Malawi by aid type and year 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
  
 
50  OECD creditor reporting system definitions are used for the different aid type categories. ‘Basket funds/pooled funding’ is defined as a modality 
under which the donor relinquishes the exclusive control of its funds by sharing the responsibility with other stakeholders. ‘General budget sup-
port’ and ‘sector budget support’ in contrast, share the responsibility with the recipient. ‘Other’ includes all other aid inflows such as project-type 
interventions or technical assistance. 
51  Germany, Norway, DFID and the Flanders International Cooperation Agency contribute to a basket funding arrangement for health and education, 
while the AfDB resumed SBS for these sectors. 
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Figure 16 Malawi: shares of aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
Note: The graph displays the distribution of the aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS. It also shows which and to what 
extent the other aid modalities absorbed the decline in GBS. The calculation was conducted as follows: First, the distribution – or 
relevance – of the different aid modalities before (2012 and 2013) and after the exit (2014 and 2015) are calculated by dividing the 
disbursements of each aid modality by the total aid disbursements (two years before and after the exit). The difference between 
these two values gives the increase in relevance of each modality. In the final step, the distribution among the modalities that 
experienced an increase in their relevance since the exit is calculated by dividing the increase in relevance by the sum of all in-
creases. 
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4.1.2 Impact of the exit in Malawi 
In Malawi, the exit effects are mostly negative. PFM, domestic accountability and budget transpar-
ency are an exception to this rule, as the Cashgate scandal and the subsequent exit from multi-donor 
GBS showed the government the urgent need for reforms in these areas (see Figure 17). These findings 
stand in contrast to results from the evaluation synthesis (discussed in chapter 0) which have been 
positive. 
The eight impact areas have been analysed using two different methodological approaches and hence the 
causal inference is slightly different across these impact areas. All impact areas have been analysed using a 
comparative case study design. For PFM, the evaluation team used public expenditure as well as domestic 
accountability and budget transparency process tracing, and they were therefore able to verify the causal 
relationship for these impact areas with even higher scrutiny. 
Figure 17 Effects of the exit from budget support in Malawi 
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Source: own, icons provided by Dave Gandy from www.flaticon.com  
Policy dialogue 
With the exit from multi-donor budget support, the dialogue structure in Malawi collapsed and was 
only partially re-established in 2015. The quality of the re-established dialogue stayed behind the lev-
els of the dialogue under budget support. High-level policy dialogues stopped in 2013, going hand in hand 
with the exit from budget support. The dialogue on PFM continued after a short break due to internal and 
external pressure. The Cashgate scandal had shown the need to reform the PFM system, which created 
internal reform pressure. The donors amplified reform pressure with a constant push for dialogue. According 
to donors’ and partners’ statements, the quality of discussions on PFM decreased compared to budget sup-
port times. It appears that the lack of high-level dialogue caused this decline in quality. The dialogue that 
still exists in some sector working groups (SWG) was not sufficient to compensate for the loss of high-level 
political dialogue. 
Harmonization among donors 
The aid portfolio became more fragmented after the exit and harmonization consequently decreased. 
Most of the aid formerly delivered through multi-donor budget support is now delivered through off-budget 
project support. Sector-wide approaches are still in place in the health and education sectors, but have dis-
appeared in others. High fragmentation in aid generally impedes harmonization and ownership. 
Even in the assessment of the possible return to budget support, fragmentation was visible. In 2015, 
EC and World Bank jointly developed a policy matrix; based on this, both organizations evaluated the pos-
sibility of a budget support return. One year later, the two donors shifted to different performance matrices, 
with the World Bank returning to GBS. For the EC, the decision to resume GBS was still outstanding at the 
time of the evaluation. 
Good evidence base
Poor evidence base
Moderately positive effect
No change or opposing effects 
Slightly negative effects 
Moderately negative effects
Strong negative effects 
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Public expenditure 
Process tracing is applied in addition to the comparative case study design to verify the causal effect of the 
exit from GBS on public expenditure. Public expenditure is analysed for the health, education and agricul-
ture sectors because these policies typically intend to reduce poverty, and studies have shown that expendi-
ture in these sectors is very effective in reducing poverty (Gomanee et al., 2005; Wilhelm and Fiestas, 2005; 
World Bank, 2007). Growth in the agriculture sector is on average at least twice as effective in reducing 
poverty as growth outside agriculture according to the World Development Report 2008 (World Bank, 
2007). Some of these programmes – for example, agriculture subsidies programmes – might be less poverty 
relevant in reality than they intend to be. Yet, evidence has shown that these programmes are still pro-poor 
and generate benefits through higher and more drought-resilient yields (Arndt et al., 2015). Public expendi-
ture for these sectors is the best available proxy to measure the budgetary effort for poverty alleviation. 
The hypothetical mechanism for public expenditure displays how the level of public expenditure for 
education, health and agriculture dropped after the exit from budget support (see Table 8). The evaluation 
team developed the hypothetical mechanism based on prior information and first explorative interviews. 
Given the significance of budget support in the national budget and the fragility of the Malawian fiscal 
situation, the mechanism shows how public expenditure diminished after the exit despite the inclusion of 
public expenditure targets in the prior action conditions by the World Bank for a re-entry. 
The scope conditions considered in designing the mechanisms are as follows (for details see section 
4.1.1): 
 A massive theft of public funds, known as Cashgate scandal led to the exit from budget support 
 The PFM system had fundamental weaknesses and the level of corruption was high 
 The share of GBS was roughly 15% of the total state budget 
 In 2015 and 2016, Malawi was hit by severe droughts and flooding 
Table 8 Hypothetical mechanism for Malawi leading to the decline in public expenditure 
Donors 
 
Suspend GBS but signal willingness to relaunch BS or similar financing modalities… 
… if conditionality is met (including those related to public expenditure [PE])  
Donors and part-
ner government 
Have fewer possibilities for policy dialogue 
Donors Continue to finance PE for education, health and agriculture through off-budget support but 
not on-budget 
GoM Does not have sufficient resources to sustain or improve PE levels 
 The level of public expenditure declines 
Source: own 
Note: A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.11. 
All donors stopped GBS disbursements to Malawi, and signalled the willingness to relaunch budget 
support subject to certain preconditions. Donors have recorded the exit in official documents, statements 
and press releases, which has been confirmed by all donor and government representatives (doubly deci-
sive).52 The donors signalled willingness to lift the suspension if certain preconditions were met. The World 
Bank, for example, formulated nine prior actions to ‘strengthen expenditure management and accountabil-
ity in public finances’ and ‘make agricultural markets work better’ (World Bank, 2017a; hoop test). The PFM 
prior actions especially include reforms regarding the performance and reliability of IFMIS, as well as budget 
transparency. The agriculture focus addresses the inefficiently managed Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
(FISP). This has not been a poverty-targeted programme and consumed the vast majority of public spending 
in agriculture, crowding out expenditure in other important areas (World Bank, 2017a). Conditionality of 
other instruments, such as the Health Services Joint Fund, requires the government to allocate at least 9% 
 
52  Throughout the following sections on public expenditure, PFM and domestic accountability and budget transparency, you will find methodological 
information referring to process tracing. For further information on this method, see section 3.2. 
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of the total budget to health. Similar arrangements can be found in the education sector (doubly decisive). 
As country reports and interviews have well documented this part of the mechanism, the overall confidence 
is high (probability of 0.946). 
Box 1 Joint funds in the health and education sectors 
These joint funds in the health and education sectors pool funding from several donors that is spent in 
alignment with national priorities; however, the funding is not disbursed through national systems. In-
stead, the fund is implemented through fiduciary agents and private banks. This private institution admin-
istration is supposed to guarantee control over financial flows. Only if donor conditions are met (e.g. allo-
cation levels to health and education sectors by the government), will extra funds be made available. Some 
interview partners discuss problems in harmonization as they face different requirements in the set-up 
and operation of the fund; for example, if funding has to be provided on- or off-budget. Disagreements in 
the operation of the fund among donors and the administration through private institutions tend to cause 
a slow-down in the implementation of the joint fund. However, interview partners consider the joint fund 
a good modality to face the exit from GBS, given the availability of resources and technical advice. 
The suspension of budget support decreased the opportunity for donors to have a meaningful high-
level policy dialogue. Right after the Cashgate scandal and the subsequent suspension of multi-donor 
budget support, the main dialogue forum – the ‘Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS)’ – ceased to 
exist. Dialogue now only takes place at the technical level in the SWGs, which do not address overarching 
questions or cross-sector issues, among them decisions on budget allocation. Therefore, we have high con-
fidence that the technical dialogue has much weaker leverage in influencing the public expenditure pattern 
(hoop test). As a result, the quantity as well as the quality of policy dialogue decreased (smoking gun). As 
one representative from the partner side put it ‘now there is some dialogue, but not at the same level. The 
momentum was lost and there is no incentive for continued policy dialogue’. Furthermore, it has been re-
ported by donors that bilateral donors’ access to decision makers declined since the exit, as they cannot 
engage with the partner government in policy dialogue meetings (smoking gun). Overall, we are cautiously 
confident that this mechanism part is true (probability of 0.846). 
After the exit, donors continued to support the education and health sectors through off-budget sup-
port, while on-budget support declined in general. Malawi received humanitarian aid following the exit 
as the lack of funds and climate shocks in the subsequent years could not be offset by domestic revenue 
mobilization. The GoM declared a state of disaster in April 2016 and was able to mobilize financial assistance 
from international partners, mixed with own funding, of around USD 150 million (World Bank, 2016a). Do-
nors provided emergency support to improve food security, agriculture, nutrition, protection and education 
(hoop test). The first joint programme after the budget support exit was agreed on in September 2015 when 
the Health Services Joint Fund was created. In 2015, AfDB provided SBS in the health and education sectors 
as a short-term funding, while other donors chose to stick to project-based financing, or financing activities 
implemented by CSOs (doubly decisive). The proportion of off-budget aid53 in the total aid inflows increased 
from 82% in 2012 to 99.6% in 2014. At the same time, the donor fragmentation was noticeable as joint fund-
ing virtually disappeared (hoop test). Because of these pieces of evidence, the overall confidence in this 
mechanism part is cautiously confident (probability of 0.815). 
As a result of the declining multi-donor support to the budget, the GoM did not have sufficient re-
sources to maintain budget allocations to education, health and agriculture (in absolute and relative 
terms). As one of the main revenue sources for the GoM disappeared and expenses for debt service soared, 
the fiscal deficit increased leading to more borrowing and thereby even higher debt service costs (hoop 
test). Droughts and floods aggravated this situation in 2015 and 2016. Against this background, it is not 
surprising that the level of public expenditure declined (measured in percentage of GDP) especially for 
health and agriculture (not shown here). One should remember that on a per capita basis GDP has been 
declining since the exit so that less budget per citizen was available. Interestingly the relative level of public 
expenditure (measured in percentage of the total budget) also declined since the exit in 2013. This finding 
 
53  All types of aid flows except GBS, SBS and pooled funding, based on CRS data. 
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holds even if the agriculture sector is excluded, which received less funding because of the prior action to 
reduce subsidies to the highly inefficient FISP programme (see Figure 18). These findings increase our con-
fidence in the hypothesis (doubly decisive) to a level of cautious confidence (probability of 0.776). 
Figure 18 Malawi’s budget allocation (in % of total budget) – decreases in education, health and ag-
riculture 
 
Source: own, based on GoM data 
The exit from budget support caused a decline in public expenditure. The budget allocations for 
health, education and agriculture declined in absolute terms (measured in percentage of GDP) and 
their relative share in the total budget declined as well.54 This means these sectors were over-propor-
tionally affected by the budget support exit. 
Public financial management 
The hypothetical causal mechanism for PFM is outlined in Table 9 and shows how the reform dynamics 
for PFM were sustained. The prospect of donor returns in combination with the need to address the Cash-
gate scandal led to the creation of a PFM action plan. Its implementation was the driver behind the reform 
progress. For the scope conditions please refer to the previous section on public expenditure. 
Table 9 Hypothetical mechanism for Malawi leading to robust reforms in PFM 
Donors 
 
Suspend BS, but signal willingness to relaunch BS or similar financing modalities … 
… if conditionality is met (e.g. relaunch of IMF structural reform programme) 
GoM Addresses Cashgate scandal issues through PFM Action Plan 
IMF Provides suggestions on further PFM reforms and monitors performance of IMF structural bench-
marks regarding PFM to assess relaunch 
GoM 
 
Implements PFM Action Plan and IMF reform suggestions and  
… exerts higher discipline in budget execution 
NAO Provides a higher number and detail of audits 
 The dynamic of PFM reform is robust
Source: own 
Note: A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.11. 
 
54  This fact is consistent throughout all data sources. 
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Donors suspended budget support, but signalled their willingness to relaunch budget support or sim-
ilar financing modalities. The fact that all donors simultaneously suspended budget support following the 
Cashgate scandal is undisputed and proven by numerous reports (hoop test; IMF, 2014a; World Bank, 2017a). 
The EC and the World Bank earmarked the suspended funds for future disbursement, so they would be still 
available for a relaunch (hoop test). The fact that EC and World Bank worked on a common set of conditions 
upon which they would relaunch their budget support programme shows the willingness to continue their 
support (doubly decisive). In sum, we are reasonably certain that donors suspend budget support but signal 
willingness to relaunch it or similar financing modalities (probability of 0.964). We are also cautiously con-
fident (probability of 0.86) that a main prerequisite for the relaunch of GBS and other pooled financing was 
a successful IMF review. Donors and people from academia confirmed that the IMF has been very influential 
because IMF decisions serve as a benchmark for other donors. 
The GoM created a PFM Action Plan to address deficiencies in the PFM system that led to the Cash-
gate scandal. The PFM Action Plan was drafted with input from GBS donors (CABS, 2013). It included reme-
dial measures to fix the problems in the PFM system (hoop test). The measures included, for example, a 
forensic audit or identification of security gaps in the IFMIS software (IMF, 2014a). Shortly afterwards the 
government signed the PFM Action Plan and put it into action (doubly decisive). The team is almost certain 
that this mechanism part happened as described (probability of 0.994). 
IMF documents and interviews have confirmed that several donor missions monitored and assessed 
the PFM performance and additional PFM reform steps were agreed on. In 2014, following the develop-
ment of the PFM Action Plan, Malawi met only four out of seven performance criteria in the IMF review 
(doubly decisive; IMF, 2015a). During that process, Malawi and the IMF agreed on a structural reform agenda. 
Reform goals included, for example, fiscal adjustment or PFM reforms to ‘address weaknesses revealed by 
the Cashgate scandal and restore confidence and trust in the budget process’ (doubly decisive; IMF, 2015a, 
p. 2). The compliance with these reform goals was assessed in the following IMF missions to Malawi in 2016 
and the indicators were ‘back on track’. Regarding PFM it was noted that ‘the implementation of PFM re-
forms was progressing slowly, but has recently gained momentum’ (IMF, 2016a, p. 15). The confidence in this 
mechanism part is cautious (probability of 0.753). 
Although not all goals have been achieved, the PFM Action Plan and IMF structural benchmarks have 
been largely successfully implemented. According to their own assessment, the GoM worked continu-
ously on the PFM targets set by their action plan and the IMF (hoop test), and according to IMF reviews and 
interviews, the goals have been met partially (doubly decisive). One example that illustrates how the PFM 
system is improving, but at a low rate, is the target on bank reconciliation: Bank reconciliation was a key 
prior action of the reform process and has been moving forward. So far, it has been completed for the finan-
cial year 2015/2016, but not for the financial years from 2009 to 2015. The confidence in this mechanism part 
is high (probability of 0.892). 
It appears that the MoFEPD exerts higher budget discipline after the exit, even though there is con-
tradictory evidence. Data on budget execution is scarce and only provided in aggregated form, making 
budget scrutiny difficult and unreliable. While the systems to enforce fiscal discipline improved – for exam-
ple, by enforcing monthly fiscal reporting (hoop test; IMF, 2016a) – the budget execution only improved 
during the first half of FY2016/17 (IMF, 2017b). One sign of improvement is the declining level of domestic 
financing since 2014 (see Figure 19). Owing to a lack in evidence, the evaluation team is only slightly more 
confident than not that this mechanism part is true (probability of 0.593). 
The performance of the NAO improved since the exit, which is evidenced by the increase in the num-
ber and detail of audit reports since the exit. With the Cashgate scandal and the exit from budget support, 
increasing attention was given to good auditing so that the NAO Auditor General received more political 
and financial support (hoop test). The NAO has provided a higher number of financial audits after the exit 
and reduced a seven-year backlog in reporting, partly with support from donors (doubly decisive). Problems, 
however, remain as financial reports are still provided with some delays. Challenges regarding the human 
resources could be the reason. The Auditor General stated in a 2017 newspaper interview that 43% of the 
technical positions in the national audit office are vacant and that ‘only 20% possesses relevant professional 
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and academic skills’ (Khamula, 2017). Overall, we are cautiously confident in this mechanism part (probabil-
ity of 0.65). 
Figure 19 Large budget deficits and high but declining domestic financing (in % of GDP)  
 
* IMF projection 
Source: IMF Malawi Country Report 2017 (IMF, 2017b) 
The exit from multi-donor budget support created momentum for PFM reform in Malawi due to ex-
ternal pressure. The exit from budget support had such a strong financial impact on Malawi and once 
it was realized that donors would not return if things remained the same, PFM reforms were ad-
dressed. The IMF and the World Bank integrated PFM reforms into the prior actions of their credit 
lines so that the GoM was eager to reform PFM to regain external financial support. Initially, the 
Cashgate scandal was certainly a setback for PFM reforms in Malawi, but it also visualized the neces-
sity to improve PFM. 
Domestic accountability and budget transparency 
For Malawi, the robustness of multi-donor budget support effects on budget transparency and do-
mestic accountability against the exit from the modality was tested with process tracing. A combina-
tion of external and domestic incentives led to this change (see Table 10). Following the literature on 
democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, either domestic or external incentives or both can trigger changes 
in domestic accountability (Cheeseman, 2015; Crawford, 2000; Joseph, 1997; Levitsky and Way, 2006). It ap-
pears that both strands were present in Malawi and led to an improvement of domestic accountability and 
budget transparency since the exit.  
Description of the hypothetical process:  
When donors suspended their budget support payments due to the Cashgate scandal, they also signalled 
the willingness to relaunch budget support or similar financing modalities if a certain conditionality – 
including reforms on budget transparency and domestic accountability – was fulfilled. This external incen-
tive could have motivated the GoM to push reforms in order to secure future financing. Also, the Cashgate 
scandal could have further sensitized CSOs and domestic accountability institutions (DAI) for shortcom-
ings in transparency and accountability. As a result, CSOs and DAI could have demanded budget infor-
mation from GoM – increasing the domestic pressure or incentives. As a response to these possible de-
velopments, the GoM provided more and better quality budget information to the public and allowed DAI 
to participate in the budget process. This enabled DAI and CSO to conduct budget scrutiny and provided 
policy recommendations to the GoM. The GoM reacted positively to these recommendations and adapted 
its policies. 
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The first mechanism part and the scope conditions were described in the previous paragraphs on public 
expenditure and PFM and apply to this mechanism as well. 
Table 10 Hypothetical mechanism for Malawi leading to robust effects on budget transparency and 
domestic accountability 
Donors Suspend GBS but signal willingness to relaunch BS or similar financing modalities 
if conditionality is met (including BT-related conditionality) 
GoM 
[DAI & CSO] 
Is motivated to secure future financing 
[Demand budget information from GoM] 
GoM Provides more and high quality budget information to the public and 
allows DAI to participate in the budget process 
DAI  DAI conduct budget scrutiny and provide policy recommendations to GoM 
GoM Reacts positively to these recommendations and changes its policies  
 Budget transparency and domestic accountability are improving 
Source: own 
Note: Square brackets represent the domestic incentive. A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the as-
signed probabilities can be found in Annex 7.11. 
The GoM was motivated to improve domestic accountability in order to secure future financing, 
which shows that external incentives played a role. The GoM reacted with a one-year delay to donor 
incentives and pressure, possibly because it took time to realize that the donor threat of not returning was 
credible. The reform dynamic started to take off after this one-year delay with the GoM addressing the prior 
actions ascribed by the World Bank and the IMF (smoking gun). The confidence in this mechanism part is 
rated as high (probability of 0.867) and the internal strand of the mechanism seems to be of high relevance 
too. 
Figure 20 Internal and external incentives as triggers for policy change 
 
Source: own 
The DAI and CSO demanded budget information from the GoM in reaction to the exit and the Cash-
gate scandal. Hence, it appears that internal incentives also played a role; therefore the combination 
of internal and external incentives triggered a policy change (see Figure 20). Among donors and part-
ners, there is broad consensus that DAI and CSO increased pressure on the government to improve account-
ability and transparency because the Cashgate scandal had been too massive to ignore (doubly decisive). 
The scandal shook up the Malawian public and augmented awareness for issues of domestic accountability 
in the society. The media – consistently described as independent and strong – also focused strongly on 
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domestic accountability issues in the aftermath of the scandal by investigating and following up on allega-
tions. An important role for the internal incentive channel is the parliamentary opposition. The general elec-
tion of 2014, only one year after the scandal, shifted powers in parliament. As a result, no party has an ab-
solute majority, which helped to strengthen the role of parliamentary oversight from the opposition parties. 
The confidence that CSO and DAI conduct more scrutiny is rated as cautiously confident (probability of 0.8). 
In response to these incentives the GoM started to provide more and higher quality budget infor-
mation to the public and allowed DAI to participate in the budget process. The access to budget infor-
mation is generally perceived as good and has been improving since the exit, as confirmed by CSOs and 
donors (smoking gun). After 2014, the GoM started to make budget planning data publicly available (see 
Figure 21). This undisputable improvement has its limitations because data on budget execution is scarce 
and only available at an aggregated level. The MoFEPD website provides some evidence that transparency 
on budget expenditure is still problematic. The folder ‘Budget Execution’ is empty, while the folder ‘Budget 
documents’ contains 22 documents.55 Figure 21 shows that the availability of documents remains constant 
or improved with the exception of audit reports.56 
Figure 21 Public availability of budget documents before and after the exit in Malawi 
 
Source: Open Budget Survey 2017 (Kubalasa, 2017) 
Note: The availability of the document shows a great variance and does not always follow a clear trend in the four countries so it 
was therefore decided to use a conservative approach, which ensures that negative ‘changes in availability’ reflect definitely dete-
riorations. This is why the lowest value before the exit is compared to the highest value after the exit. ‘Lowest availability pre-exit’ 
includes the minimum value for the 2010 and 2012 surveys and ‘Highest availability post-exit’ includes the maximum value from 
2015 and 2017 surveys. 
The participation of DAI in the budget process has substantially improved as well as the output of the 
NAO. Despite the fact that publications of current audit reports seems to be declining a seven-year backlog 
in financial reports has been cleared since the exit and provides a basis for better budget transparency in 
the future (smoking gun). The reduction of the backlog was part of the World Bank’s prior action for a new 
Development Policy Operation credit (World Bank, 2017a), as well as the access to information bill. The bill 
was passed in 2017 and is considered a milestone because it allows public access to government information. 
Yet, parliamentarians and CSOs also claim that these changes were the result of domestic pressures. There-
fore, it is unclear if the domestic incentive, the external incentive or both were decisive. Even though im-
provements in output were achieved, the NAO still lacks independence, because reports from the NAO are 
presented to the Minister of Finance first and only thereafter to the parliament. This process undermines 
 
55  It should be noted that for some sectors information on budget execution is available in different folders. 
56  It should be noted that the method of representation compares the minimum of available documents prior to the exit (two surveys – 2010, 2012) 
with the maximum of available documents after the exit (two surveys – 2015, 2017). This constitutes a conservative approach because declining 
availability is by all measures a decline. 
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the oversight function and independency of the NAO because issues addressed by the NAO are likely to 
affect mostly the MoF.57 Overall, budget transparency seems to be slightly improving and the confidence in 
this mechanism part is high (probability of 0.870). 
Equipped with better information, DAI were able to carry out better budget scrutiny and provide 
policy recommendations to the GoM. The parliament’s budget scrutiny is apparently improving compared 
to the budget support era (hoop test). The open budget index confirms this because the budget oversight 
by legislature increased from moderate in 2012 to strong in the 2015 assessment (Kubalasa, 2015). A repre-
sentative from the civil society said: ‘The way the parliament is constituted right now, with lots of members 
of the opposition party, budget scrutiny is quite strong.’ This quote also shows that development is not 
solely attributable to the exit from budget support. A stronger opposition in parliament is enhancing the 
budget scrutiny and might be a different ‘piece of the puzzle’ to explain why domestic accountability and 
budget transparency improved. CSOs are increasingly involved in the budget process through requests from 
MPs and provide policy recommendations. This not only helps CSOs to convey their messages, but it also 
helps MPs to fulfil their budget scrutiny role. However, CSOs have limited or no access to expenditure data, 
although MPs rely on and appreciate their analysis (doubly decisive). This contradictory evidence and the 
unequivocal evidence only allows us to be cautiously confident that this mechanism part is true (probability 
of 0.859). 
It appears that the GoM reacted positively to recommendations from CSOs and DAI and changed its 
policies accordingly, but there is also contradictory evidence. The GoM is now providing a platform for 
DAI to present recommendations (hoop test). The implementation of the access to information bill is an 
example for the inconclusiveness of the findings. It remains controversial whether the GoM implements 
these recommendations (doubly decisive) or not. While DAI and MoF confirm that the GoM is acting on the 
recommendations, donors and CSOs are not aware of the GoM’s reaction to any recommendation (contra-
dictory doubly decisive). It has been argued that even if this bill is passed, funding will determine if it actually 
increases accountability and transparency or remains a lip service. It seems that both groups have an equally 
high incentive to be biased in their presentation of the facts. However, the statements from DAI and MoF 
have a somewhat higher sensitivity because they are more likely to know the right answer, giving their 
statements a higher post confidence. Due to the contradictory evidence, we are only a little more confident 
than not that this mechanism part is true (probability of 0.71). 
Since the exit, domestic accountability in Malawi has continued to improve on both the demand and 
the supply-side due to external and internal pressure. The effect is, at least partly, caused by the exit 
from multi-donor budget support. The prospect of a donor return and domestic incentive stemming from 
pressure of CSOs and parliamentary opposition demanding higher budget transparency and more domestic 
accountability is evidence of improvements on the demand-side and has simultaneously led to improve-
ments in domestic accountability. The internal pressure is, however, mostly the consequence of the Cash-
gate scandal and the exit from budget support was, at most, additional proof of the gravity of the situation. 
Service delivery 
In Malawi, the evidence gathered in interviews suggests that service delivery deteriorated after the 
exit from multi-donor GBS and had negative repercussions on the amount and quality of services 
delivered in the health and education sector. For example, in UNICEF’S national budget brief (2017) it is 
stated that ‘the ability of the GoM to provide essential public services to children and to respond to the 
humanitarian crisis, has, in recent years, been severely constrained by limited fiscal space […] increasing 
debt service costs and reduced budget support by donors’. The pupil-teacher ratio increased from 61 in 2010 
to 66 in 2015, which implies a worsening of service delivery in the education sector. Other data on service 
delivery in the social sector after the exit is not available.58 
 
57  A bill is reportedly under way to change this process. The bill will also protect the tenure of the auditor general because so far the president could 
dismiss him any time. 
58 Even very recent reports from the World Bank 2016, 2017 do not provide data on service delivery after 2013 (Ravishankar et al., 2016; World Bank, 
2017b). 
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Non-income poverty 
It appears that the exit from multi-donor GBS had no sizeable impact on non-income poverty as 
trends in the health and education sector continued. Data on education and health show that non-in-
come poverty improved while budget support was disbursed. Figure 22 indicates that the primary comple-
tion rates were dropping in the early years of budget support but have been increasing since 2007 and 
throughout the exit. The indicators on health show that the situation has been improving constantly since 
the inception of budget support (see Figure 23), and continued to do so after the exit. Finally, Figure 24 
shows that between 2010 and 2015 indicators for under-nutrition have continued to decline, which is sur-
prising given the severe humanitarian crisis in the survey year (2015) and accelerated demographic growth. 
This means that non-income poverty has improved during the exit from budget support; however, a causal 
link has not been established in any study. 
Figure 22 Education indicators for Malawi 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
Figure 23 Health indicators for Malawi 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
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Figure 24 Trends of under-nutrition in Malawi 
 
Source: Malawi post disaster needs assessment (World Bank, 2016a) 
Macroeconomic performance 
The national budget was financed up to 15% by GBS. Therefore, the exit hit the country’s economy 
particularly hard and macroeconomic indicators deteriorated afterwards. Figure 25 shows the detri-
mental macroeconomic situation Malawi was facing after the exit. GDP growth per capita has been negative 
in 2015 and 2016 and the level of central government debt has been increasing from around 40% of GDP to 
over 50% of GDP in the same period. Interestingly the short-term repercussions on the GDP growth were 
less pronounced than in the other countries. The GDP growth rate was slightly above the sub-Saharan 
growth average in the year of and after the exit (see Figure 71). The IMF (2017c) and the World Bank (2015a) 
concluded that the exit from GBS led to the build-up of debt (especially domestic debt). The exit from multi-
donor GBS ‘placed the Government’s fiscal accounts under enormous pressures. These pressures resulted 
in a substantial increase to the budget deficit, which reached a value equivalent to 8.6 percent of GDP in 
the 2013/14 fiscal year, compared to 1.3 percent in 2012/13’ (World Bank, 2015a, p. 4). The breakdown in fiscal 
discipline resulted in a large accumulation of arrears and thereby debt.59 The total value of outstanding ar-
rears, owed mostly to utilities and private creditors reached the equivalent of 7.9% of GDP in 2013/14 (World 
Bank, 2015a). This breakdown of fiscal discipline and increased debt levels would have been less likely if GBS 
and its inputs (conditionality, technical assistance etc.) were still in place.  
The large fiscal deficit pushed the GoM into high domestic borrowing, which typically has adverse 
effects for the exchange rate, inflation and crowds out private borrowing (IMF, 2017c). Both domestic 
and external debt increased by an amount roughly equivalent to 10% of GDP. However, domestic debt had 
been much lower prior to the exit (see Figure 25). The annual domestic borrowing increased from -0.2% of 
GDP to 5.9% of GDP in the year of the exit (2013/14) and remained high at 4.8% of GDP in the following year 
(World Bank, 2015a). This domestic borrowing from the central bank dampened private sector investment 
and limited economic growth. The cost of all debt service payments increased from the equivalent of 2.4% 
of GDP in 2012/13 to 6.0% in 2013/14. Figure 26 shows that the share of tax revenue required to cover debt 
service costs increased from 13–15% during the GBS period to 20–25% after the exit, which was worsening 
the already tight fiscal situation further. The costs were particularly high due to high interest rates and the 
short-term profile associated with government securities. The World Bank (2015a, p. 16) concludes that the 
high cost of borrowing in combination with the exit from GBS and the unstable economic situation has 
created ‘a vicious cycle of domestic debt dependency’. 
 
 
59  Arrears are essentially a form of off-balance sheet domestic borrowing that takes liquidity out of the domestic private sector and undermines 
future investment. 
49
52,5
47,1
37,1
25
17,3
12,8 11,7
6 6 4 2,7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000 2004 2010 2015
in
 %
Stunting
Underweight
Wasting
44    4.  |  The exit from budget support and its impact: four case studies 
Figure 25 Malawi macroeconomic context – GDP growth, debt and expenses 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
The unattractive interest rate in combination with the decline in foreign currency inflows (GBS pay-
ments) probably had negative effects on the exchange rate. As laid out by the IMF, Malawi’s ‘exchange 
rate came under considerable depreciation pressure in the latter stages of 2014’ (IMF, 2015a). This was be-
cause of the seasonal phenomenon due to the end of the tobacco harvest, which was exacerbated by the 
high interest rate. The current account deficit also increased because of the exit. The value of the current 
account deficit increased from the equivalent of 1.8% of GDP in 2013 to 5.1% of GDP in 2014, ‘primarily due 
to the large decline in grants resulting from the suspension of donor support’ (World Bank, 2015a, p. 11). 
Figure 26 Malawi: increase of the debt level (especially domestic) and debt service costs 
  
Source: Malawi Country Report (IMF, 2015a) (left), own (right) 
Due to the large share of budget support in the country’s budget, it is very likely that the omission of 
budget support contributed to the macroeconomic instabilities. It is hard to imagine how any country 
could offset a sudden 15% decline of its budget and not experience any macroeconomic instability. Although 
it is difficult to accurately assess how the GDP would have developed if budget support were still in place, 
it seems that in the case of Malawi the importance of budget support was simply too large to not have a 
negative effect on the economy. 
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4.2 Rwanda 
4.2.1 The exit from budget support in Rwanda 
After allegations of Rwanda’s involvement in human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), GBS donors gradually suspended their activities between 2008 and 2013 (see Figure 27). 
Sweden and the Netherlands were the first to suspend their GBS payments in 2008 in reaction to Rwanda’s 
alleged involvement in the armed conflict in DRC. In 2012, the EC, Germany and the UK followed suit by 
suspending their payments for the same reason. The donor community considered budget support to be 
instrumental to foster political stability in post-genocide Rwanda to prevent the country from slipping back 
into conflict (Molenaers et al., 2013). Rwanda’s involvement in DRC was seen as a source of further destabi-
lization in the region, which stood in stark contrast to otherwise very positive developments in terms of 
poverty reduction and economic growth in the country. Already the comparison between the Rwandan and 
the Malawi case shows that a uniform exit strategy did not exist and different donors regarded different 
incidences as no longer tolerable, which implied an exit. 
Figure 27 Timeline of budget support in Rwanda 
1999    2003  2008  2013 
 Budget support is 
introduced 
    Budget Support Harmoniza-
tion Group is introduced 
1st multiparty parliamentary 
elections 
Sweden and Nether-
lands suspend BS af-
ter the release of a 
UN report exposing 
Rwanda’s support of 
a Tutsi rebel move-
ment in DRC 
 Germany, EC 
and UK shift to 
SBS 
   
Kagame is elected 
as president 
  
Sweden and UK delay 
BS payments due to a 
threatened military in-
cursion by Rwanda into 
the DRC   
Germany, EC and UK 
suspend BS due to 
ongoing involvement 
in DRC 
 2000    2004  2012  
Source: own 
Note: For a summary of country-related information and findings, see also the country-sheet Rwanda on DEval’s website at 
www.deval.org. 
Rwanda started to receive GBS in 1999 from nine donors. GBS contributed on average 12% of the 
government’s budget between 2002 and 2014. The year before the exit this value rose to 18% (see 
Figure 12) (OECD, 2018a; World Bank, 2017c). In 2003, a ‘Budget Support Harmonization Group’ was estab-
lished to enhance the coordination of budget support in Rwanda. Rwanda’s threat to intervene in DRC be-
came an issue for donors as early as 2004 and induced delays of budget support payments by Sweden and 
the UK (Molenaers et al., 2016). Regardless of these early interruptions in disbursements, Rwanda received 
a total of USD 823 million in GBS and over USD 1 billion in SBS between 2000 and 2013. The largest donor 
of GBS was the UK, and the World Bank was the largest donor of SBS. Budget support payments by Germany 
amounted to USD 46 million (6% of total GBS) in GBS, and USD 8.5 million in SBS (1% of total SBS) (OECD, 
2018a) (for details see Annex 7.13). 
Changes in the aid portfolio 
After donors’ exit from GBS, Rwanda was temporarily facing a lower level of donor financing as both 
the Rwandan government and donors took some time to adjust to the suspension of budget support. 
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Since 2013, the total amount of donor financing reached levels similar to the GBS period, although the ma-
jority of it is provided in the form of project funding (see Figure 28). In 2013, budget support by the EC, 
Germany and the UK was reinstated, but shifted to SBS (Molenaers et al., 2016). Since the exit from GBS, 
SBS disbursements in fact increased and remained at more or less constant levels. However, only a single 
or very few donors per sector provide SBS in accordance with the government’s ‘Division of Labour’ plan. 
The Rwandan government introduced a division of labour among donors to coordinate donor support, 
assigning each of them to specific sectors. With a few exceptions, each donor is now active in a maximum 
of three sectors in order to improve coordination and reduce transaction costs, and to better contribute to 
the government’s national development strategy. In some sectors, only a single donor is active in SBS (e.g. 
Belgium in health). The division of labour forced some donors to change their sector portfolios (e.g. Ger-
many had to leave the health sector). However, the division of labour helped to avoid the problem of over-
crowding some sectors while underfunding others. 
Overall, the aid portfolio became much more fragmented and joint programming occurs only in a few 
sectors and programmes. Figure 29 shows that since the exit from GBS, the distribution of aid modalities 
changed in a way that predominantly favours project-type interventions and, to a much lesser extent, SBS 
and contributions to multilateral programmes and funds. Among the modalities with an increased share in 
Rwanda’s post-exit aid portfolio, project-type interventions account for approximately 70% of all increases. 
In other words, the switch in modalities, which was triggered through the exit from budget support, led to 
a strong increase in importance of project-type intervention. 
Figure 28 Donor commitments for Rwanda by aid type and year 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
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Figure 29 Rwanda: shares of aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
Note: The graph displays the distribution of the aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS. It also shows which and to what 
extent the other aid modalities absorbed the decline in GBS. The calculation was conducted as follows: First, the distribution – or 
relevance – of the different aid modalities before (2012 and 2013) and after the exit (2014 and 2015) are calculated by dividing the 
disbursements of each aid modality by the total aid disbursements (two years before and after the exit). The difference between 
these two values gives the increase in relevance of each modality. In the final step the distribution among the modalities that ex-
perienced an increase in their relevance since the exit is calculated by dividing the increase in relevance by the sum of all in-
creases. 
4.2.2 Impact of the exit in Rwanda 
In Rwanda, mostly positive effects of budget support contrast with mixed effects of the exit from 
budget support. While the effect was negative on public expenditure, policy dialogue and harmoni-
zation, the effect on domestic accountability and service delivery is positive and constant for non-
income poverty and PFM (see Figure 30). 
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Figure 30 Effects of the exit from budget support in Rwanda 
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Source: own, icons provided by Dave Gandy from www.flaticon.com  
Policy dialogue 
In Rwanda, the high-level political dialogue was discarded after the exit from multi-donor GBS, and 
the dialogue shifted to a technical dialogue within sector working groups. The already existing SWG 
continued and provided a forum for sector-oriented discussion, although with high variance in performance, 
depending on the sector. However, the high-level dialogue forum, the Budget Support Harmonization 
Group, did not meet again after the exit and it was replaced by the Development Partners Cooperation 
Group (DPCG). This new dialogue forum does not address issues at national level – such as budget planning 
and management, questions of allocation and PFM – to the same extent as before, even though the DPCG 
has almost the same composition as the previous budget support dialogue forum. Donors perceive the qual-
ity of the meetings as lower, the agenda seems to be overloaded and the rather formal style of the meetings 
is not conducive to open policy dialogue. The donors perceived that there was a decline in the quality of the 
partner government’s information, making decision making more difficult. In sum, the high-level political 
dialogue has not been replaced, which seems to be an intentional decision by the government of Rwanda 
(GoR) to gain stronger control over their politics and policies. This can be perceived either as a sign of in-
creased government ownership or as unwillingness for dialogue: the partner government used the former 
narrative, donors the latter. Nevertheless, the government introduced a monitoring system in every sector 
aiming to measure sectoral reform progress. 
Harmonization among donors and access to decision makers 
Since bilateral donors’ exited from GBS, donor harmonization substantially reduced and aid became 
fragmented and dominated by off-budget projects. The fragmentation already began when donors took 
individual, uncoordinated decisions to either suspend or stop budget support programmes, differently in-
terpreting the conditionality attached to budget support programmes. In terms of aid portfolios, a shift from 
budget support to predominantly off-budget projects took place, leading to a decrease in coordination. Co-
ordination, if at all, is only happening at the sector level, for example in the area of PFM, or in individual 
programmes. Furthermore, the GoR decided to implement a ‘division of labour’ in donor support, dividing 
the donors among the sectors and letting a maximum of three donors operate in one sector. This govern-
ment decision strengthened sector harmonization, but hampered overall harmonization among donors. The 
European Commission together with the Member States increased their efforts in joint programming to 
foster harmonization, but the Member States do not always align their programmes and agreement between 
all involved parties is a resource intensive process (EU, 2018). 
Public expenditure 
Rwanda’s budget after the exit has lower budget allocation for agriculture and education, while the 
health budget remained more or less constant (see Figure 31). Agriculture, education and health received 
around 30% of the total budget over the period between 2010/11 and 2016/17. The focus of the GoR has 
Good evidence base
Poor evidence base
Moderately positive effect
No change or opposing effects 
Slightly negative effects 
Moderately negative effects
Strong negative effects 
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shifted towards fostering economic growth as evidenced by the Second Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II) for the period between 2013 and 2018. This strategy defines the acceleration 
of GDP growth and becoming a middle-income status country as core objectives. Poverty alleviation is also 
part of the strategy, but seems to be a lower priority than economic growth. Health and education are, for 
example, only part of a cross-cutting focus area and not a single thematic area like ‘Economic Transfor-
mation’ or ‘Productivity and Youth Employment’ (MINECOFIN, 2013). Since the exit, the level of public ex-
penditure has been steadily declining. 
 
Figure 31 Rwanda’s budget allocation (in % of total budget) – decreases in education and agriculture 
 
Source: own, based on MINECOFIN data 
Note: The two-year average of annual GDP values has been used to estimate the GDP for the respective fiscal years. 
Public financial management 
The Rwandan government considers good PFM as crucial for a solid budgeting process and public 
funds management, and as a means to increase the confidence of the donor community. The process 
of improving PFM started during the budget support era, but continued after the exit from multi-
donor GBS thanks to government ownership. The first PFM Action Plan was introduced in 2006, followed 
by the first Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment in 2007. These steps led to 
a comprehensive Five-year PFM Strategy 2008-2012. The PFM reform during budget support benefited 
largely from the TA/CD accompanying budget support, and the sound PFM and budget discipline have been 
enablers for good budget management. The momentum in the PFM reforms process has been sustained 
after the exit and continues to improve. After the exit, a second PFM Strategy 2013-2018 was introduced. 
This strategic plan is supported by a basket fund, which includes policy dialogue and was probably a key to 
the continued success. Examples of improvements after the exit are the alignment of the budget classifica-
tion with the Chart of Accounts60 or the establishment of IFMIS by the MINECOFIN. In general, it appears 
that the budget discipline is similar to the level during the multi-donor GBS period and the introduction of 
IFMIS is expected to improve and strengthen the system further. One repeated concern expressed by do-
nors is the reliability of data made available by the government, which is surprising given that the IMF assists 
 
60  Based on the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001. 
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in the provision of the financial data. In general, the development post-exit is positive, especially compared 
to other areas or countries. 
Domestic accountability and budget transparency 
In Rwanda, the supply-side and demand-side of domestic accountability have not been negatively 
affected by the exit and show an improving tendency. Mechanisms to fight corruption are functioning 
well. Ombudsmen, police, the Auditor General, parliament and CSO are collaborating and committed to 
fight corruption. The open budget index increased from values around 10 prior to the exit to values above 
20 after the exit (Mugisha, 2017). The accountability systems created during budget support are still in place. 
On the supply-side, the Auditor General is, for example, reporting to parliament, the governance board, 
ombudsman and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants. However, according to the open budget in-
dex, budget oversight by audit institutions has declined from ‘strong’ prior to the exit to ‘moderate’ or ‘weak’ 
after the exit (Mugisha, 2017).61 Reasons for the low values are the lack of independence (the Auditor General 
can be removed without legislative or judicial approval) and missing external oversight (audit processes are 
not reviewed). 
On the demand-side, domestic accountability is slightly improving as well. After the exit, a law was 
passed in 2013 (GoR, 2013) that will support the demand-side’s access to information. Rwandan NGOs and 
the Office of the Ombudsman launched a web portal to make the process of requesting access to govern-
ment documents easier. However, the implementation of both has been weak (Freedom House, 2017). Some 
CSOs are invited to the parliamentary debate on the budget proposal, but proposals from civil society are 
not translated into the budget planning. Overall, it seems that domestic accountability continues to improve 
slowly despite the exit. 
Figure 32 High robustness for the availability of budget documents in Rwanda 
 
Source: Open Budget Survey 2017 (Mugisha, 2017) 
Note: The availability of the document shows a great variance and does not always follow a clear trend in the four countries, so it 
was decided to use a conservative approach, which ensures that negative ‘changes in availability’ reflect definitely deteriorations. 
This is why the lowest value before the exit is compared to the highest value after the exit. ‘Lowest availability pre-exit’ includes 
the minimum value for the 2010 and 2012 surveys and ‘Highest availability post-exit’ includes the maximum value from 2015 and 
2017 surveys. 
Transparency on budget design is formally maintained, both at central and local level, while the qual-
ity and overall budget transparency seems to be declining since the exit from GBS. Figure 32 shows 
that the publication of important budget documents did not decline after the exit according to the Open 
Budget Survey (Mugisha, 2017). The publication of in-year reports definitely improved, while the availability 
of other documents fluctuated prior and after the exit. State budget proposals are now widely available for 
 
61  Because of changing survey questions, these results do not necessarily mean that the oversight function of the supreme audit institutions has 
declined. 
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consultation, including online and in three languages, according to the partner side. These findings contrast 
with the evaluation team’s survey – depicted in Figure 33. According to the survey, the online availability of 
budget information has clearly declined since the exit from GBS. Only budget execution reports continued 
to be published online after the exit, while the Auditor General’s reports and detailed statistics are no longer 
published. From the donor perspective, there is an issue with both the availability and quality of information. 
This is especially true for information on budget execution, which could be the result of a weaker dialogue 
on PFM issues. Since the provided budget data is often regarded as incorrect, the possibility for accurate 
budget analysis, budget forecasting and accountability is also compromised. 
 
Figure 33 Total number of available budget documents from Rwanda’s Ministry of Finance website 
 
Source: own, based on accessible information from the MINECOFIN website (MINECOFIN, 2017) 
Note: Reports assessed are ‘financial reports’ from the Auditor General, available ‘budget data’ and annual ‘budget execution re-
ports’. This analysis only includes series of reports that appeared more than three times. 
Service delivery 
Figure 34 Education service delivery in Rwanda 
 
Source: 2016 Education Statistical Yearbook (MINEDUC, 2016) and Statistical Yearbook 2012 (NISR, 2012) 
 
In Rwanda, the level of service delivery has improved slightly since the exit. For example, the student-
teacher ratio for primary schools declined from 59 to 58 between 2012 and 2016; for secondary schools from 
23 to 19 (see Figure 34). This indicates that service delivery has not been negatively affected by the exit, but 
it might have improved faster if GBS was still disbursed. A similar picture can be found in the health sector 
where the number of health workers (doctors, nurses and midwives) has slightly improved since the exit 
(see Figure 35). The number of hospital beds jumped from roughly 17,500 in 2012 and to 19,000 in 2013. This 
implies that preconditions for service delivery are improving, but beds alone will not improve health care 
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service delivery and come under infrastructure rather than service. The Rwanda governance scorecard, 
which was developed in 2011 by an independent government organization,62 confirms these findings as the 
quality of service delivery is improving according to this survey. However, in the most recent assessment, 
service delivery shows the lowest performance of all eight governance indicators63 (see Table 11) (Rwanda 
Governance Board, 2016) and social sector service delivery is the sub-sector with the lowest score and only 
62.2% of citizen express satisfaction with service delivery in social welfare sector. Since the scorecard is 
developed by an institution with government ties, it should be viewed with caution. 
 
Figure 35 Health service delivery in Rwanda 
 
Source: Statistical Year Book 2012 and 2016 (NISR, 2012, 2016) 
Table 11 Service delivery satisfaction in Rwanda  
 
2011 2012 2014 2016 
Quality of service delivery 66.21 70.44 72 72.93 
 Δ compared to last version 4.23 1.56 0.93 
Source: Governance Scorecard 2016 (Rwanda Governance Board, 2016) 
Explanations for the slightly improved service delivery output might be government programmes 
such as the service charter for citizens or the free basic education programme. The service charter for 
citizens was passed in 2012 detailing standards for service delivery rendered at various administrative levels 
(Government of Rwanda, 2013). It intends to provide information about available services to service seekers, 
and to oblige the service providers to actually provide the service. The introduction of the charter may be 
regarded as an improvement, which occurred after several donors had already suspended their budget sup-
port payments. Another programme that might have triggered positive results is the compulsory health 
insurance in 2008, which covers around 90% of the population. A country report indicates that the insurance 
has improved access to quality health care, but it relies on heavy subsidies. At the same time, the free basic 
education programme was prolonged from 9 to 12 years and might have had similar effects (or at least the 
student-teacher ratios were not weakened by lower student numbers) (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016a). 
 
62  Rwanda Governance Board. 
63  Rule of Law; Political Rights and Civil Liberties; Participation and Inclusiveness; Safety and Security; Investing in Human and Social Development; 
Control of Corruption, Transparency and Accountability; Quality of Service Delivery; and Economic and Corporate Governance. 
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Non-income poverty 
Non-income poverty in Rwanda seems to be stable in the health sector and slightly declining in the 
education sector. The analysed education indicators (see Figure 36) show that since the exit from multi-
donor GBS there has been a slight deterioration in the primary completion rate (declined by eight percent-
age points between 2012 and 2015) and a stagnation in the mean years of schooling. Health indicators con-
tinued to improve (e.g. lower prevalence of undernourishment, infant mortality rate, under-five mortality 
rate) – a trend that started at the time of budget support programmes and continued through the exit from 
GBS (see Figure 37). 
Figure 36 Education indicators for Rwanda 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
Figure 37 Health indicators for Rwanda 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
Macroeconomic performance 
The repercussions of the exit on Rwanda’s GDP growth have been limited; the shortfall in aid has 
been offset by extensive (external) debt accumulation. Between 2013 and 2016, the Rwandan economy 
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grew by an average of just 6.8%. This value is somewhat lower than for the preceding four-year period, where 
the average GDP growth rate was 7.6% (2008-2012) (see Figure 38). The data confirms that this decline is 
not a global or regional economic cycle but due unusually to low GDP growth in the year following the exit. 
GDP growth rates have been at least 3 percentage points above the sub-Saharan average between 2011 and 
2016, except for 2013 when it was 0.1 percentage points below (see Figure 71). Right after the suspension of 
multi-donor GBS the Rwandan government focused on a number of short-term, temporary solutions to 
compensate for cash-flow problems resulting from the aid suspensions. These solutions included accumu-
lating more arrears and debt. The increased issuance of debt also increased the financing costs for the Treas-
ury bills and crowded out domestic borrowing (Cassimon et al., 2016). As a result, credit growth rates in the 
economy (in real values) plummeted after the exit, but quickly recovered to previous levels (see Figure 39). 
Declining levels of bank lending to the private sector reduce future economic growth (Takáts and Upper, 
2013). In the case of Rwanda, this decline was probably short enough to prevent more severe consequences. 
In 2013, Rwanda issued its first Eurobond on the international debt market, which was diverted to extend 
external borrowing. Rwanda’s public debt has been steadily increasing since 2013 (World Bank, 2017d), 
mostly as a result of higher external debt (see Figure 40). 
Figure 38 Rwanda macroeconomic context - increasing revenues and robust GDP 
 
Source: Rwanda Economic Update (World Bank, 2016b) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
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Figure 39 Rwanda real credit growth rate recovered after the shock of the exit 
 
Source: Rwanda Economic Update 2015 (World Bank, 2015b) 
Figure 40 Increase of external debt in Rwanda 
 
Source: IMF Staff reports (IMF, 2012, 2013a, 2014b, 2015b, 2016b) 
The GoR reacted to the substantial withdrawal of donor support with fiscal consolidation and thereby 
prevented more severe economic consequences. The relevance of the government budget for the econ-
omy has been very high in Rwanda (World Bank, 2015b). At the same time, the budget has been largely 
financed through budget support and other forms of aid (18% of central government expenditure as shown 
in Figure 11; World Bank, 2015b). To fill the financial gap created by the GBS exit, the government promoted 
fiscal consolidation and domestic resource mobilization. Rwanda reformed its tax policy and revenue ad-
ministrative measures to boost domestic revenues, so that revenues increased by 4 percentage points of 
GDP from 2012 to 2015 (IMF, 2017d). As Figure 38 shows, revenue mobilization has been steadily improving 
throughout the exit and contributed to a stable macroeconomic situation. These adjustments, however, 
could not prevent an increase of the current account deficits. It deteriorated from 7.4% of GDP in 2013 to 
11.8% of GDP in 2014, to its lowest value in the past 20 years. More than half of this deterioration can be 
attributed to the decline in public current transfer which was mainly budget support (World Bank, 2015b). 
Yet, the exchange rate remained stable throughout the period and started to climb to its long-term average 
in the 2000s and 2010s (World Bank, 2015b). 
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4.3 Uganda 
4.3.1 The exit from budget support in Uganda 
In 2012, the involvement of the Prime Minister’s Office in a massive corruption scandal and plans of 
the government to implement a law criminalizing homosexuality led donors to first suspend and later 
exit budget support. It was discovered that USD 15 million had been diverted from a recovery programme 
for Northern Uganda to the Office of the Prime Minister. Donors responded resolutely because – although 
not the worst corruption scandal since 1998 – it involved the direct misuse of external funds (see Table 14; 
Williamson et al., 2016). By 2010, donors had responded to the pervasive high level of corruption. Germany 
for example cut its budget support payments by 10% on these grounds. The total volume of freezes in aid 
by donors is estimated to be worth USD 372 million, equivalent to around 5% of the government budget 
(Bogetic et al., 2015). This case shows that donors have an implicit limit of tolerance regarding corruption, 
but not an explicit exit strategy. 
Table 12 Estimated amount of suspended aid following the 2013 corruption scandal 
Aid/country Suspended BS com-
mitments 2012/13 in 
million USD 
Suspended BS of 
commitments 
2012/13 
Suspended ‘other 
aid’ in million 
USD 
Total suspended 
in million USD 
 Austria  2.67 50.09% -  2.67 
 Belgium  12 100.00% -  12 
 Denmark  9.4 63.69% 17.87 27.27 
 EU  33.21 100.00% -  33.21 
 Germany  4 50.00% -  4 
 Ireland  11.34 100.00% 11.16 22.5 
 Norway  - - 44.99 44.99 
 Sweden  2.31 33.29% 2.74 5.06 
 UK  13.24 36.73% 7.5 20.74 
 World Bank 200 100.00% -  200 
TOTAL 2.67 87.95% 84.27 372.44
 
Source: Analysis of Impact of Aid Suspension in Uganda (JBSF, 2013) 
Prior to 2012, Uganda had undergone periods of budget support suspensions due to poor performance 
in terms of democratization and macroeconomics (see Figure 41). In 2002, most donors – including the 
two largest: the World Bank and the UK – suspended GBS payments after the government of Uganda (GoU) 
had announced to cut the budget of several ministries to ramp up the defence allocation. Between 2005 and 
2007, donor discontent with the national budget triggered smaller budget support suspensions or cuts. In 
2006, prior to the general elections, President Museveni modified the constitution in order to run for a third 
term and imprisoned the leading opposition candidate. In response to these actions, many donors sus-
pended their budget support disbursements, although democratization was not part of the conditionality. 
To address this and other shortcomings, the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) was introduced in 2008 
(Williamson et al., 2016). 
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Figure 41 Timeline of budget support in Uganda 
1998   2005 2007 2010   
 Budget support is 
introduced 
  Constitutional 
change to lift the 
presidential term 
limit 
Suspension of BS 
by UK and Nether-
lands due to gov-
ernance concerns 
BS cut by 10% from all 
donors due to preva-
lence of massive high-
level corruption 
   
BS is suspended due higher 
defence spending (at the ex-
pense of social spending) 
Opposition leader Be-
sigye is arrested and 
Museveni wins presi-
dential election  
JBSF is intro-
duced to in-
clude govern-
ance condition-
ality in BS 
Exit from BS af-
ter corruption 
scandal in the 
Office of the 
Prime Minister 
 2002   2006 2008 2012 
Source: own 
Note: For a summary of country-related information and findings, see also the country-sheet Uganda on DEval’s website at 
www.deval.org. 
GBS funds constituted up to 29% of the total government revenue between 2004 and 2014 (MoFPED, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2015), but declined over time (see Figure 42 and Figure 12). The 
relevance of budget support funds for the budget was modest overall, but might have been higher if it were 
not for the numerous suspensions and cutbacks. For Uganda, SBS was financially of much greater im-
portance than GBS. Between 2002 and 2014, SBS totalled roughly USD 1.6 billion, while GBS amounted only 
to USD 0.6 billion. The largest donors were the EC, the World Bank and the UK. Germany provided GBS for 
six years, amounting to USD 45 million or 7% of the total GBS payments (for details see Annex 7.13). 
Figure 42 Declining share of BS in the Ugandan central government’s budget 
 
Source: Background to the Budget, GoU 2009-2014 (MoFPED, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2015) 
Changes in the aid portfolio 
Since the multi-donor exit, the aid budget has been restructured from GBS towards project support 
and pooled funding. In 2012, the aid budget was significantly reduced due to the exit from GBS and because 
aid was not immediately reprogrammed. Once reprogrammed, the aid focus shifted mostly towards project-
type interventions and, to some extent, results-based financing and basket funding. Based on our calcula-
tions, 96% of the GBS funds were reprogrammed – directly or indirectly – towards project-type interven-
tions (see Figure 44). This means that project-type interventions account for 96% of the modalities that 
gained in relevance in the aid portfolio; contributions to programmes and funds absorb a mere 4% of the 
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GBS funds. Regardless of the absence of GBS, the level of total aid inflows quickly reached levels similar to 
the budget support era and has been higher than ever before in 2015 (see Figure 43). 
Figure 43 Donor commitment for Uganda by aid type and year 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
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Figure 44 Uganda: shares of aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
Note: The graph displays the distribution of the aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS. It also shows which and to what 
extent the other aid modalities absorbed the decline in GBS. The calculation was conducted as follows: First, the distribution – or 
relevance – of the different aid modalities before (2012 and 2013) and after the exit (2014 and 2015) are calculated by dividing the 
disbursements of each aid modality by the total aid disbursements (two years before and after the exit). The difference between 
these two values gives the increase in relevance of each modality. In the final step the distribution among the modalities that ex-
perienced an increase in their relevance since the exit is calculated by dividing the increase in relevance by the sum of all in-
creases. 
SBS and GBS virtually disappeared in Uganda and a return to the same extent as before seems highly 
unlikely. Some SBS activities were continued after the suspension was lifted, but are currently being phased 
out64 and represent only a minuscule fraction of the aid portfolio. The EC is considering to reinstall SBS. The 
Ugandan government representatives tend to prefer budget support or other on-budget financing to off-
 
64  It is unclear in which year they will actually end. 
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budget financing. However, the allocation focus of the government has shifted from social sectors to infra-
structure, agriculture and energy, which makes a return to GBS less likely. 
4.3.2 Impact of the exit in Uganda 
For Uganda, generally positive effects of budget support are contrasted with negative effects of the 
exit from budget support. Only for service delivery and non-income poverty, the data does not show 
a negative tendency until now (see Figure 45). 
Figure 45 Effects of the exit from budget support in Uganda 
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Source: own, icons provided by Dave Gandy from www.flaticon.com  
Policy dialogue 
Since the exit in Uganda, there is less government involvement in donors’ programmes and less donor 
involvement in government decisions due to a collapse in dialogue structures, especially at the high 
level. Although other dialogue forums still exist, including the EU Article 8 dialogue or the National Part-
nership forum, they are either less inclusive or provide lower quality dialogue than the former budget sup-
port high-level political meetings, and they do not cover macroeconomic and budget-related issues. The 
Local Development Partners Group also continued after the exit and tried to take over the function of the 
high-level political dialogue of the budget support era. However, this forum is said to have fallen behind its 
predecessors in terms of quality of discussions. The GoU seems to be pushing a sector-dialogue approach 
with 16 SWGs still in place. However, the effectiveness of the SWGs strongly depends on the push of donors. 
While dialogue in those sectors work, there is a very fragmented, overlapping and incoherent government 
dialogue in other sectors. In addition, the focus on milestones and targets that existed during budget sup-
port disbursements has become less important in the SWG. One exception is the dialogue on PFM-related 
subjects, which takes place within the public expenditure management committee and offers quality dia-
logue on the topic. 
Harmonization among donors and access to decision makers 
Ending GBS weakened the harmonization among donors, even though coordination forums for PFM 
and the Local Development Partner Group still exist. Since the exit from budget support and the shift 
towards nearly exclusively project-type interventions in the aid portfolio, there is a lack of harmonization in 
the sectors – this is the most severe impact of ending budget support. A notable exception is the PFM Basket 
Fund and the complementary Local Development Partners Group, which stand out as still functional coor-
dination forums, providing some harmonization at the sectoral level. 
Public expenditure 
The government shifted its priorities towards productive sectors, hence the share of budget alloca-
tions into health and agriculture decreased. The goal of the government is to achieve the status of a 
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middle-income country and raise the GDP per capita level. Consequently, the five-year average for the share 
of the allocations for agriculture and health in the total budget decreased by roughly 5 percentage points 
after the exit (2013-2017) compared to the average five years prior to the exit (2008-2012). The budget for 
the education sector, on the other hand, increased by roughly 5 percentage points over the same periods. It 
should be noted, however, that this increase is driven by an extremely low education budget from 2008 to 
2010, where it represented only 5% of the total budget compared to 14% just before the exit. Figure 46 
displays these changes and shows that public expenditure in percentage of GDP reached similar levels in 
2017 as in 2012, the year of the exit. Bogetic et al. (2015) note that budget support contributed to maintaining 
a constant level of expenditure in the education, health and water sectors. With the absence of this source 
of financing, a lower budget was allocated to the sectors. The budget allocation for all three sectors com-
bined, measured as percentage of GDP, declined slightly from 5.56% in 2011 to about 4.5% in the years after 
the exit, which underscores the declining relevance of social sector support. 
Figure 46 Uganda’s budget allocation (in % of total budget) – decreases in health and agriculture 
 
Source: own, based on MoFPED data 
Public financial management 
Uganda has been a strong performer in PFM matters over much of the last decade and multi-donor 
budget support has provided significant support in this area (Bogetic et al., 2015). Achievements were 
made in the areas of budget credibility, PFM, procurement and audits, upstream governance and accounta-
bility, and strengthening local government systems, although less so in public sector management (World 
Bank, 2015c). 
Effects on PFM after the exit from GBS are mixed but in aggregate slightly negative, as some PFM 
reforms are continuing after the exit, while other areas suffer from the absence of a performance 
assessment. After the exit, a high-level action matrix (HLAM) was developed by the Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) to address donors’ concerns and prepare the ground for a 
possible relaunch of budget support. Part of this HLAM was to target weaknesses in the PFM system by 
passing the PFM Act in 2015. Other improvements in PFM relate to the work-in-progress that stretched from 
budget support and the agreed actions in the HLAM. In some areas, the performance deteriorated, like 
budget controls and credibility, due the absence of the assessment framework after the exit from GBS. 
The continued positive developments in PFM are not only the repercussions of progress during 
budget support; they are also the product of larger investments by the government. Before the exit, 
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UGX 4.5 billion (Ugandan Shillings) were invested in PFM reform, while after the exit from GBS the govern-
ment funding increased to UGX 26.5 billion. The Secretary to the Treasury announced that the third Finan-
cial Management and Accountability Programme (FINMAP III) would continue even without donor support, 
confirming the government’s determination to continue improving PFM. 
Domestic accountability and budget transparency 
The exit from multi-donor GBS led to a reduction in demand-side domestic accountability, due to the 
absence of external control and performance assessment. Once GBS was suspended, the donor commu-
nity introduced a HLAM, which defined the conditionality that the GoU would need to fulfil in order to lift 
the suspension of GBS. Although to a large extent the GoU managed to fulfil the HLAM conditions, donors 
did not relaunch GBS disbursements. The government lost interest and saw little incentive to adhere further 
to principles of accountability; in addition, the donors neglected the focus on the monitoring of results. The 
misappropriation of funds in the Office of the Prime Minister – that led to the exit from budget support – 
eventually triggered reforms in domestic accountability. In response, the GoU for example started to pub-
lish more budget statements and introduced a more inclusive debate on budget proposals. 
Enhanced transparency did not translate directly into enhanced accountability, because traction and 
means to hold the government to account were limited for the demand-side. One reason for the de-
clining accountability might be the high turnover of members of parliament (MPs) following elections, which 
weakens the demand-side. Another indication for declining demand-side accountability is that the inclusion 
of CSOs in the budget process has diminished since the exit. While a selection of CSOs was invited and were 
actively involved in policy dialogue on a wide set of budget issues (including budget execution) during the 
budget support period, the CSO involvement is now formally limited to a role in budget planning. Although 
CSOs are formally involved in both pre- and post-budget dialogue, it seems as if their proposed changes to 
the planned budget are not considered. It remains therefore uncertain if the government is committed to 
include demands of civil society in budget planning, or if it merely uses civil society’s involvement as a le-
gitimization for the proposed budget allocations. According to the Open Budget Survey, the budget over-
sight by legislature is moderate and has been declining since the exit (Namagga, 2017). Oversight is espe-
cially weak during the implementation stage of the budget cycle (Namagga, 2017). 
Figure 47 Publication of online reports on the Ugandan MoF website has remained constant 
 
Source: own, based on accessible information from the MINECOFIN website (MINECOFIN, 2017) 
Note: Reports assessed are ‘Approved Budget Estimates’, ‘Background to the Budget’, ‘Draft Budget Estimates’, ‘National Budget 
Framework Paper’ and ‘Public Investment Plan’. This analysis only includes series of reports that appeared more than three times. 
 
The supply-side of domestic accountability and the transparency in budget planning formally im-
proved. Budget transparency is slightly improving if measured by the amount of budget statements pub-
lished as shown by Figure 47. This finding is confirmed by the Open Budget Survey, which shows that the 
publication of documents has been constant with one exception: a citizen’s budget is no longer published 
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which diminishes the accessibility of the budget for citizens (see Figure 48). The oversight function of the 
supreme audit institution in Uganda seems to be strong and is only limited by a lack of adequate resources 
(Namagga, 2017). 
Figure 48 Public availability of budget documents in Uganda 
 
Source: Open Budget Survey 2017 (Namagga, 2017) 
Note: The availability of the document shows a great variance and does not always follow a clear trend in the four countries so it 
was decided to use a conservative approach, which ensures that negative ‘changes in availability’ reflect definitely deteriorations. 
This is why the lowest value before the exit is compared to the highest value after the exit. ‘Lowest availability pre-exit’ includes 
the minimum value for the 2010 and 2012 surveys and ‘Highest availability post-exit’ includes the maximum value from 2015 and 
2017 surveys. 
Service delivery 
Figure 49 Education service delivery in Uganda 
 
Source: 2015 Statistical Abstract (UBOS, 2015) 
The decline in public expenditure to potentially poverty-relevant sectors had no negative effect on 
service delivery, which remained more or less constant. The data presented in Figure 49 and Figure 50 
show that education and health indicators for service delivery remained largely constant. Only the pupil per 
classroom ratio in primary schools worsened slightly from 57 students per classroom before the exit to 59 
students in 2014. The student-teacher ratio for primary and secondary schools improved after the exit. For 
health services, Figure 50 shows that the Ugandan population tends increasingly to go to professional health 
facilities and rely less on self-medication or pharmacies. This finding suggests that service delivery has im-
proved between 2008 and 2015. Yet, the improvement could have occurred entirely during the multi-donor 
budget support era or be the result of a shift in preferences towards a more professional first source of 
treatment within the population. The majority of interview partners stated that the quality of social sector 
service delivery has been compromised by the budget reductions for these sectors. Corruption is regarded 
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as a widespread phenomenon, which negatively affects service delivery. These statements are hard to cor-
roborate so that our overall assessment is that service delivery has so far not been negatively affected. 
 
Figure 50 Uganda’s health service delivery measured by first source of treatment in case of sickness 
 
Source: Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2016/17 (MOH, 2017) 
Non-income poverty 
The budget reductions in education and health after the exit did not affect service delivery and so far 
do not seem to have had an effect on non-income poverty. The data presented in Figure 51 shows a 
constant increase in life expectancy and decrease in infant and under-five mortality rates during budget 
support and after the exit. A similar trend unfolds related to education indicators (see Figure 52): the mean 
years of schooling increased constantly over the last 15 years, while the literacy and primary completion 
rates remained constant at unsatisfactory levels. For all three indicators a break in the trend is not visible. 
Overall, this leaves us to assume that the implications of the exit from GBS did not have repercussions in 
health and education indicators, at least so far. 
Figure 51 Health indicators Uganda 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
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Figure 52 Education indicators Uganda 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
Macroeconomic performance 
Uganda quickly reached macroeconomic stability after the end of multi-donor budget support due to 
fiscal adjustments. The effects of the aid suspension on macroeconomic stability were not as severe as in 
the case of Malawi, but the growth rate recorded in FY 2012/13 was the lowest in over 20 years. It stood at 
3.3%, 1.7 percentage points below the sub-Saharan average (in 2011 it was 5.0 percentage points above the 
regional average; see Figure 71). According to the World Bank this declines was partly due to ‘the slow take-
off of investment projects and the freeze to budget support by development partners’ (World Bank, 2015d, 
p. 6). As shown in Figure 53, GDP per capita grew at a lower rate after the exit from GBS than during the 
GBS period, while government expenditure decreased, which is a clear sign that fiscal adjustments were 
undertaken in response to the exit from GBS. The IMF (2013b) estimated that the exit from GBS would re-
duce the fiscal space and require adjustments to the budget in the amount of 1.5% of GDP. The data shows 
that such an adjustment took place at least partly – reduction of around 0.75% of GDP according to the IMF 
(2013b). Government expenditure declined from 15% of GDP in 2011 to 11% of GDP in 2015 (IMF, 2013b). 
Figure 53 Uganda macroeconomic context - GDP growth and government expenses 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
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The GoU reacted to the financial shock of the exit from GBS by increasing the level of debt, especially 
domestic debt. Since the exit from GBS in Uganda in 2012, the level of public debt increased from 24% to 
30% in 2014 and stands at 40% in 2017 (IMF, 2017d). This increase in the share and level of domestic debt 
creates the risk of crowding out private borrowing by pushing up the interest rates and thereby of lower 
growth rates (World Bank, 2015d). 
4.4 Zambia 
4.4.1 The exit from budget support in Zambia 
The exit from multi-donor GBS in Zambia was not the result of one major scandal, but of a gradual 
process of declining importance of budget support for Zambia. Budget support steadily declined from 
contributing 7% of the budget in 2010, to 3.2% in 2011, reducing further to 0.9% by 2013 and 0.5% by 2014. 
The reason for this decline was a combination of three main factors: (1) performance indicators were not 
met; (2) Zambia had developed into a LMIC in 2011; and (3) the general donor appetite for budget support 
per se was decreasing because of the global financial crisis, increased accountability requests in the home 
societies and reports about misappropriation of funds related to the instrument. Due to this evolution, it is 
hard to say when budget support ended exactly. The relevance of budget support was already only marginal 
between 2012 and 2014. 
The multi-donor budget support era in Zambia is characterized by very high total GBS payments (only 
five countries worldwide received more GBS during that time65) and a relative scarcity of major scan-
dals. The only major scandal during the budget support era in Zambia was for corruption in the Ministry of 
Health, which led to the suspension of budget support by some donors in 2009/10, including Germany (see 
Figure 54). Budget support in Zambia was predominantly provided as GBS, and the disbursements amounted 
to around USD 1 billion between 2000 and 2014, while SBS amounted to USD 300 million. Germany’s allo-
cation (USD 66.9 million) was responsible for 6.4% of all GBS disbursements in that time (for details see 
Annex 7.13). The dependency on GBS for the government was already small prior to the exit, as in 2011 the 
share of GBS in the central government expenditure was only 4% (see Figure 12). 
Figure 54 Timeline of budget support in Zambia 
2005   2008 2011 2014   
 Budget support is intro-
duced 
Zambia receives debt re-
lief under HIPC66 initiative 
  President Mwanawasa 
dies in office and Ru-
piah Banda is elected 
new president 
President Sata 
becomes the 
new president 
Lungu wins election for 
the remainder of Sata’s 
term 
   
 
     
Partial suspension of BS 
due to corruption in the 
health ministry 
The last donors 
exit BS; President 
Sata dies in office 
Lungu is ap-
proved in reg-
ular election 
    2011 2013  2015 
Source: own 
Note: For a summary of country-related information and findings, see also the country-sheet Zambia on DEval’s website at 
www.deval.org. 
High copper prices, increasing foreign investments and access to the global capital market allowed 
the country to become independent from budget support and decreased the incentives to meet the 
 
65  Only Ghana (USD 2.7 billion), Jordan (USD 2.8 billion), Mozambique (USD 3.0 billion), Tanzania (USD 3.8 billion), and Egypt (USD 5.4 billion) re-
ceived more GBS between 2000 and 2014 (OECD, 2018a). 
66  HIPC: heavily indebted poor country. 
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conditionality. As the world market price for copper reached record highs between 2006 and 2008, and 
again between 2010 and 2013, Zambia’s revenues as the 8th largest copper producer in the world (USGS, 
2017) increased overnight. In addition to that, the government issued its first sovereign bond (Eurobond) on 
international markets in 2012, and thereby gained access to USD 750 million of finance. This new financial 
independency greatly reduced the incentive for the government of Zambia to meet performance indicators. 
Zambia had already been struggling to meet the performance indicators prior to 2012 and donors left or 
suspended budget support out of dissatisfaction with this development. Conversely, the Zambian govern-
ment perceived the conditionality as too ambitious and claimed that performance indicators became harder 
to achieve once they went off-track, because target values not achieved in a previous year would be added 
to next year’s target values. 
Zambia’s status as a LMIC made it harder for donors to justify budget support against their constitu-
ents and made donor funding more expensive for the government of Zambia. Figure 55 shows how the 
transition from a low-income country to a LMIC in 2011 coincides with a shift in donor funding from grants 
to loans. Since loans only have a ‘grant element’, they are less attractive than grants from the borrower 
perspective. At the same time, foreign direct investment (FDI) increased and played a much more important 
role than donor funding between 2010 and 2015. 
Figure 55 Declining donor support is substituted by FDI and grants are replaced by loans 
 
Source: own, based on MoF data, and UNCTADstat (UNCTAD, 2017) 
Changes in the aid portfolio 
Since the exit, GBS funds have been reprogrammed mostly towards project-type interventions and 
some pooled funding. As Figure 56 shows, GBS has been virtually absent since 2013 and has only partly 
been replaced by new pooled funding. After the exit, funding was increasingly delivered through SBS, pro-
ject-type interventions, multilateral programmes and funds, and support of private bodies such as NGOs 
(Figure 57). The level of total aid flows also increased slightly, even though partners claim that the exit from 
budget support has left significant gaps in funding, while donors argue that ending GBS did not change the 
volume of aid. An explanation for these contrasting perceptions might be that donor support is now directed 
towards sectors such as energy instead of pro-poor sectors, and mostly concessional loans instead of grants 
are provided. A multi-donor trust fund for PFM has been set up since the exit and PFM reform dynamics 
finally reached a moderately satisfactory level in 2017.67 
The IMF is considering a return to Zambia with a programme that would focus on fiscal consolidation. 
This could signal to other donors and investors that confidence in the economy is increasing. The 
 
67  The fund is likely to turn into a ‘single’ donor trust fund, as the UK is not planning to participate in a second phase and the contribution of the 
third member Finland are negligible compared to Germany’s and UK’s contributions. 
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return of an IMF programme has been anticipated since 2014, but has not yet materialized due to two pres-
idential elections, which made the required reforms politically unattractive (Arndt et al., 2015). Weaknesses 
in PFM were highlighted by the IMF in June 2017 as a key area of required improvement for an IMF engage-
ment (IMF, 2017e). Other donors explained that a return of SBS is only possible once this IMF programme is 
running. 
Figure 56 Zambia donor commitment by aid type and year 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
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Figure 57 Zambia: shares of aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
Note: The graph displays the distribution of the aid modalities before and after the exit from GBS. It also shows which and to what 
extent the other aid modalities absorbed the decline in GBS. The calculation was conducted as follows: First, the distribution – or 
relevance – of the different aid modalities before (2012 and 2013) and after the exit (2014 and 2015) are calculated by dividing the 
disbursements of each aid modality by the total aid disbursements (two years before and after the exit). The difference between 
these two values gives the increase in relevance of each modality. In the final step, the distribution among the modalities that 
experienced an increase in their relevance since the exit is calculated by dividing the increase in relevance by the sum of all in-
creases. 
4.4.2 Impact of the exit in Zambia 
In Zambia, mostly positive effects of budget support are compared with mostly negative effects of 
the exit from budget support. One exception is the constant level in public expenditure since the exit 
from multi-donor budget support. A constant mode of campaigning for two subsequent presidential 
elections seems to explain this stable level (see Figure 58). 
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Figure 58 Effects of the exit from budget support in Zambia 
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Source: own, icons provided by Dave Gandy from www.flaticon.com  
Policy dialogue 
In Zambia, ending GBS reduced the frequency, quality and inclusiveness of policy dialogue, especially 
at higher political level. The abandoned high-level political dialogue was partly replaced by dialogue in the 
context of the Cotonou Agreement. However, this dialogue forum is less inclusive than the earlier one, as 
only the government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) and representatives of EU Member States participate 
in it. Sector advisory groups are mostly still active, for example in energy and health, but include fewer 
stakeholders and depend strongly on GRZ and donor priorities. Regarding PFM, some of the former budget 
support dialogue is now taking place within the structures of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund on PFM. Generally, 
there seems to be much less willingness of the government to participate in dialogue with the donors than 
was the case during the disbursement of budget support. Further, since the collapse of the budget support 
dialogue (PRBS), CSOs are no longer included in a formal dialogue structure. 
Harmonization among donors and access to decision makers 
Since the end of GBS, the donor landscape experienced a shift from harmonization to bilateralization, 
when many of the positive achievements during multi-donor budget support disappeared after the 
exit. Harmonization had already been declining towards the end of budget support as the disagreement 
regarding performance indicators and disbursement decisions became more substantial. The decline of har-
monization manifested in the increase in off-budget project support and the decline of policy dialogue. Co-
operation among donors is rare and is, if at all, only taking place at the level of certain sectors. 
Public expenditure 
The most important scope conditions for process tracing in the Zambian case are the following: 
 Poverty reduction has been identified as a main objective in planning and budgeting. 
 Donors continued to influence the government in promoting pro-poor policies. 
 The political situation (two presidential elections in two years) might have incentivized the govern-
ment to allocate more funds to social sectors in order to secure votes. 
The hypothetical mechanism assumes that public expenditure effects were stable, because an exter-
nal variable ‘interfered’ since the exit from GBS (see Table 13 for the mechanism). Based on information 
gathered from the literature and first explorative interviews, a hypothetical mechanism was developed and 
later tested in interviews. This mechanism explains step-by-step how and why public expenditure remained 
stable after the exit from budget support.  
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Description of the hypothetical process (public expenditure): 
During budget support, donors could influence the government’s budget allocation decisions through 
conditionality that was attached to the budget support payments. The GRZ reacted to these incentives by 
increasing the allocations to social sectors, mainly agriculture and health. The donor exit occurred due to 
insufficient reform commitment, even though not because public expenditure declined. The exit from GBS 
coincided with a period of two presidential elections within two years and its associated campaigns. This 
ongoing election campaign incentivized the GRZ to maintain previous expenditure levels as budget cuts 
could have caused a loss of votes. Thereby the public expenditure effects have been sustained. 
 
Table 13 Hypothetical mechanism for Zambia leading to sustainable public expenditure effects after 
the exit from budget support 
Donors Exert control through conditionality linked to BS payments 
GRZ Increases public expenditure for education, health and agriculture due to donor pressure/control 
Donors Exit from BS due to insufficient reform commitment of the government 
GRZ Keeps high levels of public expenditure for education, health and agriculture due to ongoing election 
campaigning 
Public expenditure effects are robust  
Source: own 
Note: A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.12. 
Donors exerted influence through conditionality, which was linked to budget support payments. The 
fact that donors employed conditionality as part of the budget support programme (hoop test)68 is uncon-
troversial. Likewise, not fulfilling these conditions would have negative consequences for the disbursement 
decisions of GBS, i.e. GBS would not be disbursed (hoop test). Many donors explicitly mentioned not ful-
filling one or more aspects of the budget support conditionality as the reason for the exit or suspension of 
budget support in their official statements. In addition, previous temporary suspensions, e.g. in 2007 due to 
not fulfilling macroeconomic conditions, made it clear that budget support payments were contingent on 
the fulfilment of the conditionality. Employees from the MoF and CSOs stated clearly that donors were able 
to effectively influence the budget allocation through the conditionality. These statements can be charac-
terized as a ‘smoking gun’ because it provides strong evidence that the hypothesis is true. The confidence 
in the entire mechanism part is high (probability of 0.936). 
Because of donor pressure or control, the GRZ increased public expenditure in social sectors and 
agriculture. The expenditure data as well as the interviews show that the general level of public expenditure 
for education, health and agriculture increased during budget support (hoop test). Furthermore, it appears 
that during budget support, donors were able to influence the allocation of the funds (smoking gun)69 and 
that donors enhanced the demand for social spending (doubly decisive).70 Although only one source has 
mentioned the latter, the bias for this statement is relatively high, and the overall confidence for this mech-
anism is still high (probability of 0.917). 
The confidence that donors exit from multi-donor budget support due to insufficient reform commit-
ment of the government is rated as high. Through interviews, it is established that performance indicators 
 
68  Throughout the following sections on public expenditure, PFM and domestic accountability and budget transparency, you will find methodological 
information referring to process tracing. For further information on this method, see section 3.2. 
69  It is a smoking gun because the fact that the allocation of funds was influenced does not necessary mean that they translate into pro-social 
spending. 
70  The fact that donors influenced the expenditure in a way that favoured social sectors is clear evidence that the hypothesis is true. If the evidence 
had suggested the contrary, the mechanism part would not hold. 
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as part of the PAF deteriorated and were rated as insufficient (hoop test). Donors and partners also con-
firmed that ‘donors lost trust in GRZ commitment’ and therefore decided to abandon budget support in 
Zambia (doubly decisive). In sum, the certainty for this part of the mechanism is high (probability of 0.958). 
While we are cautiously confident that pro-poor public expenditure has been maintained after the 
exit, an attribution to the exit is not possible, which does not necessarily mean that the exit had no 
impact. Budget allocation figures as well as statements from the interviews unequivocally confirm that the 
level of public expenditure for education, health and agriculture is still high, as can be seen in Figure 59 
(hoop test). The budget share for health and agriculture are at higher levels in 2017 than they were prior to 
the exit in 2013. The budget share for education is fluctuating around a 10-year average of 16.5% of the total 
budget. Similarly, the level of public expenditure in the three sectors is constant and, if anything, slightly 
higher than during most of the GBS period. The evidence gathered in interviews regarding the reason for 
the maintained high level of spending indicates one main reason: the ongoing election campaigns between 
2014 and 2016. It was confirmed by a variety of sources that the ongoing election campaigning has influ-
enced public expenditure (smoking gun) and that public expenditure for education, health and agriculture 
is high because of the ongoing elections (doubly decisive). These findings are in line with scientific literature 
on electoral cycles that argue that government spending increases before elections, especially towards ac-
tivities with high visibility (less into capital investments). At the same time revenues fall, leading to a larger 
deficit in election years (Schuknecht, 2000; Vergne, 2009). Such political budget cycles are much larger in 
developing countries than in developed countries (Shi and Svensson, 2002).The high levels of public ex-
penditure can be regarded as a way to secure votes. In sum, the confidence in this mechanism part is cau-
tious (probability of 0.842), which implies that because of the ongoing election campaigning public expendi-
ture remained high. 
However, this does not mean that the election campaign is the only reason for increased levels of public 
expenditure. It is highly likely that other alternative explanations also played a major role. For example, the 
Zambian government might have intrinsic motivation to support the social sector. 
Figure 59 Zambia’s budget allocation (in % of total budget) – constant allocations in education, 
health and agriculture 
 
*preliminary data; **budget data 
Source: own, based on MoF data 
This evaluation found that after the exit from multi-donor GBS the level and share of public expendi-
ture for education, health and agriculture was sustained, maybe even improved. The reason for the 
robust effects seems to be that during the investigation period (2014-2017) Zambian politics was caught 
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between two presidential elections and public expenditure seems to have been a way for the government 
in power to gain voter’s approval. The fact that public expenditure increased after the exit from GBS is 
counter-intuitive, because typically the omission of budget support decreases the budget. However, in the 
case of Zambia, the share of budget support payments in the total budget was only marginal towards the 
end of budget support. It is still somewhat surprising that government expenditure increased after the exit 
and it points towards rather unsustainable and debt-reliant fiscal policies. 
Public financial management 
In applying process tracing, the evaluation team was able to test the causal effects between reduced 
efforts in PFM and the exit from multi-donor budget support in Zambia. The confidence levels in the 
individual parts are very high so that we are confident in attributing the reduction in efforts to reform 
PFM to the exit from budget support. To fully understand the process, one has to take into account the 
following scope conditions for Zambia: 
 Increased revenues from FDI and copper profits reduced the share and thereby the dependence on 
donor funds. 
 Donors reduced their budget support payments so that the share of donor inflows to the budget 
decreased even further. 
 After the death of President Sata in office, two presidential elections in two years followed the exit. 
As a reaction to these changing circumstances, the GRZ allowed a deterioration of PFM reform efforts. In 
the light of these insufficient reform commitments from the GRZ, donors exited from GBS. This departure 
from budget support led – at the same time – to a fragmentation of the aid portfolio. The GRZ, on the other 
hand, did not sustain a high-level political dialogue to discuss major causes of the budget deficit with the 
donors. Instead, efforts on budget credibility and budget discipline were further reduced as a result of the 
ongoing election campaigning and the intent to secure votes. Consequently, the MoF increased the borrow-
ing level and increasingly diverted with the budget execution from the planned budget. 
The causal link between the exit from multi-donor budget support and a decline in PFM performance 
was tested through process tracing (see Table 14 for the mechanism). Based on information gathered 
from the literature and first explorative interviews, it was possible to develop a hypothesized mechanism 
and test it through extensive further interviews. The mechanism explains step-by-step how and why PFM 
efforts decreased as a result of the exit from budget support.  
Description of the hypothetical process (PFM): 
Since 2008, donors were gradually reducing their contributions to budget support, while at the same time 
other revenue gained in importance as a source of funding in Zambia, particularly investments from Asia 
and copper yields. This meant the share of budget support in the budget was becoming smaller every year 
and thereby the donors’ leverage to push for any sort of reform decreased. Without the incentive of re-
ceiving significant budget support, the GRZ reduced its efforts in PFM and other reform areas. Donors felt 
vindicated by the insufficient reform commitment from the GRZ and stopped their budget support pro-
grammes. The donor portfolios became more fragmented once budget support was abandoned. The GRZ, 
on the other hand, did not sustain the high-level political dialogue with donors and conducted no further 
performance assessment on budget management and PFM. Without this control mechanism, the budget 
discipline and thereby the budget credibility declined. This process was fuelled by the ongoing election 
campaign, which made budget cuts very unattractive. The MoF followed these government decisions, in-
creased the borrowing, and diverted strongly from the planned budget. 
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Table 14 Hypothetical causal mechanism for Zambia regarding reduced PFM efforts 
Donors 
 
Reduce amount of GBS and thereby…  
… decrease leverage to push for PFM reform 
GRZ Reduces reform efforts regarding PFM, accountability and other conditionality 
Donors Exit from GBS due to insufficient reform commitment by the government  
Donors Increase fragmentation of the aid budget (decrease harmonization) 
GRZ Does not sustain joint dialogue about major causes of budget deficit with development partners 
GRZ Further decrease efforts on budget credibility and discipline 
fuelled by ongoing election campaigning 
MoF Increase borrowing, and diverts with the executed budget from the planned budget 
 PFM efforts further reduced 
Source: own 
Note: A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.12. 
Donors reduced their amount of budget support and thereby lost leverage to push for PFM reform. 
At the same time, Zambia’s dependence on GBS was lowered. Figure 55 and interviews consistently 
confirm that the FDI increased strongly since 2009 and revenues from copper and foreign investment 
surged in the run-up to the exit from GBS. This finding implies that in order to keep the relative share of 
donor funds in the budget constant, the absolute volume of budget support would have had to increase. The 
subsequent test that the graduation to lower-middle-income country status made donor funding less af-
fordable and attractive is also easily confirmed. In 2011, Zambia effectively passed the threshold income 
level to become a LMIC. Since then, funding became more expensive for the GRZ; and for donors it became 
harder to justify any sort of concessional funding. In consequence, the share of donor funding in the budget 
decreased (doubly decisive) as shown by the declining share of grants in the Zambian budget in Figure 55. 
In addition, reports and interviews also confirm that the share of budget support in the budget steadily 
decreased over time. Since these facts are all undisputed and well documented, the evaluation team is rea-
sonably certain about this mechanism part (probability of 0.977). 
The second aspect of the mechanism part – donors lack leverage to push for PFM reform – is also 
passed with a high level of confidence. It seems that initially budget support was able to leverage reforms 
(hoop test). However, over time the number of indicators as part of the conditionality increased and all sides 
acknowledge that the conditionality might have been set too ambitiously (hoop test), and thus the GRZ 
might have perceived them as unachievable at some point. The decreasing share of budget support in the 
budget seems to have contributed to a further decline in leverage. In combination, the declining share of 
budget support in the budget and the proliferation of conditionality turned the cost-benefit relation unfa-
vourable for the GRZ, and thus reduced motivation for further reforms (smoking gun). The overall confi-
dence in this mechanism part is high (probability of 0.899). 
The GRZ subsequently reduced its efforts regarding PFM, accountability and other conditionality. It 
appears that the reform dynamics strongly deteriorated (doubly decisive) prior to the exit, which has also 
been indicated by the Open Budget Index for Zambia (Kalondawanga, 2015). According to this report, budget 
transparency plummeted in 2012, reaching only a score of 4, while in 2010 the score had been at 36. Towards 
the end of budget support, the GRZ provided less information to the donors and the public. Line ministries 
stopped attending the policy meetings at some point, showing a clear reduction of efforts from the side of 
the GRZ. Based on these findings the post confidence is rated as high (probability of 0.857). 
The confidence that donors exit from multi-donor budget support due to insufficient reform commit-
ment by the recipient government in this mechanism part is rated as high. Press releases and interviews 
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established that the performance in core indicators of the PAF deteriorated and did not reach the set targets 
(hoop test). Donors and partners also confirmed in the interviews that ‘donors lost trust in GRZ commit-
ment’ to achieve the performance indicators and therefore decided to exit from GBS in Zambia. In sum, the 
confidence in this part of the mechanism is high (probability of 0.907). 
Data and interviews confirm that the fragmentation of the aid portfolio increased and harmonization 
declined. Especially from the partner side, but also some donors confirmed that the objectives and ap-
proaches of the different donors were diverging (hoop test). The interviews further confirmed that the aid 
budget has become more fragmented since the exit, which is also indicated by 0 displaying the increase in 
project-type interventions. Regarding harmonization, the evidence is somewhat inconclusive. Partners and 
some donors see a deterioration or even complete disappearance of harmonization (doubly decisive). This 
statement contrasts with other donors’ statements that regard harmonization as unproblematic. The incen-
tive for a biased statement from the donors is very high in this case, the majority of sources confirmed that 
harmonization declined, and donors only claimed that harmonization still exists but did not specify in what 
form. Therefore, the hypothesis remains valid even though the confidence slightly reduced due to the con-
tradictory evidence. The post confidence for this part of the mechanism is high (probability of 0.867). 
The GRZ did not sustain a joint dialogue with donors about major causes of the budget deficit. Multi-
ple sources including the MoF and donors confirmed that there is not the same extent of dialogue as during 
budget support (doubly decisive). This means that high-level policy dialogue is no longer taking place and 
the Cooperating Partner’s Group is meeting less frequently. Some donors pointed out that already while 
budget support was disbursed, the effectiveness of the dialogue was limited. However, the new dialogue 
forums have no binding character and are therefore highly unlikely to be more effective. A limitation of this 
mechanism part is, however, that in theory the budget deficit and PFM could still be discussed in the limited 
dialogue structure. The overall confidence in this mechanism is high (probability of 0.817). 
The GRZ further decreased efforts on budget credibility and discipline due to the incentives for higher 
public spending to secure votes in the ongoing elections. The data shows that budget discipline de-
creased since the exit (doubly decisive; see Figure 60). It has also been repeatedly claimed in interviews that 
budget execution and budget planning are strongly diverging. As noted by a World Bank Report, Zambia has 
accrued a sizeable fiscal deficit since 2013. The fiscal deficit (including new arrears) rose from -6.8% of GDP 
in 2013 to -7.8% in 2014 to -12.0% in 2015. The trend might be reversing since 2016, as the deficit is at -5% of 
GDP (World Bank, 2017e). It appears that based on the evidence from the interviews, one of the main rea-
sons for the low budget discipline was the fact that Zambia found itself in an extended three-year electoral 
cycle (doubly decisive). The necessary budget cuts to reduce the fiscal deficit might have cost important 
votes, so that the expansion of the deficit was a rationale response to these circumstances by the govern-
ment. Such arguments are in line with literature on electoral cycle and its negative effect on budget disci-
pline (Brender and Drazen, 2004; Shi and Svensson, 2002; Vergne, 2009). The levels of corruption and mis-
appropriation in the government seem to be still high or even increasing (smoking gun): cases of misappro-
priation of funds outside of the IFMIS system have occurred in 2017, and before. This points towards a higher 
prevalence of corruption, but the corruption perception index has been constant since 2013 for Zambia 
(Transparency International, 2017). Some improvements are reported for the use of IFMIS and PFM in gen-
eral. This test is classified as a contradictory hoop test, i.e. the improvements in PFM are a necessary condi-
tion to reject the hypothesis. However, given that these improvements are slow and not systematic and 
other contradictory evidence is not identified, the overall confidence in the mechanism part is still rated as 
cautiously confident (probability of at 0.703). 
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Figure 60 Increasing budget balance deficits after the exit from GBS 
 
Source: own, based on MoF data 
Finally, the MoF’s reaction to these circumstances was to increase borrowing. As Figure 61 and inter-
views show, Zambia’s debt has increased since the exit – from around 20% of GDP before the exit to 58% of 
GDP in 2015 (doubly decisive).  Once the revenues fell below target, partly due to the omission of budget 
support, but more importantly due to declining copper prices, the GRZ did not make the necessary expendi-
ture adjustments, resulting in a substantial build-up of arrears (World Bank, 2016c). The explanation why the 
MoF has not promoted fiscal austerity might be that the Minister of Finance is from the opposition party 
and has therefore limited political power (straw in the wind). The confidence in this final part of the mech-
anism is high (probability of 0.925). 
Figure 61 Increasing borrowing after the exit from GBS 
 
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor (2017d) 
Since the exit from multi-donor budget support, the performance in PFM reforms has declined, which 
can be attributed to the exit from GBS. The effects of the exit have been very pronounced regarding the 
quality of the policy dialogue. The omission of high-level political dialogue between the GRZ and donors 
and the associated lack of accountability is one key component in explaining the decline in PFM perfor-
mance. Excessive government spending is another reason for the decline. The level of borrowing increased 
after the exit, partly because donor funds were unavailable for the budget and partly because the two to 
three-year period of political campaigns made fiscal austerity unattractive. 
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Domestic accountability and budget transparency 
For Zambia, we found a causal link between the exit from multi-donor budget support and a decline 
in domestic accountability and budget transparency through process tracing (see Table 15 for the 
mechanism). A detailed presentation of the scope conditions for Zambia can be found in the section on 
PFM as well as the description of the first five mechanisms. 
Description of the hypothetical process (domestic accountability): 
The decline in GBS share in the budget and associated loss of leverage (outlined in the section above on 
PFM) also affected the GRZ’s efforts in accountability. Donors felt vindicated by GRZ’s insufficient reform 
commitment and stopped their budget support programmes. The donor portfolios became more frag-
mented once budget support was abandoned. The GRZ, on the other hand, did not sustain the dialogue 
on issues of domestic accountability with the donors and conducted no further performance assessment 
on budget management and PFM. CSOs and donors were also not consulted about the budget, and since 
they were not formally participating in the budget process, CSOs had no more means to exert control over 
the government. Similarly, without a formalized process for budget scrutiny, other domestic accountabil-
ity institutions (DAI), like the Auditor General or the parliament, lacked leverage to enforce a follow-up 
on their recommendations. Under these circumstances, the GRZ reduced budget transparency and budget 
accountability further. Figuratively speaking, domestic accountability and budget transparency declined 
because the ‘carrot’ of donor funds was missing as well as the ‘stick’ of CSOs scrutiny, donor conditionality 
and DAI’s influence. 
 
Table 15 Hypothesized mechanism for Zambia leading to reduced domestic accountability 
Donors Reduce amount of GBS and thereby decrease leverage to push for PFM reforms 
GRZ Reduces reform efforts regarding PFM, accountability and other conditionality 
Donors Exit from GBS due to insufficient reform commitment of the government 
Donors Increase fragmentation of the aid budget 
GRZ Does not sustain dialogue with development partners on macro, budget and PFM issues 
GRZ Conducts no performance assessment about the budget, and 
conducts no formalized donor/CSO consultations about the budget 
CSO Cannot exert control because formalized participation in budget process is absent 
DAI Have no formalized leverage to enforce/follow up on recommendations 
GRZ Reduces budget transparency  
GRZ Reduces budget accountability 
 Budget transparency and domestic accountability are further reduced 
Source: own 
Note: A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.12. 
The GRZ stopped to conduct performance assessments about the budget and did not allow formalized 
donor or CSO consultations on the budget. Both donors and MoF representatives have confirmed that 
the quality of reporting on the budget decreased after the exit (smoking gun). Only one conflicting state-
ment claims that an external party is evaluating the performance of the MoF based on the original PAF 
indicators (smoking gun). Although the bias of this statement is assessed as very high because there was no 
further proof for this statement, both tests are of the same type and therefore weighted equally, lowering 
the post confidence. The participation of CSOs in the budget dialogue seems to have disappeared (smoking 
gun). During budget support, CSOs were participating in the formalized policy dialogue and discussions on 
budget-related topics. After the exit, their role seems to have shrunk to provide policy recommendations, 
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often in the form of unsolicited policy advice rather than in a regular fashion. This shows that the exit has 
negatively affected the demand-side of domestic accountability. All but one CSO interview partner under-
scored that regardless of the deterioration they are still providing recommendation to policymakers and are 
consulted. This somewhat contradictory evidence also lowers the overall post confidence for the mechanism 
to 0.537. 
Because CSOs are no longer formally participating in the budget process, they cannot exert control. 
It is uncontroversial that the participation of CSOs in the budget process has decreased since the exit (hoop 
test), as they have no access to crucial budget information and are no longer formally invited to budget 
consultations. Furthermore, the ability of CSOs to disseminate their message declined (hoop test) because 
the freedom of press deteriorated and the media is generally not inclined to cover government critical find-
ings. Somewhat surprisingly, even CSOs themselves confirmed that they cannot effectively exert control in 
the budget process. Overall, this should provide a high level of confidence that the hypothesis is true, im-
plying that the demand-side of domestic accountability has become weaker since the exit. However, CSOs 
also claim they are still providing valuable policy advice and have access to information. It seems likely that 
the interviewees have great incentive to describe their effectiveness and work in the best possible way. In 
addition, their statements could be interpreted such that they are producing analysis that could potentially 
influence the policy dialogue on budget; while in reality their recommendations are not picked up. Overall, 
since the contradicting evidence does not disconfirm the hypothesis and is subject to a large potential bias, 
the confidence in this part of the mechanism is still rated as cautiously high (probability of 0.739). 
Similar to the situation of the CSOs, DAI have no formalized leverage to enforce or follow up on 
recommendations since the exit from multi-donor budget support. The Office of the Auditor General 
(OAG), despite its overall satisfactory performance, appears to have little power. Its inability to enforce a 
follow-up on audit reports is a clear indication of this limited power (doubly decisive). The Auditor General 
lacks independence too, as he is directly appointed by the President. This arrangement can easily cause a 
conflict of interest for the position of the Auditor General, because reports critical of the government might 
jeopardize job security. Similarly, the anti-corruption commission seems to suffer from a lack of independ-
ence (doubly decisive). The head of the anti-corruption commission, for example, resigned because of being 
told which cases to investigate. The prosecution of corruption cases is rated as ‘not satisfactory’ and targets, 
if at all, only minor offenders (hoop test). Evidence to prove that the parliament has very limited leverage in 
the budget process (doubly decisive) is very strong, and comes from independent reports71 (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2016b) as well as from interviews with the partner side. It appears that the legislation has limited 
influence on budget decisions because the budget is only presented and discussed after it is finalized so 
that decisions are not made by the parliament. In contrast to these findings, some statements from the 
partner side indicate that the parliament has proven to be effective in bringing forward important legislation 
(contradictory hoop test). Because the evidence overwhelmingly confirms our hypothesis, and the incentive 
for a bias for the contradictory claims is very high, the overall confidence is still rated as cautious (probability 
of 0.791) – even though it was slightly reduced to account for the contradictory evidence. 
The consequence of these developments is a reduction in domestic accountability, which has been 
most noticeable in budget execution. After the exit from budget support, a decline in domestic account-
ability seemed to have occurred (doubly decisive) as evidenced by various interviews with donors and CSOs. 
The budget execution has proven to be particularly problematic. In contrast to these findings, some recent 
reform aspirations point towards an improvement or change of mind. A new act will obligate the MoF to 
report loans and guarantees agreements to the parliament before they are signed. Until now, these agree-
ments were presented only ex post to parliament. This is an indication, but by no means confirmation, that 
domestic accountability (and budget transparency) might be improving again. It remains questionable if this 
is an improvement compared to the level right after the exit from budget support or simply a reversing of a 
 
71  ‘the constitution remains ‘top heavy’ it does not include sufficient checks and balances on the executive. […] As a result, it is rare for the judiciary 
or parliament to act against the executive, despite many attempts by international donors to strengthen the judiciary and parliament.’ (Bertels-
mann Stiftung, 2016b, p. 8) 
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negative trend. This evidence reduces the confidence in our hypothesis, and the confidence that budget 
accountability declined is rated overall as more likely than not (probability of 0.548). 
For budget transparency, the picture is more nuanced. Budget transparency formally fulfils the con-
ditions for transparency; yet, transparency with practical relevance has been declining since the exit. 
This means, for example, that, while on paper the planned budget is published and available, the information 
provided cannot be easily interpreted72 and in some cases, the data is even incorrect. Data from the Open 
Budget Survey (Kalondawanga and Chileshe, 2017) confirms this first statement as the availability of budget 
documents remains constant or improves in all of the categories. However, it should be noted that the var-
iance is quite large and only the enacted budget and audit reports have been published in a consistent man-
ner (see Figure 62). The evaluation team’s own assessment reveals a slightly different picture. The online 
availability of budget documents is decreasing since budget support exit (see Figure 63). Annual debt re-
ports and annual financial reports have not been updated since 2014.73 Due to this contradictory evidence 
and the mentioned reform aspirations, we are only slightly more confident than not concerning this mech-
anism part (probability of 0.573). 
Figure 62 Public availability of budget documents is robust throughout the exit in Zambia 
 
Source: Open Budget Survey 2017 (Kalondawanga and Chileshe, 2017) 
Note: The availability of the document shows a great variance and does not always follow a clear trend in the four countries, so it 
was decided to use a conservative approach, which ensures that negative ‘changes in availability’ reflect definitely deteriorations. 
This is why the lowest value before the exit is compared to the highest value after the exit. ‘Lowest availability pre-exit’ includes 
the minimum value for the 2010 and 2012 surveys and ‘Highest availability post-exit’ includes the maximum value from 2015 and 
2017 surveys. 
 
 
72  This ‘yellow book’ is roughly a 2,000-page document of tables with numbers without any explanation of these numbers. 
73  We did not consider data for 2017 because annual reports cannot be produced at the point where this report is written. It should be also noted 
that in 2008 a lower IT capacity might have prevented the publication of more reports. 
-1
0
1
2
-1
0
1
2
Pre-Budget
Statement
Executive’s 
Budget 
Proposal
Enacted
Budget
Citizens
Budget
In-Year
Reports
Mid-Year
Review
Year-End
Report
Audit Report C
ha
ng
e 
in
 a
va
ila
bi
lit
y
Lowest availability pre-exit Highest availability post-exit Change in availability
Available to 
the public
Published late 
or not online
Not available
80    4.  |  The exit from budget support and its impact: four case studies 
Figure 63 Total number of available budget documents from the Zambia’s Ministry of Finance web-
site 
 
Source: own, based on accessible information from the MoF website (MoF, 2017) 
Note: Reports assessed are ‘annual debt reports’, ‘annual financial reports’, ‘quarterly budget execution reports’ (each report 
counts 0.25), ‘Yellow book’, ‘ Citizens budget’. This analysis only includes series of reports that appeared more than three times. 
Evidence after the multi-donor budget support exit shows that domestic accountability has been de-
clining and that the causal attribution to the exit from budget support has been confirmed via process 
tracing. The omission of external control and incentives had adverse effects on the inclusion of demand-
side actors in the budget process. The loss of policy dialogue eliminated whatever participation CSOs had 
in the budget formulation process. In addition, the GRZ has curtailed press freedom, thereby eliminating 
communication options for CSOs. Budget transparency seems to remain high on paper but the quality and 
utility of the provided information remains questionable. 
Service delivery 
The data availability for service delivery allows only a very limited analysis, but it shows a slightly 
negative tendency in the area of education service delivery. During the GBS period, service delivery in 
education and health had been improving, while delivery seems to be slightly deteriorating after the exit 
service. In the education sector, the student-teacher ratio increased from 49.7 in 2013 to 51.5 in 2015, i.e. each 
teacher has to provide education to more students (see Figure 64). 
Figure 64 Student-teacher and student-school ratio for Zambia 
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Source: 2015 Education Statistical Bulletin (Ministry of General Education Zambia, 2016) 
Non-income poverty 
It appears that the exit has not noticeably negatively affected non-income poverty. The available data, 
presented in Figure 65 and Figure 66, allow few conclusions regarding the effect of the exit on non-income 
poverty. Between 2013 and 2015, the data does not show substantial changes in the general trends. Under-
nourishment prevalence, for example, declined from 53% in 2008 to approximately 48% in 2015. The most 
interesting development might be the primary completion rate. It had been increasing until 2010, around 
the time President Sata took office and donor relationships started to deteriorate. Since then, the comple-
tion rate has been declining (until 2013). Yet, the most recent data point is for 2013 so that we can draw little 
inference on the effect of the exit. Improvements in the health sector have continued after the exit: the 
under-five mortality declined from 16% in 2000 to 6.4% in 2015 and life expectancy increased from 43.5 years 
in 2000 to 60.8 years in 2015. Overall, it seems that non-income poverty was not really affected by the exit 
from budget support. This is not very surprising given that public expenditure in the social sector remained 
high and that effects might only be detectable after some time. 
Figure 65 Health indicators for Zambia 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
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Figure 66  Education indicators for Zambia 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
Macroeconomic performance 
Zambia experienced a dramatic decline in terms of its macroeconomic performance towards the end 
of multi-donor budget support and after the exit. The contribution of budget support to this decline is at 
best small because budget support had virtually lost relevance for the Zambian budget by the time the mac-
roeconomic performance was deteriorating. As external conditions deteriorated, including slower regional 
and global growth and a sharp decline in the price of copper, the fiscal deficit rose and large arrears were 
building up. The fiscal deficit (including external grants) rose to 9.4% in 2015, up from 2.6% in 2012. Prior to 
the exit in the period 2005-2013 the budget deficit averaged 3.1% of GDP, while after the exit the fiscal deficit 
averaged 6.4% of GDP (Figure 67). 
The financial gap created by the suspension of budget support was offset by external debt, especially 
through Eurobonds and new non-concessional sources, which led to a huge increase in the total debt 
level (World Bank, 2017e). The share of budget support in the GRZ budget was small, yet in absolute terms 
budget support still constituted a considerable amount – according to CRS data USD 86 million in 2012 – 
which had to be compensated for. The GRZ issued Eurobonds and received non-concessional loans from 
several countries, including China, during and after the exit. At the end of 2014 external public and private 
debt stood at 24% of GDP compared to 15% in 2011, largely reflecting the issuance of Eurobonds (see IMF, 
2015c). Because of these external sources, Zambia shifted from a balance between domestic and external 
debt to a now predominantly externally indebted economy. Moreover, the total level of debt increased from 
about 30% of GDP before the exit (2013) to levels around 55% in the years following the exit. 
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Figure 67 Zambia macroeconomic context – budget deficits and declining GDP after the exit 
 
Source: own, based on MoF data 
It is not clear whether increased budget deficits since 2012 are the result of the exit from multi-donor 
budget support or a falling copper price. Figure 68 shows the dependency of the Zambian GDP on the 
world market price for copper. In times of high copper prices, the omission of donor funding and high 
levels of expenditure could be relatively easy offset; once the price deteriorates, the fiscal situation tightens 
immediately. The copper price reductions had negative impacts on the current account, which had been in 
surplus until 2013 and turned into a current account in deficit in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). The government 
expenditure has not been adjusted appropriately to respond to this decline in revenue, having depleted the 
central bank’s foreign-exchange reserves to a six-year low (Hill and Clifford Mitimingi, 2016). The GDP 
growth fell below the sub-Saharan average in 2013 and remained below this regional average until now. It is 
possible that with budget support the decline would have been partly offset because it would have provided 
additional funds and pressure to maintain fiscal austerity. Although this might appear plausible, we cannot 
attribute the macroeconomic developments to the exit of budget support, especially because the relevance 
of GBS for the budget was already very low prior to the exit. Interviewees often claimed that the fiscal 
discipline was reduced after the exit and budget debt thresholds were elevated. It is unclear if it is as a direct 
consequence of the exit or if it would have happened regardless. 
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Figure 68 Dependency on copper: development of GDP and copper prices in Zambia 2005-2016 
 
Source: own, based on MoF data 
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Reading manual 
This chapter presents the findings on how the exit from multi-donor GBS affects structures, processes and 
developmental achievements that can be attributed to the provision of budget support. The chapter is the-
matically divided into sections on the effects on budget support structures for policy dialogue, donor har-
monization and on the impact areas of the intervention logic public expenditure, PFM, domestic accounta-
bility, service delivery, non-income poverty, and macroeconomic performance. After a summary of findings 
across the four case studies (for an overview see Annex 7.15), each of the following thematic sections starts 
by briefly describing the relevance of the topic in the budget support theory of change and the knowledge 
prior to the exit, using evidence from a previous evaluation synthesis on the effects of budget support (Orth 
et al., 2017). Next, the aggregated findings across all four case study countries are presented and can be 
contrasted to the effects prior to the exit. Readers who are interested in aggregate results of the exit from 
budget support should focus on this section, while the country-specific results are in Chapter 4. 
5.1 Summary findings 
Before-and-after comparison of budget support effects 
In combination with the findings of the synthesis study explained in the Introduction to this report (Orth et 
al., 2017) it is possible to undertake an analysis that allows to identify causal effects of budget support. The 
central question of whether budget support caused any changes has been hard to answer due to the lack of 
a counterfactual. This report provides the unique opportunity to create a quasi-counterfactual using find-
ings from the synthesis study on the effects during the GBS period and comparing them to the results after 
the exit. Quasi-counterfactual means that if we find that the introduction of budget support improved a 
certain outcome and the exit from budget support decreased the same outcome, it is safe to assume that 
budget support triggered these outcome changes and not some unknown omitted variable. 
The analysis shows that the exit from GBS had negative effects on most areas that formerly benefited from 
positive budget support effects. The consequences of the exit from GBS are most pronounced for a decrease 
in harmonization, higher fragmentation of the aid portfolio and weakened policy dialogue. Effects of budget 
support during the budget support period are consistently positive, whereas after the exit these effects 
became negative in all of the four case studies. The analysis further shows large differences for public ex-
penditure, PFM and macroeconomic performance; but for these areas, the outcomes after the exit vary be-
tween the countries. For example, PFM remained constant in the case of Rwanda, while Uganda and Zambia 
experienced a decline and the possible relaunch of GBS in Malawi stimulated the reform effort. Overall, the 
PFM reform effort decreased due to a lack of external pressure since the exit. For service delivery and non-
income poverty, the repercussions are less clear, because the evidence base before and after the exit is not 
sufficient (see Figure 69, and for a summary of all country level results see Annex 7.15). 
Robustness of budget support effects after the exit 
The exit from multi-donor budget support had negative effects on most areas that previously had 
registered positive budget support effects (see Figure 69). Based on the analysis of the four case studies, 
the evaluation finds that the exit from budget support had strong negative effects on harmonization among 
donors, the existence of a quality policy dialogue and macroeconomic performance. The exit had negative 
effects in the case of public expenditure and mild negative effects on PFM. No immediate or contradictory 
effects of the exit from budget support on domestic accountability and budget transparency, service deliv-
ery and indicators of non-income poverty could be detected. However, this does not mean that such effects 
can be conclusively ruled out, as they can be expected to impact indicators such as access to health services 
or education only in the medium to long term. 
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Figure 69 Summary of exit effects 
 
 
Source: own, icons provided by Dave Gandy from www.flaticon.com  
Note: The arrows indicate the effect direction and effect magnitude. Arrows facing vertically up/down indicate a strong posi-
tive/negative effect. Diagonal arrows indicate that the effect is predominantly positive/negative. Horizontal arrows indicate that 
there were no (or contradictory) effects. The shading of the bars indicated the quality of the evidence base from good (solid), me-
dium (darker shade) to weak (lighter shade). 
For an overview of the exit results at country level and the corresponding aggregate result, see Annex 7.15. 
 
Most prominently, the exit from budget support led to a collapse of a high-level political dialogue be-
tween donors and partners and to an increase in the fragmentation of aid. The collapse of these struc-
tures substantially limited the dialogue on important policy reforms and beyond that strained the relation-
ship between donors and partners. Since the exit, development cooperation became highly fragmented, 
mostly shifting to individual project-type interventions. Coordination and harmonization among develop-
ment partners deteriorated substantially, with each development partner often using different planning, 
implementation, monitoring and reporting processes. 
The influence of development partners on partner governments’ strategic policy formulation and reform 
agendas through dialogue and conditionality decreased substantially. The diminished involvement of do-
nors in policy planning and monitoring led to a departure from the reform agenda of the GBS period. Large 
providers of external assistance still have some leverage, but the extent of this varies substantially and 
hinges primarily on the importance of the donor’s financial contributions or the donor’s central role in the 
provision of services, for example in health. 
The possibility of a relaunch of GBS provided some incentives to push for reforms after the exit in Malawi 
and to some extent in Uganda. Otherwise, reform efforts continued in some areas; however, they were not 
attributable to donor influence, rather were predominantly due to domestic factors, such as fiscal pressure 
or electoral campaigning. 
The effects of the exit from budget support on public expenditure among the four case study countries are 
mixed, but a general tendency of a decline in relevance of expenditure for social sectors is observable. Right 
after the exit, the level of public expenditure to poverty-relevant sectors dropped significantly, but gradually 
recovered in the following years. This did not translate into lower levels of service delivery and it seems that 
service delivery has been only slightly affected, if at all, by budget reductions in social sectors. 
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For PFM and domestic accountability, the exit from budget support also had slightly negative effects. 
However, the effects differ among the case study countries. For example, in Malawi and Uganda where the 
exit from budget support had been the result of a major corruption scandal, a renewed focus on PFM was 
set, as the scandal showed that reforms in PFM were urgent. In Rwanda, the performance in PFM reforms 
remained stable after the exit from budget support. Explanation is the strong ownership of the government, 
particularly for reforms in PFM. Regarding domestic accountability, the supply-side continued to improve 
in all four countries but a declining power and access for demand-side actors in Uganda and Zambia reduced 
the overall domestic accountability. Domestic accountability appears to be robust in Malawi and Rwanda. 
The quantity of published budget documents improved in all countries but the quality of the provided infor-
mation seems to become lower so that overall budget transparency is rather declining. 
Regarding the macroeconomic performance, all countries experienced a short-term decline in GDP growth 
and an incline in the level of debt after the exit. For Zambia and Malawi these disruptions lasted longer 
because necessary fiscal adjustments were not conducted. The exit from GBS creates a macroeconomic 
shock because government revenues virtually disappear overnight and cannot be replaced at the same pace. 
This creates fiscal deficits, increases the levels of debt and ultimately creates substantial uncertainty, which 
discourages much-needed investments. 
For non-income poverty, the data shows no negative development as far as the available data allows tell-
ing. This could be due to a time lag with which the effects manifest themselves or because the assumed 
theory of change is not adequate. A similar picture emerges for the performance in non-income poverty, 
which appears to be stable so far. 
 
Box 2 Findings confirmed through process tracing 
For Malawi and Zambia, the effects on public expenditure, PFM and domestic accountability could be 
confirmed through the process tracing methodology. 
In the case of Malawi, the following causal mechanisms were confirmed: 
 The exit from budget support had a negative effect on the level of social sector relevant public 
expenditure; the GBS effects were not robust against the exit. 
 The momentum for PFM reform was sustained throughout the exit. 
 Budget transparency and domestic accountability are improving since the exit. 
In the case of Zambia, the following three causal mechanisms were confirmed: 
 The sustained levels of public expenditure in social sectors are caused by election campaigns of 
two subsequent presidential elections. 
 The exit had negative effects on former improvements in PFM, the effects have not been sus-
tained. 
 The exit had negative effects on both budget transparency and domestic accountability; the for-
mer positive budget support effects have not been sustained. 
The following sections describe in detail the individual effects of the exit on budget support structures for 
policy dialogue, donor harmonization and on the impact areas of the intervention logic public expenditure, 
PFM, domestic accountability, service delivery, non-income poverty and macroeconomic performance. 
5.2 Policy dialogue 
Relevance 
High-level policy dialogue between donors and the partner government is a key component of multi-
donor GBS, and offers the possibility to exchange ideas and provide policy recommendations. By ag-
gregating collective sector or policy expertise and by providing a forum to exchange ideas and advice be-
tween donors and partners, formalized policy dialogue can contribute to more informed and collectively 
5.  |  Robustness of budget support effects: a before-and-after exit comparison    89 
owned policy decisions and, ultimately, to better policy outcomes for partner governments (Koeberle et al., 
2006; Rajan et al., 2015). At the same time, donors can adjust their activities according to the priorities dis-
cussed in the meetings. 
According to the theory of change, budget support inputs complement each other, so policy dialogue 
has the potential to enhance the effectiveness of all other budget support inputs. As one of the ‘non-
financial’ inputs of the aid modality, policy dialogue intends to increase the impact of the other budget 
support inputs by facilitating better-informed policy decision making. The quality of policy dialogue itself is 
also strengthened when combined with other non-financial inputs, specifically TA/CD (Lister, 2007). Krisch 
et al. (2015) find that policy dialogue of GBS is improved by the accompanying measures through two mech-
anisms: (a) accompanying measures can help to feed valuable information into the policy dialogue about 
the quality of public services and needs for support of government institutions; (b) by implementing accom-
panying measures, donor representatives gain country-specific knowledge and skills, which improves the 
quality of the policy dialogue (Krisch et al., 2015). 
Dialogue in the context of budget support programmes is typically held at two levels: political and 
technical. Overarching strategic issues are mainly discussed among high-level representatives of the part-
ner government, donors and eventually CSOs. This level of policy dialogue allows donors to express con-
cerns and to negotiate countermeasures with the government in case the conditionality is not met. This 
type of policy dialogue is often referred to as high-level political dialogue. Discussions on sector-specific 
reform progress are generally held at the technical level and are not unique to GBS as they can also be 
featured in other aid modalities, such as multi-donor trust funds. 
Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
Despite the large number of reports on budget support, most sources do not assess the specific ef-
fects of policy dialogue as one input of the budget support package. Some sources, however, do 
acknowledge the particular effect of policy dialogue on the impact areas of the intervention logic. The evi-
dence analysed in the evaluation synthesis (Orth et al., 2017) has found positive effects of the policy dialogue 
on harmonizing donors’ approaches and increasing governments’ ownership, as the open dialogue facili-
tates consensus both among the donors and between donors and partners. Budget formulation and plan-
ning, accounting and budget transparency are other areas that improved primarily through non-financial 
inputs, among them the policy dialogue. 
Main findings post-exit 
The exit from multi-donor budget support has substantially weakened the policy dialogue between 
donors and partners. This means that the exchange of ideas at a high political level is strongly reduced 
or even completely absent, the quality of dialogue deteriorated, and the trust between donors and 
partner government has diminished. 
As a result of the exit from GBS, the high-level policy dialogue was abandoned in all four case study 
countries and the information exchange between donors and partners on strategic topics became less 
frequent, less open and therefore less reliable. The evaluation team found that, as a consequence of 
abandoning the high-level political dialogue, the frequency and quality of high-level meetings was reduced 
and the discussion topics became mostly limited to technical aspects. Similarly, the data and information 
made available by partners became less reliable or was only provided in aggregated form, strongly limiting 
its usefulness. For example, expenditure data on an aggregate level reveals little about the poverty relevance 
of those expenses and undermines the possibilities of targeting specific population groups. On the other 
hand, the partners are struggling to meet the demands posed by the increased number of donor missions 
resulting from the surge in project-type interventions, which reflects the lack of harmonization among do-
nors since the exit from GBS. 
The collapse of dialogue structures at the political level shifted the dialogue – in some cases exclu-
sively – to the technical level. With the shift to the technical level, dialogue between donors and partner 
governments was weakened and became less effective. Government involvement in donors’ programmes 
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consequently declined and at the same time, and the influence of donors on policies became minimal 
or unstructured. The opportunity for informed decision making through policy dialogue is thus further 
limited since the exit from GBS. PFM is one of the few (if not only) policy areas, where the common objec-
tives of donors and partners to reduce fiduciary risks and improve the management of internal revenues 
contributed to stronger efforts in keeping dialogue structures alive. 
SWGs were introduced in many countries long before the first budget support programmes started; never-
theless, the exit from GBS left its mark on these working groups. Although existing structures of SWGs 
remained largely intact after the exit, there is now a high level of fragmentation within them. The regularity 
of meetings has generally reduced and the participants operate in more isolation. This negatively affects 
the access to information for the SWGs and the ability to come to informed strategic decisions. 
5.3 Harmonization among development partners and access to decision makers 
Relevance 
Harmonization is a key element in enhancing the effectiveness of development cooperation, which is 
supported by the joint funding and performance assessment offered through multi-donor budget sup-
port. According to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD DAC, 2005), harmonization is defined 
as the process through which donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to 
avoid duplication of their activities, projects and programmes. According to the theory of change for budget 
support, a better harmonized external assistance that is aligned to government policies and systems is one 
of the direct outputs of budget support, influenced by the three non-financial budget support inputs – policy 
dialogue (see section 5.1), conditionality and technical assistance/capacity development. Through the pro-
vision of an institutionalized framework for donor coordination, particularly budget support, policy dialogue 
is considered to contribute to harmonization even in cases of large and heterogeneous donor groups. The 
conditionality encased in the PAF is also expected to foster harmonization, facilitating a joint approach to 
assess the government’s performance through commonly agreed indicators (OECD DAC, 2012). 
Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
Because of budget support, the harmonization among donors and between donors and partner gov-
ernments usually improved. The evaluation team specifically observed positive developments regarding 
harmonization of aid policies and procedures. Yet, diverging priorities of donors, such as different prefer-
ences and a lack of common goals, sometimes undermined donors’ willingness to provide budget support 
disbursements in a harmonized way, which weakened the effectiveness of budget support on harmoniza-
tion. Progress in harmonization is evident in the overall procedures for budget support disbursements, but 
less so regarding individual disbursement decisions and practices. For example, financial inputs were often 
disbursed following additional bilateral agreements, and breaches of these agreements led to unilateral de-
cisions by individual donors to suspend tranches (Orth et al., 2017). 
Main findings post-exit 
Since the exit from multi-donor GBS, donor harmonization declined across the studied countries as 
the donors’ approaches and programmes became more fragmented. Following the exit from GBS, har-
monization suffered an abrupt degradation as donors mostly stopped joint funding approaches, in spite of 
the governments’ preference for budget support. One exception is PFM, an area where harmonization is 
still largely functional in all four countries, because partner governments regard PFM as a crucial tool to 
achieve good governance or as condition to receive continued donor support. 
In addition to the higher fragmentation in donors’ aid portfolio and the lack of harmonization, donor’s 
access to decision makers within the partner governments changed. Bilateralization of aid weakens 
donor’s leverage to push for certain reforms. Government officials, however, claim that the access to deci-
sion makers did not decline (especially in Rwanda and Uganda). Across all case study countries, it is found 
5.  |  Robustness of budget support effects: a before-and-after exit comparison    91 
that leverage still exists for large donors (especially multilateral ones), while smaller donors tend to have 
less access. 
5.4 Public expenditure 
Relevance 
The level and composition of public expenditure are core determinants of public policy in the recipi-
ent countries and reflect the strategic orientation of the national development. Budget support pay-
ments are only disbursed if certain budget allocation levels are met and thus promote spending in 
‘social’ sectors. Through allocations and expenditure, the government decides which actors, sectors and 
programmes benefit from public resources (Faust et al., 2011). The intervention logic assumes that the fi-
nancial inputs of budget support increase the level of public spending and shift the allocation composition 
towards social sectors, particularly health and education. Budget support effects on the budget are assumed 
to be observable at three levels: (a) level of public expenditure; (b) allocation and composition of public 
expenditure; and (c) cost of funds and efficiency of public expenditure (Lister, 2007). For the current evalu-
ation, the analysis focuses on the level and composition of public expenditure for health, education and 
agriculture.74 Evidence and results on allocative efficiency are subsumed under the term composition of 
public spending. 
Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
Budget support had positive effects on the level and composition of public expenditure in social sec-
tors, even if the fiscal space remained limited. There were no effects of budget support on govern-
ment’s revenue mobilization. In line with the effects expected by the intervention logic, budget support 
increased the level of public spending and triggered a shift of the allocation composition towards social 
sectors, particularly health and education. The evaluation synthesis findings confirm that budget support 
increased governments’ spending capacity. The assumed risk that the external funding would lead to a 
‘crowding out’ effect and incentivize the government to neglect the mobilization of internal revenues did 
not materialize. On the contrary, slight improvements in the level of domestic revenue mobilization were 
reported in some cases, but those did not offer sufficient fiscal space to provide more or better services 
than before the era of budget support (Orth et al., 2017) 
While effects of financial budget support inputs are sufficiently covered by evidence, the evidence 
concerning the effect of non-financial inputs on government expenditure is insufficient. According to 
the assumption of the budget support intervention logic, policy dialogue, conditionality and TA/CD were 
supposed to enhance the recipient government’s capacity to increase domestic revenues. However, these 
effects are poorly covered in the evidence, hence the team could not formulate any generalizable conclu-
sions on the expected positive influence of non-financial inputs (Orth et al., 2017). 
Main findings post-exit 
The share of budget allocation for the health, education and agriculture sectors declined in most case 
study countries, reflecting policy changes of the governments giving less importance to these sectors 
and shifting focus to productive sectors (see Table 16). 
Potential poverty-relevant sectors (i.e. health, education and agriculture) received a lower share of 
the total budget after the exit from GBS in the case study countries, except for Zambia. The relative 
and total level of public expenditure declined in most case study countries. Allocations changed in favour 
of productive sectors in the country’s quest to achieve economic growth or middle-income country status 
(Uganda, Rwanda) or due to high debt service obligations (Malawi). Donors tried to use conditionality to 
maintain prior levels of budget allocations, but without success. In Zambia, the level of public expenditure 
 
74  See the explanation for the choice of sectors in section 4.1. 
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for the three sectors increased but this development fell into a period of several elections, which made 
inflated social spending very attractive. 
Table 16 Results for public expenditure at a glance by country 
 
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Zambia 
- Public expenditure for 
health, education and ag-
riculture declined in rela-
tive and absolute terms 
[PT+CCS]  
- Donors’ conditionality 
was not sufficient to 
maintain a constant level 
of PE allocations 
[PT+CCS] 
- Public expenditure for
education and agriculture 
slightly decreased after 
the GBS exit (not for 
health) [CCS] 
- Public expenditure for 
health, education and ag-
riculture declined [CCS] 
- Productive sectors bene-
fited from higher budget 
allocations [CCS] 
- Public expenditure for 
health, education and ag-
riculture increased,75 most 
probably due to an ongo-
ing election cycle 
[PT+CCS] 
 
Source: own 
Note: Process tracing methodology [PT]; Comparative case studies [CCS] 
A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.11 and 7.12. 
 
5.5 Public financial management 
Relevance 
Public financial management (PFM) is a crucial tool for good governance as it helps to plan, direct 
and control financial resources and thereby enables an effective and efficient delivery of public ser-
vices (OECD, 2011). According to the intervention logic of budget support, the modality is expected to in-
duce strengthened PFM and procurement systems, including improvements in transparency, fiscal disci-
pline, oversight, as well as allocative and operational efficiency. These improvements are critical both for 
the partner countries as well as for donors. Along with indicators related to poverty reduction or govern-
ance, the PAF also contained performance indicators related to the transparency76 and effectiveness of PFM, 
underscoring the high relevance of improved PFM in the budget support context. 
The non-financial inputs of budget support are expected to significantly contribute to reform the PFM sys-
tem. In addition, the financial inputs should systemically influence the PFM, as budget support funds are 
channelled through the country’s own budgetary system. Both financial and non-financial inputs are ex-
pected to reinforce each other in improving PFM and specifically the budget processes in beneficiary coun-
tries. 
Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
One of the central findings of the evaluation synthesis on budget support (Orth et al., 2017) is that 
the modality contributes substantially to improvements in PFM. A major reason for this contribution is 
that budget support triggered an increased focus of donors and governments alike on the capacity con-
straints of government performance in PFM. Overall, given that the commitment to PFM reform is part of 
the underlying principles for the provision of budget support, partner governments receiving budget sup-
port tend to push for reforms in PFM (Orth et al., 2017). 
GBS has had a positive effect especially on the formulation, planning, comprehensiveness and trans-
parency of the budget. The most important factors in fostering PFM efforts are the non-financial inputs of 
 
75  However, for agriculture, not all expenditure of the FISP programme benefits poor households. 
76  Budget transparency is discussed in section 5.5 on domestic accountability. 
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budget support, in particular policy dialogue and TA/CD, as well as the institutional capacity and political 
will for PFM reform of the recipient government. The evidence points towards a positive effect on budget 
formulation and planning – primarily through TA/CD delivered to the partner government. Budgeting and 
accounting were also improved due to budget support. A few sources report negative effects, which are 
related to fiscal discipline, budget credibility and transparency (Orth et al., 2017). 
Main findings post-exit 
The PFM efforts remained stable in two (Malawi, Rwanda) out of the four countries after the exit from 
multi-donor budget support. In Malawi, PFM gained fundamental importance in the aftermath of the Cash-
gate scandal. Both the government and the donor community agreed that PFM had to be in the centre of 
reform efforts after the scandal, and the government implemented a PFM Action Plan. Technical assistance 
in PFM is ongoing and supported by a policy dialogue; however, the sustainability of the implemented struc-
tures is questioned as the reform is primarily based on the demand from donors. CSOs further demanded 
action from the government side. In Rwanda, the performance in PFM remained stable after the exit from 
budget support due to strong ownership of the government for PFM reforms. The government particularly 
pushed reforms in debt management policy, processes and capacities for macroeconomic and fiscal fore-
casting, and established a Medium Term Macroeconomic Framework. However, improvements are still 
needed in areas like expenditure management, internal audit or fiscal decentralization. 
In the other two countries (Uganda and Zambia) efforts in PFM declined. Although PFM reforms fund-
ing increased significantly in Uganda compared to funding during and after the exit, the increase did not 
translate into better performance. On the contrary, budget credibility and budget control deteriorated after 
the exit, probably due to the lack of performance assessment on those reforms. The end of GBS seems to 
have released external donor pressure on budget transparency, jeopardizing political will and backing for 
technical staff in government bodies. The absence of a policy dialogue further resulted in the exclusion of 
civil society from questions related to PFM. 
With process tracing, it has been possible to test the hypothetical effect of the exit from multi-donor 
GBS on the achieved improvements in PFM during the budget support period in Malawi and Zambia. 
Malawi went through a shock after the Cashgate scandal, but both donors and government understood the 
central role the deficient PFM system had played in the scandal and continued reform efforts. Improvements 
have been achieved on the technical level (accounts reconciliation and introduction of a new IFMIS), while 
effective budget scrutiny is still negatively affected by the reporting of NAO through MoFEPD instead of 
directly to parliament. Zambia witnessed a deterioration in PFM reforms as the government lost the incen-
tive to reform after the exit (see Table 17). 
Table 17 Results for PFM reform at a glance by country 
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Zambia 
PFM reform is sustainable 
(due to pressure to im-
prove the PFM after the 
Cashgate scandal) 
[PT+CCS] 
PFM performance re-
mained stable [CCS]   
PFM reform efforts suf-
fered insignificant 
changes as a result of exit 
[CCS]  
PFM efforts are further re-
duced (due to decline in 
donor leverage to push for 
PFM reforms) [PT+CCS] 
 
Source: own 
Note: Process tracing methodology [PT]; Comparative case studies [CCS] 
A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.11 and 7.12. 
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5.6 Domestic accountability and budget transparency 
Relevance 
Good governance is a central objective of budget support and is promoted, among others, through 
domestic accountability and budget transparency. Both domestic accountability and budget transpar-
ency are objectives at the core of the intervention logic of budget support. Budget support is expected to 
positively affect the supply and demand-side of domestic accountability. Institutions on the supply-side of 
domestic accountability include government institutions such as ministries of finance, national statistic of-
fices, and supreme audit institutions (SAI),77 which are expected to supply (budget) information to the gen-
eral public. Budget support is expected to contribute to the strengthening of these institutions, for example 
through improved predictability of revenues, control mechanisms via conditionality and capacity develop-
ment. The demand-side of domestic accountability consists of actors like parliaments, civil society and me-
dia, who demand the information to hold the government to account. These actors could, for example, ben-
efit from budget support through policy dialogue that invite them to participate in the budget process or 
through capacity development and technical assistance. 
According to the theory of change, positive effects on domestic accountability are achieved through 
a combination of improved budget transparency, strengthened public sector institutions responsible 
for PFM, and strengthened linkages between government and oversight bodies. Budget transparency 
and functional PFM are necessary conditions for domestic accountability, because clarity about the use of 
public funds is needed to hold public representatives and officials accountable for effectiveness and effi-
ciency and without finances being managed consistently and transparent, accountability cannot be en-
forced. A budget support intervention is expected to have a positive impact on human rights and democracy, 
to which domestic accountability can significantly contribute. Furthermore, good governance is not an end 
in itself but serves as a cross-cutting approach to increase the effectiveness of budget support to achieve 
the objectives of reducing poverty and promoting socioeconomic development. 
Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
The overall finding that emerges from synthesizing the reviewed evidence is that multi-donor budget 
support contributes significantly to improvements on the supply-side of domestic accountability (e.g. 
Ministry of Finance or Auditor General), while contributions to the demand-side of domestic account-
ability (e.g. parliament or CSO) are poorly covered and show mixed results (Orth et al., 2017). 
The supply-side of domestic accountability improved as a result of budget support – especially 
through improved PFM and the increased capacity and power of SAI. The effects of budget support on 
the comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget are positive. As budget support is channelled 
through the national budget systems, it further strengthens and increases the relevance of these systems. 
The most notable changes the team identified for SAI through budget support are improvements regarding 
the quality and quantity of audit sources as well as their timely publication. However, the evidence suggests 
that achievements were limited to the technical level and did not affect the political procedures. Budget 
support was, for example, unable to promote solutions with regard to the follow-up of audits, the audit 
recommendations, the enforcement of prosecution, and the recovery of funds (Orth et al., 2017). 
Evidence regarding the demand-side of domestic accountability and democratic governance is scarce 
so that we were unable to draw any generalizable conclusions. The majority of studies indicate a weak 
positive effect of budget support strengthening the oversight function of parliaments, while a minority finds 
no effect. Results are even more inconsistent for the effect on the participation of CSO’s in the budget 
process. They range from mildly positive to absent or even negative. Overall, budget support seems to per-
form below its potential to effectively support the demand-side of domestic accountability (Orth et al., 
2017). 
 
77  Note that SAI can be part of the supply as well as the demand-side and fulfil both functions depending on the institutional and legal status. 
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The majority of sources describe positive effects of budget support on governance, and few sources 
report absent effects. However, the results on governance are not clear-cut. Most sources only draw hes-
itant conclusions on the effects of budget support on good governance. Improvements are mostly attributed 
to stronger intra-government accountability structures thanks to the fact that budget support disburse-
ments are allocated by the Ministry of Finance (Orth et al., 2017). 
Main findings post-exit 
The case studies revealed that in two countries (Zambia and Uganda) there was a reduction of do-
mestic accountability after the exit from multi-donor budget support, while in the other two (Malawi 
and Rwanda) domestic accountability increased after the exit from GBS (see Table 18). The supply-side 
of domestic accountability improved in all countries but the demand-side declined in Zambia and Uganda 
as CSO and parliament had less access to budget discussion after the exit. For Zambia and Malawi, the 
analysis went beyond a comparative case study design and tested the robustness of effects through process 
tracing. The drivers for improved or declined domestic accountability were external pressure or the lack 
thereof and ownership of the government. 
Budget transparency improved in all four countries in terms of quantity; however, the quality of the 
published documents remains disputed. Even though transparency regarding the planned budget has 
been maintained on paper in Rwanda and Zambia, the quality and relevance of this information declined 
due to a lack of access to accurate budget expenditure data. In Malawi, the provided budget information is 
still insufficient but has been improving as a result of the exit and the Cashgate scandal. In Uganda, budget 
transparency is slightly improving if measured by the amount of budget statements published. 
Table 18 Results for domestic accountability and budget transparency at a glance by country 
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Zambia 
- Supply-side DA im-
proved [PT+CCS] 
- Demand-side DA im-
proved [PT+CCS] 
- BT improved formally 
but is still insufficient 
[PT+CCS] 
- Supply-side DA im-
proved [CCS] 
- Demand-side DA im-
proved [CCS] 
- BT improved formally 
[CCS] 
- Supply-side DA im-
proved [CCS] 
- Demand-side DA de-
clined [CCS] 
- BT improved formally 
[CCS] 
- Supply-side DA im-
proved [PT+CCS] 
- Demand-side DA de-
clined [PT+CCS] 
- BT improved formally 
[PT+CCS] 
Source: own 
Note: Domestic accountability [DA]; Budget transparency [BT];Process tracing methodology [PT]; Comparative case studies [CCS] 
A detailed table with all tests for each mechanism part including the assigned probabilities can be found in Annex 7.11 and 7.12. 
 
The output of the NAO improved in Malawi since the exit and has been sustained in Rwanda.78 In 
Zambia, the media and CSOs have lost influence, while in Malawi they have gained slightly in influ-
ence since the exit. 
5.7 Service delivery 
Relevance 
Improvements in public service delivery are predicted outcomes of budget support programmes, be-
cause the provided financial means to the recipient government’s budget are expected to be used to 
finance the expansion of service delivery in social sectors. Through its non-financial elements, budget 
support is also designed to influence sector policies and increase the quality of social services by strength-
ening the administrative capacities for service delivery. 
 
78  For Zambia and Rwanda the evidence does not allow any statements to be made regarding the NAO’s output. 
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Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
A majority of sources provides evidence for a positive effect of budget support on the amount of 
public service delivered (Orth et al., 2017). The evidence suggests that funds provided through budget 
support are predominantly used for investments or to cover running costs in the social sectors (e.g. salaries 
for health workers or teachers). Thus, funds from budget support are decisive in increasing service delivery, 
particularly in the education and health sectors. Yet, budget support does not prove to be effective at im-
proving the quality of provided services or the administration responsible for delivering these services (Orth 
et al., 2017). 
Main findings post-exit 
The results for service delivery are diverse and range from negative effects (Malawi and Zambia), over 
negligible effects (Uganda) to slightly positive effects (Rwanda). There is no established clear link 
between change in public expenditure to social sectors and service delivery. This leads to two possible 
conclusions: (a) the lack of good data led to skewed results, i.e. the link exists, but it is not measured by the 
data; (b) the link does not exist and service delivery is independent from public expenditure, for example 
because public expenditure during the budget support period was spent on activities that were not related 
to service delivery. 
5.8 Non-income poverty 
Relevance 
Non-income poverty measures the relative poverty generated by the lack of access to services, goods and 
amenities. The level of income is not always a good proxy to measure poverty and the extent to which it 
allows to meet basic needs. Budget support is expected to influence non-income poverty through improved 
service delivery, whereas income poverty would be improved even more indirectly, e.g. through achieving a 
stable macroeconomic environment that allows higher economic growth. Since the impact of budget sup-
port on non-income poverty is indirect and can be influenced by other external factors, such as the economic 
performance, the attribution is challenging even in theory. 
Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
Despite a considerable number of sources that address changes in non-income poverty, the attribu-
tion to budget support often remains implausible or disregarded. While most cases describe improve-
ments in non-income poverty, attribution statements relating to the contribution of budget support to these 
trends is found in only a few studies. This is because evaluations face problems in plausibly linking changes 
in non-income poverty to budget support programmes. The evidence does not report on the negative effect 
of budget support on non-income poverty (Orth et al., 2017), but also suggests that budget support does 
not reach its full potential in reducing non-income poverty. Possible explanations for failing to maximize 
budget support potential related to non-income poverty include donors’ focus on quantitative targets to 
increase access to basic services, a lack of pro-poor policy orientation by the recipient government, dysfunc-
tional accountability mechanisms, and the weakness of budget support to affect local systems for service 
delivery (Orth et al., 2017). 
Main findings post-exit 
Available data would indicate that there has been no negative effect on non-income poverty in the four case 
study countries. The trend of continuous improvement of non-income poverty indicators has been robust 
throughout the exit. This means that indicators such as life expectancy, undernourishment or primary school 
completion have improved in all four countries during multi-donor budget support and continued on this 
trajectory after the exit. However, data limitations allow only very limited assessments as the latest data 
points are for 2015 – only two or three years after the exit from GBS. It seems likely that it might take more 
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time than that to measure the impacts of the exit. For example, it would appear that the decline of public 
expenditure for health will only manifest itself in life expectancy data with a time lag. 
5.9 Macroeconomic performance 
Relevance 
Budget support is expected to have macroeconomic effects, particularly on economic growth. It is 
assumed that budget support allows the government to increase public spending or saving, thereby creating 
added demand for domestic products and/or facilitating a reduction in government borrowing. If the gov-
ernment spending is used for non-tradable goods, this may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate (de 
Kemp et al., 2011; Miyamoto et al., 2016). The advantage of a higher exchange rate is that imports get 
cheaper; but the downside is that exports become more expensive. In the worst-case scenario, it could lead 
to a ‘Dutch disease’ effect – meaning that export products are becoming too expensive for other countries 
and the export sector production collapses. The interest rates could decline as the government can partly 
replace its borrowing by budget support and hence the demand for loans goes down, thereby decreasing 
the interest rate. Moreover, technical assistance components from the budget support programme focusing 
on macroeconomic and sector policy management are expected to have positive policy and institutional 
effects (OECD DAC, 2012). The expected outcome of progress in economic development due to budget sup-
port is a reduction of income poverty. However, this is the product of the entirety of government policies, 
decisions on spending and budget allocation; it is influenced by budget support only to a limited degree 
(Lawson et al., 2003; OECD DAC, 2012). 
Knowledge prior to exit evaluation 
Overall, the existing evidence reports positive effects on macroeconomic performance. However, 
most sources agree that the evidence base is insufficient to clearly attribute improvements in mac-
roeconomic performance to the presence of budget support programmes. The evidence attributes the 
reinforcement of already existing macroeconomic stability to the presence of budget support, as it includes 
more international partners in the macroeconomic debate, and fosters fiscal discipline by the provision of 
on-budget funds. There appears to be growth of GDP during the GBS period in many countries, but a clear 
attribution to budget support programmes is not possible. Some sources suggest that economic growth is 
boosted, because budget support funds enable increases in government spending without a simultaneous 
increase in domestic borrowing. Alternative explanations for economic growth are debt relief (e.g. Malawi 
2006), high domestic commodity prices (e.g. copper prices for Zambia) and IMF programmes (Lawson et al., 
2016; Leiderer and Faust, 2012). Budget support has a positive effect on private sector development, espe-
cially on the business environment, although the strength of the effect varies strongly between countries 
(Orth et al., 2017). 
Main findings post-exit 
In all four case study countries, the GDP growth declined in the short run after the exit and the level 
of debt increased to offset the shortfall in multi-donor GBS payments (see Table 19 and Figure 70). It 
appears that the macroeconomic situation deteriorated right after the exit but recovered quickly when ad-
equate measures were taken. Figure 71 shows that with exception of Malawi the annual GDP growth rates 
fell significantly with the exit and are below or only slightly above the sub-Saharan average in the year fol-
lowing the exit. While in previous and subsequent years (e.g. 2010 and 2015) the GDP growth rates are much 
higher than the regional average. This demonstrates that GDP growth reductions that followed the exit are 
not simply a reflection of global or regional economic cycles. However, the deterioration should not be 
solely attributed to the exit and must be analysed within the broader economic context, as typically the 
donor exit occurred in response to a deterioration of government commitment to the donor’s agenda. For 
example, a continued lack of commitment to fiscal austerity led to GBS suspensions in some cases (e.g. the 
World Bank in 2012 in Uganda), but can itself cause macroeconomic instability. The common response to 
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the exit from GBS was to increase borrowing to substitute the budget support payments. Only Zambia ex-
panded external financing whereas the other three expanded domestic borrowing. Such an increase in bor-
rowing has the inherent risk of crowding out domestic investments and compromising the economic growth 
even further. 
Table 19 Results for macroeconomic performance at a glance by country 
Macroeconomic development fol-
lowing the exit from GBS 
Country 
GDP declined Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda 
Debt increased Malawi (mostly domestic), Zambia (mostly external), Uganda (mostly 
domestic), Rwanda (mostly external) 
Fiscal deficits increased Zambia, Malawi 
Exchange rate deterioration Malawi, Uganda (only shortly) 
Current Account deficit increased Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda 
Fiscal adjustment Uganda, Rwanda 
Source: own 
In two countries (Rwanda and Uganda), economic development has recovered quickly, probably be-
cause fiscal adjustments were undertaken. The other two countries (Malawi and Zambia) did not man-
age to keep the deficits low, probably because the financial situation was already strained prior to 
the exit owing to high debt levels. For Malawi, the financial gap created by the shortfall in funding was 
too large to be filled with other revenues or to be met by fiscal adjustments alone. In Zambia, it seems that 
missing external pressure and scrutiny on the budget led to a widening of the deficit. Rwanda and Uganda, 
on the other hand, undertook fiscal adjustments, which contributed to a quick recovery and less instability. 
 
Figure 70 Increasing government debt in all four countries (in percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook Data (IMF, 2017f) 
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Figure 71 Difference in percentage points between countries’ GDP growth and sub-Saharan average 
GDP growth by year 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017c) 
Note: GDP growth rate of Sub-Sahara Africa is ex-high-income countries 
  
0,5
-1,9
0,4
1,1
-0,2
1,3
3,4
5,1
-0,1
3,0
5,8
4,7
5,0
0,1
-1,3
0,5
2,1
3,4
1,2
3,9
0,2 0,1
-0,1
2,4
-3,0
-2,0
-1,0
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
in
 %
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Zambia
100    6.  |  Conclusions and recommendations 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
6.  |  Conclusions and recommendations    101 
6.1 Conclusions 
This evaluation finds that the broad and mostly unplanned exit from multi-donor GBS in the four case study 
countries undid most of the positive effects associated with the provision of budget support in those coun-
tries. The findings also show that the exit from multi-donor GBS and the associated changes in aid portfolios 
have implications that reach far beyond the mere suspension or reprogramming of financial support for 
partner governments. The exit negatively affects the overall relationship between donors and partner gov-
ernments as well as between donors and thus the overall quality and effectiveness of development cooper-
ation in those countries. 
The evaluation observes a substantial deterioration of donor coordination and harmonization across the 
four case studies, with an almost full reversal to levels of aid fragmentation that most development experts 
on both sides of the aid relation had believed to be a thing of the past. Stand-alone project-type funding is 
the prevailing modality in bilateral aid portfolios. Joint funding, in turn, is rare and limited to a few selected 
sectors and programmes, despite budget support still being the preferred modality for partner governments 
to receive external support for their development strategies and policies. The negative externalities and 
costs of high fragmentation of aid make it more difficult for donors to address systematic and broader gov-
ernance issues. 
As a direct consequence of this, there was a substantial decrease in donors’ influence on partner govern-
ments’ strategic policy formulation and reform agendas through dialogue and conditionality. Not only did 
the high-level political dialogue collapse after the exit, the quality of the technical dialogue also decreased 
in response to the exit. 
The diminished involvement of donors in policy planning and monitoring, in combination with the absence 
of a framework for mutual accountability since the exit, translates into a more limited reform commitment 
of partner governments. Large providers of external assistance still have some leverage, but the extent of 
this varies substantially and hinges primarily on the importance of the donors’ financial contributions or the 
donors’ central role in the provision of services, for example in health.79 
Budget support on average only accounted for 10% of ODA across all DAC donor countries. Yet it achieved 
positive effects in a number of relevant development areas (including public expenditure, PFM, service de-
livery quantity and the supply-side of domestic accountability). Furthermore, it managed to create formal-
ized structures for policy dialogue, and established a framework for mutual accountability (Orth et al., 2017), 
which other aid modalities that account for much larger shares of ODA have not been able to achieve in a 
similar way and at comparable cost. With the exit from GBS, although the total level of aid receipts remained 
constant in most countries, the established structures largely disappeared and the majority of positive 
achievements of budget support were negatively affected or even reversed. Donors’ aid portfolios are more 
fragmented since the exit from GBS and apparently do not provide sufficient incentive to maintain similar 
formalized structures for policy dialogue and mutual accountability on both sides of the aid relation. 
These developments are at odds with recently adopted agendas, including the Fourth High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness (OECD DAC, 2011), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 17) (UN, 2017) and the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda on financing the SDGs (UN, 2015), underscore the need of inclusive partnerships, 
enhanced ownership of partner governments and stronger alignment of strategies. Individual donor strate-
gies, such as Germany’s ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’, also acknowledge the need to ‘develop a common, in-
ternational strategy and take a coordinated approach’ (BMZ, 2017, p. 13). 
It seems highly unlikely that donors will be able to live up to the ambitious goals and principles formulated 
in these agendas unless they jointly re-engage in integrated approaches to development cooperation that 
combine financial and non-financial elements of cooperation, dialogue and mutual accountability in a simi-
lar or evolved fashion to multi-donor GBS. 
 
79  Only in the case of highly aid-dependent Malawi did the possibility of a relaunch of GBS provide sufficient incentives to push for reforms. In the 
other three countries, reform efforts continued, but were not attributable to donor influence. 
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6.2 Assessment of budget support against DAC criteria for evaluating development as-
sistance 
Relevance 
The relevance of outputs and outcomes achieved by budget support is high. Budget support programmes 
managed to strengthen the alignment between donor programmes and partner government strategies, to 
increase social sector spending and access to social service delivery, and to improve PFM. Therefore, the 
modality successfully addressed important development goals and bottlenecks in receiving countries. The 
analysis of the early exit from GBS further emphasizes the relevance of the modality. Since the exit, policy 
constraints and bottlenecks are more difficult to address. 
Effectiveness 
Evidence on the effectiveness of budget support clearly shows that the modality is effective in a number of 
developmental areas, including the implementation of aid effectiveness principles, increases in social public 
expenditure and improvements in PFM (Orth et al. 2017). The attribution of these positive effects to budget 
support is further underlined by the fact that many of these positive budget support effects were not robust 
against the exit from the modality: in fact, most effects were negatively affected by the exit. 
Efficiency 
While there is no absolute measure for the efficiency of aid modalities, indications are that multi-donor GBS 
has been able to achieve substantial developmental gains at comparably low cost. Budget support was never 
used predominantly or even exclusively in the recipient countries’ aid portfolio – averaging about 7% to 22% 
of ODA – whereas project-type interventions always constituted the lion’s share in countries’ aid portfolios. 
Yet, this relatively small amount of funding was able to achieve important systemic changes in partner coun-
tries and in partner relations, for example, through better PFM or policy dialogue and established formalized 
structures. The exit from GBS in contrast led to a collapse of crucial dialogue structures, which had allowed 
donors and partners to jointly address poverty-reduction strategies and development plans, thereby in-
creasing overall development effectiveness. 
Impact 
Evidence clearly shows that budget support leads to increased public spending in social sectors, improves 
the quality of public sector financial management, strengthens the supply-side of domestic accountability 
and improves access to public services (Orth et al., 2017). The exit from the modality, on the other hand, led 
to a reduction in social sector allocation in the case study countries. It thus seems safe to conclude that 
budget support triggered these positive outcome changes. Although there is no reliable evidence that these 
changes ultimately led to improvements in living conditions for the poor and/or the general population in 
budget support receiving countries, it would not seem unreasonable to assume that they at the very least 
helped to create necessary preconditions for such improvements at impact level. 
Sustainability 
A concluding assessment of the sustainability of budget support effects is not possible. Yet, considering 
that budget support programmes had systemic effects and that some systemic effects remained after the 
exit from the modality (for example in PFM), it seems plausible that the modality can in fact provide for 
sustainable positive effects. The findings on the lack of robustness in budget support effects show that an 
uncoordinated, unplanned exit can clearly jeopardize the sustainability. 
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6.3 Recommendations 
Figure 72 From findings to recommendations 
 
 
Source: own 
Recommendation 1 
The evaluation finds strongly increased fragmentation of aid in the wake of the exit from multi-donor GBS 
in all four case studies as a consequence of a general shift in focus away from joint funding approaches to 
(mostly stand-alone) project-type interventions. This leads to high transaction costs, less coordination and 
coherence among donor programmes, and to the weakening of institutions in developing countries. The 
negative externalities and costs of high fragmentation of aid make it difficult for donors to create ownership 
of the partner government and to address systematic and broader governance issues (see Figure 72). 
Therefore, this evaluation recommends: 
1 Bilateral and multilateral donors should jointly (re)engage in integrated policy-based approaches 
to support partner development strategies. 
Bilateral and multilateral donors should (re)engage in joint approaches that support the national develop-
ment plans and poverty-reduction strategies of the partner government to ensure ownership and better 
alignment of donors’ programmes to these strategies, thus being policy based. The approaches should com-
bine the whole spectrum of instruments in an integrated approach. 
The global agenda 2030 as well as individual donors’ strategies, such as Germany’s Marshall Plan with Africa, 
that focus on coordination and concerted action will have to rely on such joint policy-based approaches to 
be successfully implemented. 
1a  Bilateral and multilateral donors should design such approaches around the integrated provision 
of funding, technical assistance, policy dialogue and mutual accountability that ensure jointly 
coordinated implementation. 
Recommendation 2:
Donors and partners should develop 
strategies for the coordinated and 
carefully managed exit from 
integrated policy-based approaches 
such as budget support, even and 
especially for those cases, when a 
sudden and unplanned exit is 
warranted.
Recommendation 1:
Donors should jointly (re)engage in 
integrated policy-based approaches 
to support partner development 
strategies. 
The integration of budget support inputs, which are financial inputs, 
conditionality, policy dialogue and TA/CD works well in a package and leads to 
positive effects in many development relevant areas.
Relatively small amounts of GBS achieve various positive effects, created forma-
lized structures for policy dialogue and mutual accountability. High 
fragmentation in today’s aid portfolios does not allow filling this vacuum. 
Fragmentation increases after the exit because joint funding is rare and limited 
to a few selected sectors and programmes.
Donor’s influence on partner governments’ strategic policy formulation and 
reform agendas through dialogue and conditionality decreased substantially.
A collapse of the established policy dialogue structures along with a severe 
deterioration of donor coordination and harmonization can be observed.
The exit severely and negatively affects the overall relationship between donors 
and partner governments as well as between donors.
The broad and mostly unplanned exit undermined most positive effects 
associated with the provision of budget support in the four case study 
countries.
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The findings from this exit evaluation support the existing evidence that the integrated mix of inputs as is 
provided through budget support lead to important developmental outcomes. Future aid modalities should 
thus integrate at least the following inputs: 
 A formalized dialogue. 
 Targeted technical assistance and capacity development that addresses the main bottlenecks in 
partner systems that hinder the effective formulation and implementation of policies and reforms. 
Technical assistance and policy dialogue generate important synergies. On one hand, working with 
partner governments on the bottlenecks generates important information that feeds into the joint 
policy dialogue, and on the other hand, the policy dialogue strengthens the targeting and ac-
ceptance by partners of the technical assistance activities. 
 A framework for mutual accountability that serves to enhance donors’ coordination in decision mak-
ing. At the same time, this framework allows the partner government to predict the volume of dis-
bursements and assume its responsibilities. 
Furthermore, any such integrated approach should be based on the principles of harmonization, coordina-
tion, and joint planning and implementation. 
1b  In order to improve the design of such integrated approaches and its’ individual components, 
donors and partners should invest in closing evidence gaps regarding the effectiveness of indi-
vidual inputs. 
While evidence strongly suggests that the described ‘package’ of inputs works to produce important devel-
opment outcomes, there is less understanding how exactly the individual inputs work together and, there-
fore, how to improve this interaction. Future empirical work should thus focus on the analysis of causal 
mechanisms for specific inputs so that integrated policy-based approaches can be designed to be even more 
effective than previous GBS programmes. 
Recommendation 2 
This evaluation shows that the uncoordinated and sudden retreat of donors from GBS negatively affects, or 
in the extreme even reverses, the majority of positive achievements. It also shows that the negative reper-
cussions of an unplanned and uncoordinated exit extend beyond immediate budget support effects and 
affect the quality of development cooperation on a much broader level (see Figure 72). An exit strategy is 
needed to avoid such negative repercussions in the case of future integrated policy-based approaches. 
2 Bilateral and multilateral donors together with partner governments should develop strategies 
for the coordinated and carefully managed exit from integrated policy-based approaches such as 
budget support, even and especially for those cases when a sudden and unplanned exit is war-
ranted, e.g. due to a breach of underlying principles. 
The goal of an exit strategy should be to structure a coordinated exit, ensure sustainable programme effects 
even after the programme ends, and minimize negative repercussions of the exit. Such an exit should be 
organized as a coordinated withdrawal of donors and without diluting the political signal intended with the 
exit. Established processes and structures, most importantly the policy dialogue and the arrangements for 
mutual accountability, should be continued. 
2a  Throughout the exit from integrated policy-based approaches, bilateral and multilateral donors 
and partner governments should continue the policy dialogue. 
Early communication, consultation and involvement of stakeholders – most importantly of the partner gov-
ernment – is crucial throughout the exit to ensure a coordinated retreat of donors. The policy dialogue was 
formally tied to policy-based modalities such as budget support, but content-wise and on a conceptual level, 
the dialogue can take place independently of the modality. It could serve to discuss aims and indicators of 
the national development strategy. 
6.  |  Conclusions and recommendations    105 
However, without integrated policy-based approaches such as budget support, the connectional element in 
the policy and technical dialogue is lacking. Bilateral and multilateral donors, possibly by nominating a lead 
donor, have to ensure that dialogue at the policy and technical levels continues in a coordinated manner. 
2b  Throughout the exit from integrated policy-based approaches, bilateral and multilateral donors 
and partner governments should ensure that arrangements for mutual accountability remain in 
place. 
To minimize negative repercussions of the exit, the arrangements for mutual accountability (e.g. a Perfor-
mance Assessment Framework) help to define responsibilities and targets throughout the exit. 
2c  Bilateral and multilateral donors should be prepared to adopt immediate, short-term measures 
to deal with acute shortfalls in indispensable spending, particularly in the social sectors. 
Where the sudden exit from budget support (e.g. because of a breach of underlying principles) or similar 
modalities means that the partner government would in the short run not be able to fund crucial expendi-
tures, such as for medication and electricity in hospitals, bilateral and multilateral donors should be pre-
pared to adopt immediate measures to counterbalance these shortfalls in indispensable spending. Through 
effective earmarking this should be done in a way as not to dilute the political signal intended to be given 
with the exit. This might imply that donors would need to jointly build compensation funds (either jointly at 
the country level or across countries) from which to fund such expenditure, not necessarily through govern-
ment channels. 
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7.1 The comprehensive evaluation framework for budget support 
 
Source: OECD DAC, 2012, p. 9 
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7.2 Glossary of budget support terminology 
Term Definition 
General budget support “GBS is a modality to finance a partner country’s budget through a transfer 
of resources from an external financing agency to the partner government’s 
national treasury. The funds thus transferred are managed in accordance 
with the recipient’s budgetary procedures. “ (OECD DAC, 2006a, p. 26) 
GBS is provided as a non-earmarked contribution and is subject to specific 
disbursement conditions (OECD DAC, 2006a). 
Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) Several donors jointly provide budget support disbursements and agree on 
common conditionality (Koeberle et al., 2006, p. 69). 
Sector budget support (SBS) Modality supporting the implementation of a sector development pro-
gramme. The preconditions for payment and capacity development target 
sector specific policy subject and budget allocation priorities (OECD DAC, 
2012). 
Compared to GBS, the funds are earmarked for the utilisation in a specific 
sector (Williamson and Dom, 2010). 
Underlying principles Principles such as macroeconomic stability, commitment of the govern-
ment to implement national development plans and reforms in PFM, and 
adherence to democratic principles and human rights that need to be ful-
filled to introduce or continue a BS programme in a country, while the 
breach of one or more principles can lead to the termination of BS (Faust 
et al., 2011). 
Technical Assistance (TA) / Capacity Development (CD) TA is provided to facilitate the implementation of development projects. It 
is applied in both bilateral projects and complex programmes. CD means 
building the ability of countries to manage their own development. The aim 
is to increase individual and institutional abilities to perform functions, 
solve problems and achieve objectives (OECD, 2018b).  
As part of the BS package, TA/CD is being employed to strengthen the ca-
pacities of the government and other institutions in the partner country 
and thereby increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the funds used 
(OECD DAC, 2006b). 
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Term Definition 
Performance assessment framework (PAF) Negotiated set of indicators measuring government performance in areas 
such as the implementation of sector strategies and PFM reforms. Donors 
link their disbursements in different ways to these indicators (as either 
fixed tranche based on overall PAF-performance or as floating or perfor-
mance tranches linked to individual PAF indicators) (OECD DAC, 2006b). 
High Level Political Dialogue Strategic issues are discussed in high-level political dialogue between high-
level representatives of the partner government and representatives of em-
bassies. The aim is to create a joint debate between donors and the partner 
government on policy reforms and other strategic issues (Molenaers et al., 
2010). 
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7.3 Evaluation matrix 
Level Detailed questions Assessment criteria/ indicators Sources Data collection tools 
Inputs How does ending GBS change donors’
aid portfolios? 
 Total aid volume: programme vs project-type in-
terventions 
 Sector allocation 
 Continuation of former aid modalities to BS? 
 From GBS to SBS? 
 New financing instruments? 
 Germany: BMZ
 EC: Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation 
and Development (DG 
DEVCO)? 
 Other important bilateral do-
nors: UK 
Quantitative analysis
Direct out-
puts 
How does the partner demand for and 
utilization of TA/CD related to the ob-
jectives of BS develop? 
 TA/CD relating to supply-side of PFM (e.g. MoF, 
Auditor General, tax authorities) 
 Demand-side of PFM line ministries and institu-
tions that received SBS 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Standardized ques-
tions to be rated 
Direct out-
puts 
To what extent are dialogue forums of 
BS still functional? 
 Different levels of policy dialogue (technical/ 
sectoral, multi-donor budget support (MDBS) 
group, higher level political dialogue) still ex-
isting 
 Participants (donor/ partner side) 
 Frequency of meetings 
 Topics discussed 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Mini focus groups (for-
mer and current rep-
resentatives) 
Direct out-
puts 
Have other dialogue forums replaced 
BS dialogue? 
 Other dialogue forums
 Participants (donor/ partner side) 
 Frequency of meetings 
 Topics discussed 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Mini focus groups (for-
mer and current rep-
resentatives) 
Direct out-
puts 
How has donor access to decision 
makers on partner side changed? 
Number and content of meetings with:
 Politicians at central, sectoral and decentral level 
 Officials at central, sectoral and decentral level 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Standardized ques-
tions to be rated 
Direct out-
puts 
To what extent are programmes/ pro-
jects harmonized among donors? 
 Comparison during/ after ending BS
 Overview about portfolio of other donors 
 (joint) needs assessment 
 (joint) programming 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Standardized ques-
tions to be rated 
Direct out-
puts 
How has conditionality developed? Comparison during/ after ending BS
 Number of (PAF) indicators 
 Specification 
 Harmonization among donors 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Mini focus groups 
 Standardized ques-
tions to be rated 
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Level Detailed questions Assessment criteria/ indicators Sources Data collection tools 
Direct out-
puts 
Have transaction costs changed?  Comparison during/ after ending BS
 No. of staff working on BS/ programme admin-
istration 
 Banking and other costs 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Mini focus groups 
 Standardized ques-
tions to be rated 
Induced out-
puts 
Has the commitment of the partner 
government to implement reforms 
changed? 
 Number and quality of reform plans
 Pace of implementation 
 Reform plans and implemen-
tation reports 
 Interviews with donor and 
partner representatives 
 Interview guideline
 Standardized ques-
tions to be rated 
Induced out-
puts 
Has the budget allocation for social 
sectors changed? 
Comparison during/ after ending BS, e.g.
 Education 
 Health 
 Agriculture/ rural development 
 MDBS evaluations
 Information on government 
websites 
 Others? 
(To be subcontracted to 
national expert) 
Induced out-
puts 
Have BS effects related to improved 
budget transparency (BT), budget 
management and overall PFM been 
sustained? 
Comparison during/ after ending BS, e.g.
 Budget transparency 
 Supply of budget information 
 Revenue generation 
 Procurement 
 MDBS evaluations
 Information on government 
websites 
 Open Budget Index 
 Interviews 
(To be subcontracted to 
national expert) 
Induced out-
puts 
Have BS effects related to improved 
domestic accountability been sus-
tained? 
Comparison during/ after ending BS, e.g.
 Number of stakeholders (supreme audit institu-
tions, parliament, media, civil society) demand-
ing and using budget information 
 Quality of public discourse 
 Number of corruption cases being exposed and 
disciplinary measures taken 
Interviews with
 Donor representatives 
 Implementing agencies 
 Partner representatives 
Interview guideline
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to im-
proved public administration and 
public service delivery been sus-
tained? 
Comparison during/ after ending BS, e.g.
 access to public services 
 Government and interna-
tional statistics 
 Interviews 
(To be subcontracted to 
national expert) 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to reduc-
tion of non-income poverty been sus-
tained? 
Comparison during/ after ending BS, e.g.
 Utilization of public services 
 Government and interna-
tional statistics 
 Interviews 
(To be subcontracted to 
national expert) 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to im-
proved macroeconomic performance 
been sustained? 
Comparison during/ after ending BS Macroeco-
nomic indicators, e.g. 
 debt 
 Government and interna-
tional statistics 
 Interviews 
(To be subcontracted to 
national expert) 
Source: own 
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7.4 Classification of the sampled countries by income 
Low-income economies 
($1,005 or less) 
Lower-middle-income econo-
mies ($1,006 to $3,955) 
Upper-middle-income econo-
mies ($3,956 to $12,235) 
Burkina Faso Ghana South Africa 
Burundi Morocco  
Malawi Nicaragua  
Mali Tunisia  
Mozambique Vietnam  
Rwanda Zambia  
Tanzania   
Uganda   
Source: World Bank Data Help Desk (World Bank, 2017f)  
7.5 Background information on the sample selection: preconditions and selection crite-
ria 
Fulfilment of preconditions 
 Precondition 1: Provision of GBS for at least three consecutive years 
 Precondition 2: Provision of GBS by multiple donors80 
 Precondition 3: Involvement of Germany in the GBS provision 
 Precondition 4: Termination and/or sustained suspension81 of GBS by several donors, including Ger-
many and the EC 
 Precondition 5: Absence of severe armed conflict jeopardizing development results 
Among the 15 sampled countries, precondition 1 is not fulfilled in the case of South Africa, as GBS disburse-
ments were limited to two years. For the remaining 14 countries, precondition 1 is met. The duration of GBS 
disbursements varies between five years in Nicaragua (2006-2011) (OECD, 2018a) and 13 years in Uganda/ 
Rwanda. (Bogetic et al., 2015; KfW, 2014; MINECOFIN, 2010, 2011, 2012; MoFPED, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2014b; OECD, 2017a; Purcell et al., 2006). 
The number of donors providing GBS to a country varies between 5 (Burundi) and 21 (Mozambique) (OECD, 
2018a). Only in the cases of Morocco (GBS disbursement only by the EC) and Tunisia (GBS disbursement by 
Italy, EC and United Arab Emirates), precondition 2 is not met. 
Morocco, Tunisia and Burundi did not receive GBS from Germany (precondition 3). To all other remaining 
countries, Germany provided GBS. Most of the 11 countries (with the exception of Nicaragua) additionally 
received indirect GBS payments from Germany through programmes of the EC. 
For precondition 4, the evaluation team considers not only terminations of budget support, but also sus-
tained suspensions over more than one budget cycle affecting the implementation of development policies 
and reform progress in a similar way as terminations. Suspensions and terminations of GBS, including the 
required termination of GBS disbursements by Germany and the EC occurred in 9 of the 11 remaining coun-
tries (Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia) (Molenaers et al., 
 
80  Multiple donors are defined as a group of at least five donors providing GBS in three years. The number of donors per year may vary. 
81  The term ‘sustained suspension’ in this evaluation is defined as a suspension of more than one budget support cycle (usually a fiscal year), so that 
suspensions can be differentiated from single delays in payment. A minimum amount suspended is not required. 
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2016; OECD, 2018a). In Burkina Faso, Germany has provided GBS since 2005 in a 2016 still ongoing pro-
gramme (BMZ, 2016a) and in Mozambique, the EC is resuming GBS disbursements for the period until 2020 
(EC, 2015b). Precondition 5 is thus not met in Burkina Faso and Mozambique. 
Among the nine remaining countries, one country faced severe armed conflicts within the country, which 
led to the ending of GBS disbursements. In Mali, a military coup took place in 2012. The weakening of the 
nation state created a temporary phase of limited statehood in the North of Mali that was used by rebel 
groups to claim territory (World Bank, 2017g). 
Ratings of the selection criteria 
 Selection criterion 1: Time period covered by GBS evaluation82 
 Selection criterion 2: Provision of a substantial amount of GBS83 
 Selection criterion 3: Provision of a substantial amount of GBS from Germany and the EC 
 Selection criterion 4: Significance of suspensions and terminations of GBS 
Regarding the coverage of the budget support evaluation (selection criterion 1), Tanzania (Booth et al., 2005; 
Lawson et al., 2013) and Uganda (Bogetic et al., 2015; Lister et al., 2006) are rated highest because for those 
countries two budget support evaluations exist, covering the time span 1994-2004 and from 2005/2006 to 
2012/2013. For Zambia, rated second best, the evaluation covers the years 2005-2010 (de Kemp et al., 2011). 
To rate if a substantial amount of GBS was provided (selection criterion 2), the total GBS payments for one 
country were measured as a percentage of government expenditure in that country during the GBS period 
(as far as data was available). The highest average was reached in Rwanda, followed by Malawi and Zambia 
(OECD, 2018a; World Bank, 2017c) (see Figure 73 andFigure 74). 
Selection criterion 3 was measured as the share of GBS paid by each Germany and the EC in relation to total 
GBS. The highest shares were in Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia (OECD, 2018a) (see Table 20). 
Regarding selection criterion 4, the most significant financial cutback was observed in Zambia, where all 
donors terminated GBS by the end of 2014 (BMZ, 2016b). Also in Nicaragua, Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda, 
the suspension of GBS led to significant cutbacks, for example in the form of a widening fiscal gap in Malawi 
(Claussen et al., 2006). 
 
82  Again, the methodology of the evaluation must be specifically designed for evaluating budget support and the methodology must have been 
jointly agreed in a multi-donor setting. 
83  Measured as total GBS payments in percentage of government expenditure in the respective country for the years in which GBS was disbursed. 
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Figure 73 Share of general and SBS disbursements by all donors in relation to general government expenditure 
 
Source: CRS & World Development Indicators (OECD, 2018a; World Bank, 2017c) 
Figure 74 Total general and SBS disbursed by all donors 
 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
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Table 20 Share of total GBS and SBS by Germany, EC and largest donor for selection criteria 3 
 Number of BS 
donors 
German BS as share of 
total BS in country 
GBS SBS 
BS by EC as share of to-
tal BS in country 
GBS SBS 
Share of largest donor GBS in 
country 
Share of largest donor SBS in 
country 
Ghana  12 8% - 17% 1% UK 31% World Bank 75% 
Malawi  8 4% - 46% 5% EU 46% World Bank 60% 
Nicaragua  14 8% - - 0% Netherlands 34% World Bank 56% 
Rwanda  9 6% 1% 37% 11% UK 43% World Bank 68% 
Tanzania  18 1% 2% 14% 2% UK 33% World Bank 83% 
Uganda  12 7% 0% 35% 1% UK 50% World Bank 87% 
Vietnam  17 2% - 7% 2% Japan 54% World Bank 80% 
Zambia  12 6% - 31% 9% EU 31% World Bank 68% 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
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7.6 Interview guidelines 
Interviews with development partners 
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions 
Introduc-
tion 
  What was the main reason behind ending GBS?
 What are key consequences of ending GBS programmes? 
Inputs How does ending GBS change 
your aid portfolio? 
 How did the size and share of aid change after ending GBS?
 Was it possible to reprogram the GBS funds? Into which programmes? 
 Which finance modalities are proposed/ used to substitute GBS? 
o Programme or project-type intervention? 
 Is government ownership experienced as stronger or weaker? 
 Is transparency experienced as stronger or weaker? 
o Which elements of the GBS package (performance tranche, policy dialogue, underlying principles) have been 
integrated into the modalities? 
Why? How does it work? 
Direct out-
puts 
How does the partner demand 
for and utilization of TA/ CD re-
lated to the objectives of BS de-
velop? 
 Are TA/CD related to budget support still in place? 
o How do they perform? 
o Does ending GBS change the partner demand for TA/ CD? 
 Increase/ decrease? 
 Different focus? 
 Is the demand for TA/CD dependent on the aid modality used? 
 Hypothesis: capacity building is rather supply (demand) oriented? 
Direct out-
puts 
To what extent are dialogue fo-
rums of BS still functional? 
 Which dialogue forums of BS still exist?
o Technical/sectoral policy dialogue 
o MDBS group 
o Higher level political dialogue 
 Who are the participants on donor and partner side? 
 How frequently are meetings taking place? 
 Which topics are on the agenda? 
Direct out-
puts 
Have other dialogue forums re-
placed BS dialogue? 
 Are there new dialogue forums replacing BS dialogue forums?
o What are key characteristics and topics of the new dialogue forum? 
o Who are the participants from donor and partner side? 
o How frequently is the dialogue taking place? 
 Hypothesis: Compared to dialogue forums of BS, what is the new dialogue forum missing (adding)? 
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Interviews with development partners 
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions 
Direct out-
puts 
How has donor access to deci-
sion makers on partner side 
changed? 
 Did the access to decision makers on partner side change after ending GBS?
 Number of meetings with politicians/officials at central, sectoral and decentral level? 
 Content of the meetings? 
o Experience with effectiveness/ results of these meetings? 
Direct out-
puts 
To what extent are pro-
grammes/ projects harmonized 
among donors? 
 Was there a harmonization of donor activities and funding while GBS was disbursed?
o Joint needs assessment 
o Joint programming 
o Joint implementation 
o Goals of the National Development Plan 
o How did the harmonization of donor activities develop after ending GBS? 
 Joint needs assessment 
 Joint programming 
 Joint implementation 
 Goals of the National Development Plan 
Direct out-
puts 
How has conditionality devel-
oped? 
 How was conditionality (e.g. PAF indicators) shaped while disbursing GBS?
o To what extent is conditionality used after ending GBS? 
 Did the specification of conditionality change? 
 Is conditionality harmonized among donors?  
Direct out-
puts 
Have transaction costs 
changed? 
 How many members of staff were working on GBS? 
o On programme administration? 
o Banking cost? 
o How many members of staff are working on programme administration after ending BS? 
 Banking cost? 
 Hypothesis: consequence of ending GBS: higher (lower) administrative burden on the government 
Induced 
outputs 
Has the commitment of the 
partner government to imple-
ment reforms changed? 
 What is the progress of reforms being implemented while GBS was disbursed?
 Have new reforms been planned since ending GBS? 
o How many reforms were planned since ending GBS? 
o How fast were the planned reforms implemented? 
o Did the quality of the reforms planned and implemented change since ending GBS? 
Induced 
outputs 
Have BS effects related to im-
proved domestic accountabil-
ity been sustained? 
 Were there effects of GBS on improved domestic accountability?
o Which ones? 
 How many corruption cases were exposed? 
‐ How many disciplinary measures were taken? 
 How did number of stakeholders demanding and using budget information change after ending GBS? 
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Interviews with development partners 
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions 
 How did the quality of public discourse change? 
 How many corruption cases have been exposed since ending GBS? 
‐ How many disciplinary measures have been taken since ending GBS? 
 How did the staff capacity to oversee public spending in the OAG change after ending GBS? 
Induced 
outputs 
Has the budget allocation for 
social sectors changed? 
 Has the budget allocation for social sectors changed? 
1. e.g. education, health, agriculture and rural development 
Induced 
outputs 
Have BS effects related to im-
proved BT, budget manage-
ment and overall PFM been 
sustained? 
 What were the effects of GBS on PFM?
o Budget transparency 
o Supply of budget information 
o Revenue generation 
o Fiscal discipline 
o Improvement PEFA indicators 
 Have effects been sustained after ending GBS? 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
improved public administration 
and public service delivery 
been sustained? 
 Have BS outcomes related to improved public administration and public service delivery been sustained? (Comparison 
during/after ending GBS) 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
reduction of non-income pov-
erty been sustained? 
 Have BS outcomes related to reduction of non-income poverty been sustained? (Comparison during/after ending GBS) 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
improved macroeconomic per-
formance been sustained? 
 Have BS outcomes related to improved macroeconomic performance been sustained? (Comparison during/after ending 
GBS) 
Additional 
question 
regarding 
the Ger-
man finan-
cial aid (for 
mini focus 
groups) 
 Good financial governance programme:
 Have BS effects related to improved PFM been sustained? (Comparison during/after ending GBS) 
2. Budget transparency 
3. Revenue generation 
4. Account system 
5. Public sector accounting 
6. External audit 
7. Supply of budget information 
8. Social accountability 
9. Benefits, rights and obligations for civil society 
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Interview with partners (supply-side of domestic accountability) 
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions 
Introduc-
tion 
 1. What was the main reason behind ending GBS?
2. What are key consequences of ending GBS programmes? 
Inputs How does ending GBS change 
your aid portfolio? 
3. Which finance modalities have been proposed to substitute GBS?
 What is your preference? 
 Can you participate in the decision making? 
o How? 
o Is ownership experienced as stronger or weaker? 
o Is transparency experienced as stronger or weaker? 
Direct out-
puts 
How does the partner demand 
for and utilization of TA/ CD re-
lated to the objectives of BS de-
velop? 
4. Are TA/CD related to budget support still in place? 
 How do they perform? 
 Does ending GBS change the demand for TA/ CD? 
o Increase/ decrease? 
o Different focus? 
o Is the demand for TA/CD dependent on the aid modality used? 
o Hypothesis: capacity building is rather supply (demand) oriented 
Direct out-
puts 
To what extent are dialogue fo-
rums of BS still functional? 
5. Which dialogue forums of BS still exist?
 Technical/sectoral policy dialogue 
 MDBS group 
 Higher level political dialogue 
o Who are the participants on donor and partner side? 
o How frequently are meetings taking place? 
o Which topics are on the agenda? 
Direct out-
puts 
Have other dialogue forums re-
placed BS dialogue? 
6. Are there new dialogue forums replacing BS dialogue forums?
 What are key characteristics and topics of the new dialogue forum? 
 Who are the participants from donor and partner side? 
 How frequently is the dialogue taking place? 
o Hypothesis: Compared to dialogue forums of BS, what is the new dialogue forum missing (adding)? 
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Interview with partners (supply-side of domestic accountability) 
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions 
Direct out-
puts 
To what extent are pro-
grammes/ projects harmonized 
among donors? 
7. Was there a harmonization of donor activities and funding while GBS was disbursed?
 Joint needs assessment 
 Joint programming 
 Joint implementation 
 Goals of the National Development Plan 
 How did the harmonization of donor activities develop after ending GBS? 
o Joint needs assessment 
o Joint programming 
o Joint implementation 
o Goals of the National Development Plan 
o Consequences on predictability of aid flows 
Direct out-
puts 
How has conditionality devel-
oped? 
8. How was conditionality (e.g. PAF indicators) shaped while GBS was disbursed?
 To what extent is conditionality used after ending GBS? 
o Did the specification of conditionality change? 
o Is conditionality harmonized among donors?  
Direct out-
puts 
Have transaction costs 
changed? 
9. How many members of staff were working on GBS? 
 On programme administration? 
o Banking cost? 
o How many members of staff are working on programme administration after ending BS? 
 Banking cost? 
 Hypothesis: consequence of ending GBS: higher (lower) administrative burden on the government. 
Induced 
outputs 
Has the commitment of the 
partner government to imple-
ment reforms changed? 
10. What is the progress of reforms being implemented while GBS was disbursed?
11. Have new reforms been planned since ending GBS? 
 How many reforms were planned since ending GBS? 
 How fast were the planned reforms implemented? 
 Did the quality of the reforms planned and implemented change since ending GBS? 
Induced 
outputs 
Have BS effects related to im-
proved domestic accountabil-
ity been sustained? 
12. Were there effects of GBS on improved domestic accountability?
 Which ones? 
o How many corruption cases were exposed? 
 How many disciplinary measures were taken? 
o How did the number of stakeholders demanding and using budget information change after ending GBS? 
o How did the quality of public discourse change? 
o How many corruption cases have been exposed since ending GBS? 
 How many disciplinary measures have been taken since ending GBS? 
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Interview with partners (supply-side of domestic accountability) 
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions 
o How did the capacity of staff in the OAG to oversee public spending change after ending GBS?
Induced 
outputs 
Has the budget allocation for 
social sectors changed? 
13. Has the budget allocation for social sectors changed? (subcontracted)
 e.g. education, health, agriculture and rural development 
 Public expenditure patterns consistent with poverty-reduction priorities? 
Induced 
outputs 
Have BS effects related to im-
proved BT, budget manage-
ment and overall PFM been 
sustained? 
14. What were the effects of GBS on PFM? (subcontracted)
 Budget transparency 
 Supply of budget information 
 Revenue generation 
 Fiscal discipline 
 Improvement PEFA indicators 
 Have effects been sustained after ending GBS? 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
improved public administration 
and public service delivery 
been sustained? 
15. Have BS outcomes related to improved public administration and public service delivery been sustained? (Comparison 
during/after ending GBS) (subcontracted) 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
reduction of non-income pov-
erty been sustained? 
16. Have BS outcomes related to reduction of non-income poverty been sustained? (Comparison during/after ending GBS) 
(subcontracted) 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
improved macroeconomic per-
formance been sustained? 
17. Have BS outcomes related to improved macroeconomic performance been sustained? (Comparison during/after ending 
GBS) (subcontracted) 
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Interview with partners (demand-side of domestic accountability)
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions
Introduc-
tion 
 1. What is the main reason behind ending GBS?
2. What are key consequences of ending GBS programmes? 
Inputs How does ending GBS change 
your aid portfolio? 
3. Which finance modalities are proposed to substitute GBS?
 What is your preference? 
 Can you participate in the decision making? 
o How? 
 Is ownership experienced as stronger or weaker? 
 Is transparency experienced as stronger or weaker? 
Direct out-
puts 
How does the partner demand 
for and utilization of TA/ CD re-
lated to the objectives of BS de-
velop? 
4. Are TA/CD related to budget support still in place? 
 How do they perform? 
 Does ending GBS change the demand for TA/ CD? 
i. Increase/ decrease? 
ii. Different focus? 
iii. Is the demand for TA/CD dependent on the aid modality used? 
iv. Hypothesis: capacity building is rather supply (demand) oriented 
Direct out-
puts 
To what extent are dialogue fo-
rums of BS still functional? 
5. Which dialogue forums of BS still exist?
 Technical/sectoral policy dialogue 
 MDBS group 
 Higher level political dialogue 
i. Who are the participants on donor and partner side? 
ii. How frequently are they taking place? 
iii. Which topics are on the agenda? 
Direct out-
puts 
Have other dialogue forums re-
placed BS dialogue? 
6. Are there new dialogue forums replacing BS dialogue forums?
 What are key characteristics and topics of the new dialogue forum? 
 Who are the participants from donor and partner side? 
 How frequently is the dialogue taking place? 
o Hypothesis: Compared to dialogue forums of BS, what is the new dialogue forum missing (adding)? 
Induced 
outputs 
Has the commitment of the 
partner government to imple-
ment reforms changed? 
7. What is the progress of reforms being implemented while GBS was disbursed?
8. Have new reforms been planned since ending GBS? 
 How many reforms were planned since ending GBS? 
 How fast were the planned reforms implemented? 
 Did the quality of the reforms planned and implemented change since ending GBS? 
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Induced 
outputs 
Have BS effects related to im-
proved domestic accountabil-
ity been sustained? 
9. Were there effects of GBS on improved domestic accountability?
 Which ones? 
o How many corruption cases were exposed? 
 How many disciplinary measures were taken? 
o How did the number of stakeholders demanding and using budget information change after ending GBS? 
o How did the quality of public discourse change? 
o How many corruption cases have been exposed since ending GBS? 
 How many disciplinary measures have been taken since ending GBS? 
o How did the capacity of staff in the OAG to oversee public spending change after ending GBS? 
Induced 
outputs 
Has the budget allocation for 
social sectors changed? 
10. Has the budget allocation into social sectors changed? 
10. e.g. education, health, agriculture and rural development 
Induced 
outputs 
Have BS effects related to im-
proved BT, budget manage-
ment and overall PFM been 
sustained? 
11. What were the effects of GBS on PFM?
 Budget transparency 
 Supply of budget information 
 Revenue generation 
 Fiscal discipline 
 Improvement PEFA indicators 
 Have effects been sustained after ending GBS? 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
improved public administration 
and public service delivery 
been sustained? 
12. Have BS outcomes related to improved public administration and public service delivery been sustained? (Comparison 
during/after ending GBS) 
Outcome Have BS outcomes related to 
reduction of non-income pov-
erty been sustained? 
13. Have BS outcomes related to reduction of non-income poverty been sustained? (Comparison during/after ending GBS) 
Source: own 
 
124    7.  |  Annex 
7.7 List of interview partners 
 
Malawi 
German Cooperation 
Name Institution Position
Thomas Staiger Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Lilongwe 
Counsellor, Head of Development 
Cooperation 
Jens Petersen-Thumser Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internati-
onale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
Team Leader Public Financial and 
Economic Management Project 
Liam Sanyang GIZ Consultant for budget implementa-
tion in MoFEPD 
Lamulo Nsanja KfW Senior Country Economist 
Other development partners 
Name Institution Position
Bilateral 
Lucy Hayes DFID Senior Governance Advisor
Bjarne Garden Royal Norwegian Embassy Minister Counsellor/Deputy Head of 
Mission, Head of Development Co-
operation 
EU and multilateral 
Lluis Navarro EU Delegation to the Republic of 
Malawi 
Head of Cooperation 
Janet Mortoo EU Delegation to the Republic of 
Malawi 
Programme Manager – ECOPA Sec-
tion 
Richard Record World Bank Senior Country Economist 
Priscilla F. Kandoole World Bank Country Economist 
Daniel Domelov World Bank Ex. PFM Expert 
Andrew Mwaba AfDB Resident Representative 
Fenwick D. Kamanga AfDB Principal Governance Expert
Jack Joo Kyung Ree IMF Resident Representative 
Government and parliament 
Name Institution Position
Mike Majabula GoM Director – Human Resources Divi-
sion 
Seodi White Office of the President and Cabinet Chief Director Public Sector Reforms
Mr Matambo Ministry of Finance Accountant General 
Peter K. Simbani Ministry of Finance, Economic Plan-
ning and Development 
Acting Chief Director – Department 
of Economic Planning and Develop-
ment 
Nations Msowoya Ministry of Finance, Economic Plan-
ning and Development – National 
Authorizing Office Support Unit 
Head of Unit 
Stephenson D.L. Kamphasa National Audit Office Auditor General 
Charles Maseya National Audit Office Assistant Auditor General 
Hon. Rhino Moyo Chiphiko Parliament Chairperson – Budget & Finance 
Committee 
Fred Kamwani Parliament Clerk – Public Accounts Committee
Hon. Alekeni Menyani  Parliament Chair – Public Accounts Committee 
Sector ministries 
Emma Jipson Mabvumbe Ministry of Health Director of Planning & Policy Devel-
opment 
Civil society  
Name Institution Position
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Jeff J. Kabondo African Institute of Corporate Citi-
zenship (AICC) 
Programme Manager – Governance
Ronald Mtonga Council for NGOs in Malawi (CON-
GOMA) 
Executive Director 
Benedicto Kondowe Civil Society Education Coalition 
(CSEC) 
Executive Director 
Macdonald Mayaar Mphangwe Malawi Health Equity Network 
(MHEN) 
Governance Project Officer 
George M. Jobe Malawi Health Equity Network 
(MHEN) 
Executive Director 
Carsterns George Mulume Episcopal Conference of Malawi Director of Social Development
Academia and consultants 
Name Institution Position
Dr Naomi Ngwira   Former academia, government offi-
cial 
A/Pro Winford Masanjala University of Malawi A/Professor 
Sunga Kalemba-Nyirenda   Consultant 
 
Rwanda 
German Cooperation 
Name Institution Position
Dr Peter Woeste Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Kigali 
Ambassador  
Stefan Sckell Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Kigali 
Head of Development Cooperation
Mandy Hupfer Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Kigali 
Bodo Immink  GIZ Country Director 
Markus Bär KfW Director KfW Office Kigali 
Other development partners 
Name Institution Position
Bilateral 
Kenny Osborne DFID Deputy Head of Office 
Johan Debar Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium Minister Counsellor 
Pieter Dorst Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands 
Head of Development Cooperation 
Mikael Boström Embassy of Sweden Counsellor/ Head of Development 
Cooperation  
Giancarlo de Picciotto Swiss Cooperation Office Regional Head of International Co-
operation 
EU and multilateral 
Emanuel-José Amaral EU Delegation to Rwanda Team Leader Governance and PFM
Lénaïc Georgelin  EU Delegation to Rwanda Team Leader Infrastructure
Aghassi Mkrtchyan World Bank Country Manager; Country Econo-
mist 
Silas Udahemuka World Bank Human Development Specialist –
Social Protection and Labour 
Mulle Chikoko  AfDB Chief Socio-Economist 
Government and parliament 
Name Institution Position
Marcel Mukeshimana MinEcoFin Accountant General 
Leonard Rugwabiza Minega MinEcoFin Chief Economist 
Jonathan Nzayikorera MinEcoFin Acting Director General – National 
Budget 
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Tom Butera  MinEcoFin External Resources Mobilization Ex-
pert 
Prof. Thomas Kigabo Rusuhuzwa National Bank of Rwanda – Mone-
tary Policy and Research 
Chief Economist and Director Gen-
eral 
Hon. Constance Mukayuhi Rwaka Parliament Chair Committee on National 
Budget and Patrimony  
Sector ministries 
Samuel Mulindwa  Ministry of Education Permanent Secretary 
Yves Bernard Ningabire Ministry of Local Government Director of Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation  
Civil society  
Name Institution Position
Apollinaire Mupiganyi Transparency International Executive Director  
Edward Kalisa  Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) Secretary General 
Josephine Irene Uwamariya Action Aid Rwanda Country Director  
James Butare  Action Aid Rwanda Head of Programmes and Policy
Stephen Rodriques  UNDP Country Director 
 
Uganda 
German Cooperation 
Name Institution Position
Udo Weber Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Kampala 
Head of Cooperation 
Sandy Richter GIZ  Programme Leader Transparency 
and Accountability 
Oliver Jünger KfW Head of Country Office 
Ann-Christin Damm KfW Junior PFM Consultant 
Other development partners 
Name Institution Position
Bilateral 
Paul Mullard DFID Senior Economic Advisor 
Adrian Green DFID Head – Growth & Economic Man-
agement 
Susanne Spets Embassy of Sweden Deputy Head of Mission, Head of 
Cooperation 
Sarah B. Mayanja USAID Education Specialist 
Frank Kirwan Irish Embassy Head of Cooperation 
Peter Michael Oumo Irish Aid Economic Advisor 
Hans-Peter van der Woude Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands 
Head of Cooperation 
Simon Gill Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) 
Project Director – Budget Strength-
ening Initiative 
Sebastian Wolf ODI Research Fellow – Budget Strength-
ening Initiative 
TIIna Pasanen ODI Research Fellow 
Majbrit Holm Jakobsen Embassy of Denmark Deputy Head of Mission 
Cate Najjuma Embassy of Denmark Senior Programme Advisor – Econo-
mist 
Wouter Cools Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium Development Cooperation Attaché
EU and multilateral 
Thomas Tiedemann EU Delegation to the Republic of 
Uganda 
Head of Section – Governance and 
Human Rights 
Dr Christian Raitz von Frentz EU Delegation to the Republic of 
Uganda 
Operations Advisor – Governance 
(Accountability) 
Cédrique Merell  EU Delegation to the Republic of 
Uganda 
Director Economic Growth Section
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Enock Nyorekwa Twinoburyo EU Delegation to the Republic of 
Uganda 
Infrastructure Economist – Eco-
nomic Growth Section 
Asger Hallberg Borg World Bank Senior Country Officer 
Government and parliament 
Name Institution Position
John Charles Ogol MoFPED – Development Assistance 
and Regional Cooperation Depart-
ment 
AG. Commissioner 
Azizah Nabitalo MoFPED – Development Assistance 
and Regional Cooperation Depart-
ment 
Kenneth Mugambe MoFPED Director Budget 
Rosetti Nabbumba Nayenga MoFPED Deputy Head – Budget Monitoring 
and Accountability Unit, Technical 
Monitoring Officer Agriculture 
Allan Gitta MoFPED Finance Manager – Budget Monitor-
ing and Accountability Unit 
Amos Lugoloobi Parliament Chair Person Budget Committee
Sector ministries and FINMAP 
Richard Kabagambe-Tureebe Ministry of Health Acting Assistant Commissioner 
(Budget and Finance) Planning De-
partment  
Johnson Mutesigensi MoFPED Coordinator of the Financial Man-
agement and Accountability Pro-
gramme (FINMAP) 
Nick Roberts FINMAP Basket Mechanism Implementation Consultant
Civil society  
Name Institution Position
Juliet Akelo Uganda Debt Network Policy Officer 
Christine Byiringiro Uganda Debt Network Programme Officer 
Courtney Sandro Uganda Debt Network Policy Officer 
Richard Ssewakiryanga Uganda National NGO Forum Executive Director  
Academia and consultants 
Name Institution Position
Willy Kagarura   Consultant 
 
Zambia 
German Cooperation 
Name Institution Position
Bernd Finke Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Lusaka 
Ambassador 
Dr Frank Hofmann Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Lusaka 
Counsellor, Head of Development 
Cooperation 
Christian Zoll Embassy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Lusaka 
Counsellor 
Thomas Schaef GIZ Country Director 
Doris Nückel GIZ  Programme Leader and Senior Advi-
sor to MoF 
Martin W. Phillips GIZ Senior Budget Advisor 
Megan Gray GIZ Advisor Good Financial Governance
Stephan A. Neu KfW Director
Helmut Elischer Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Resident Director 
Other development partners 
Name Institution Position
Bilateral 
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Bruce Lawson-McDowall PhD DFID Deputy Head of Office 
Emeline Dicker DFID Governance and Stability Team 
Leader 
Arve Ofstad Royal Norwegian Embassy Ambassador 
EU and multilateral 
Aad Biesebroek EU Delegation to the Republic of 
Zambia and the Common Market for 
East and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
Head of Cooperation 
Ina-Marlene Ruthenberg World Bank Country Manager 
Tobias Nybo Rasmussen IMF Resident Representative 
Damoni Kitabire AfDB Resident Representative 
Philip Boahen AfDB Principal Country Programme Of-
ficer 
Government and parliament  
Name Institution Position
Dick Chellah Sichembe Ministry of Finance Accountant General  
Tamala Ngoma Ministry of Finance Deputy General Accountant
Emmi Chemguluka Ministry of Finance Deputy General Accountant
Mukuli Chikuba Ministry of Finance Director Economic Management
Chasiya Kazembe Ministry of Finance Chief Economist (Donor Coordina-
tion) 
David Zulu Ministry of Finance Chief Economist 
Willis Chipango Ministry of Finance Chief Budget Analyst – Expenditure
Chola J. Chabala Ministry of Finance Director – National Planning
Prudence Kaoma Ministry of Finance Assistant Director Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
Wamupu S. Akapelwa Ministry of Finance Assistant Director of Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
Apostle Monde F. Siturala Ministry of Finance Acting Director Development Coop-
eration 
Irene Chongo Lamba Anti-Corruption Commission Deputy Director General  
Mr. Sakala Anti-Corruption Commission Director investigations 
Lawrence Hansingo Anti-Corruption Commission Director community education
Mathews Mbewe Anti-Corruption Commission Secretary to the Commission
Zondwayo Soko Anti-Corruption Commission Director prevention 
H. H. Hamududu Parliament Chair of Committee on public ac-
counts, Committee on estimates 
Misael Fitzgerald Kateshi Parliament Revenue and Expenditure Analyst –
Parliamentary Budget Office 
Sector ministries 
Fanizani Phiri Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing 
Acting Assistant Director Roads, 
Markets and Bus Stations 
Shadreck Kambufuire Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing 
Principal Planer Department of 
Physical Planning 
Roland Chulu Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing 
Senior Accountant 
Civil society and media 
Name Institution Position
Geofrey Chongo Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflec-
tions (JCTR) 
Deputy Director 
Sharon Chileshe Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflec-
tions (JCTR) 
Acting Programme Manager
Kryticous Patrick Nshindano Civil Society for Poverty Reduction 
(CSPR) 
Executive Director 
Tommy Singongi Civil Society for Poverty Reduction 
(CSPR) 
Coordinator Resource 
Governance Programme  
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Goodwell Lungu  Transparency International Zambia 
(TIZ) 
Executive Director 
Isac Mwaipopo Centre for Trade Policy and Develop-
ment (CTPD) 
Trade Policy Programme Officer
Stuart Lisula The Post
Joshua Jere Zambia National Broadcasting Cor-
poration 
Website Editor, focusing on Eco-
nomic and Financial Business Re-
porting 
Public finance experts  
Name Institution Position
Oliver Saasa Premier Consult Managing Consultant and Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer 
Felix Nkulukusa Sigora Zambia Chief Executive Officer 
 
Interview partners German Development Cooperation 
Name Institution Position
Anja Kramer KfW Former Head of Country Office 
Uganda 
Daniela Beckmann KfW Former Head of Country Office 
Rwanda 
Stephan Klingebiel German Development Institute 
(DIE) 
Head of Department (Bi- and Multi-
lateral Development Cooperation) 
Nils Warner BMZ Deputy Head of Division; 
Former Head of Development Coop-
eration, Embassy of the Federal Re-
public of Germany Kigali 
Andrea Hensel BMZ Officer, Division for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; 
Former Deputy Head of Develop-
ment Cooperation, Embassy of the 
Federal Republic of Germany Kigali 
Dr Gabriele Geier BMZ Head of Division 100 (Policy issues 
of bilateral development coopera-
tion; emerging economies) 
Gundula Weitz-Huthmann BMZ Head of Division 104 (Procedures of 
Financial and Technical Coopera-
tion) 
Source: own 
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7.8 Interview guidelines for process tracing 
Interview with development partners 
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions
Induced outputs Budget transparency mechanism 1. How and why do you think the public expenditure (plan and execution) changed after 
the GBS exit? 
o During GBS, to what extent did the BS dialogue influence budget allocation? 
How do you think changes in dialogue after GBS exit influences budget alloca-
tion in social sectors? 
o After GBS exit, what external factors do you think contributed to the changes 
in public expenditure (commodity prices, international markets)? 
o After GBS exit, what internal factors do you thing contributed to the changes 
in public expenditure (droughts, elections)? 
Induced outputs Public expenditure mechanism 2. Has the commitment of the partner to implement PFM reforms changed? Why?
o What is the progress in PFM reforms? Which document/plan/strategy builds 
the basis? 
o Who implements the reforms? Who is the driving force behind it? 
o What is the particular role of the IMF/World Bank/ your role? 
o How sustainable do you consider the reforms? 
o What are the challenges in implementing the reforms? 
o Which IMF structural benchmarks have been achieved? 
 What is the strategy of the government to fulfil the remaining benchmarks? 
 How do you perceive the commitment in fulfilling the benchmarks? 
 Who implements the reforms? Who is the driving force behind it? 
Induced outputs PFM mechanism 3. From the data we see that BT increased steadily since 2008, even after the exit from GBS 
in 2012. Can you explain why? 
o What were the reasons for the government to be transparent on budget issues? 
o To what extent did internal or external factors play a role? 
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Interview with partners (supply-side of domestic accountability)
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions
Induced outputs Budget transparency mechanism o From the data we see that BT increased steadily since 2008, even after the exit from 
GBS in 2012. Can you explain why? 
 What were the reasons for the government to be transparent on budget issues? 
 To what extent did internal or external factors play a role? 
o How would you describe the role of DAI in the budget process in your country? 
 Did their formal integration in the budget process change? How? 
 How important are DAI for budget scrutiny and how did their role change since 
2012? 
o Do you recall instances where the GoM reacted to suggestions or pressure from DAI 
in the budget process? 
 Are they somehow documented? 
Induced outputs Public expenditure mechanism o After GBS exit, what external factors do you think contributed to the changes in 
public expenditure? 
 E.g. commodity prices, financial markets) 
o How did the allocation for social sectors change after GBS exit, and what influenced 
this change? 
 How was it then vs how is it now? 
o How did the dialogue with the donors support the allocation of budget into social 
sectors? And what is the situation now? 
o How would you rate the budget discipline now? 
Induced outputs PFM mechanism o We understand that the basis for PFM reform is the PFM Action Plan
 When and between whom was the PFM Action Plan drafted and agreed upon? 
 What triggered the drafting of the PFM Action Plan? 
 Which reforms does the PFM Action Plan include? 
 What is the progress on those reforms? 
 Who implements the reforms? Who is the driving force behind it? 
 Is there a new strategy for PFM reform? 
 What are the challenges in implementing the reform? 
 What role does the IMF and World Bank/other donors play in PFM reform? 
1. Which IMF structural benchmarks have been achieved? 
2. What is the strategy to fulfil the remaining benchmarks? 
3. Who implements the reforms? Who is the driving force behind it? 
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Interview with partners (demand-side of domestic accountability)
Level Evaluation question Detailed questions
Induced outputs Budget transparency mechanism 1. From the data we see that BT increased steadily since 2008, even after the exit from 
GBS in 2012. Can you explain why? 
 What were the reasons for the government to be transparent on budget issues. 
 To what extent did internal or external factors play a role? 
2. How would you describe the role of DAI in the budget process in your country? 
 Did their formal integration in the budget process change? How? 
 How important are DAI for budget scrutiny and how did their role change since 
2012? 
3. Do you recall instances where the GoM reacted to suggestions or pressure from DAI 
in the budget process? 
 Are they somehow documented? 
Induced outputs Public expenditure mechanism 4. Has the budget allocation into social sectors changed?
o How were you involved/ knowledgeable about the budgeting process before? 
What is the situation now? 
o (If any change) what do you think caused this change? 
5. Has the commitment of the GoM to implement PFM reforms changed? Why? 
o What is the progress on those reforms? 
o Who implements the reforms? Who is the driving force behind it? 
o What is the role of civil society in implementing the reforms? 
o How do you perceive the commitment in fulfilling the PFM Action Plan/IMF 
structural benchmarks? 
o How sustainable are the reforms? 
o How do you perceive the role of donors/IMF/World Bank in the PFM reform 
process? 
o What are the challenges in implementing the reform? 
Source: own
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7.9 Calculation of the post confidence 
In combination with the prior confidence, the assessment of sensitivity and type I error enables the 
calculation of the post confidence. To ensure the comparability of values given for sensitivity and type I 
error across mechanism parts, the evaluation team developed a coherent scale for assessing sensitivity and 
type I error for each test. One should note that the assessment is discretionary and constitutes a quantifi-
cation of qualitative results. The post value is calculated according to the following formula: 
Posterior = Prior*Sensitivity/(Prior*Sensitivity + Type I Error*(1 – Prior)) 
Sensitivity 
Definition: The probability of getting a confirmation, from the respective entities, when the hypothesis is 
true. When the sensitivity is high, the probability is high, too. 
Example: The probability of the government admitting that social expenditure increased, when it actually 
increased, is very high because the government has very little incentive to hide the fact. However, the prob-
ability of the government admitting to corruption is low because they have an incentive to hide these facts. 
Determinants: Two indicators determine the sensitivity, the likelihood that the actors providing the evi-
dence know the answer, and the incentive to conceal it. In other words, the evaluation team assigns values 
depending on if the interview partner is expected to know the answer or not (see Table 21). The second 
indicator measures the incentive to conceal the truth by the interview partners. Depending on the topic and 
the source, the incentives range from high to medium to low, with the equivalent values. To calculate the 
sensitivity, both indicators are added up. 
Table 21 Scale for assessing sensitivity 
 Expected to know the an-
swer 
Somewhat likely to 
know the answer 
Somewhat unlikely to 
know the answer 
Knowledge 0.90  0.70 0.45 
 High incentive to conceal Medium incentive to 
conceal 
Low incentive to conceal 
Incentive to conceal -0.50 -0.30 -0.05 
 
Source: own  
Type I error 
Definition: The type I error, on the other hand, is the probability of getting a confirmation from the respec-
tive entities when the hypothesis is not true. 
Example: Using the example of public expenditure, the government has an incentive to state that public 
expenditure increased, although it did not actually increase. 
Determinants: Three indicators (can) influence the calculation of the type I error: triangulation, contradic-
tory evidence and the likelihood of biased statements. The overall confidence in the evidence for each test 
depends on the mix of sources. Confidence is generally higher if the evidence comes from interviews with 
different stakeholder groups, such as donor and partner representatives and civil society representatives. 
The mix of sources influences the likelihood of biased statements. For example, if asked how the policy 
dialogue has developed since the exit, government representatives and donors are assumed to have a higher 
likelihood for a positive bias than CSOs, because the former are responsible for the quality of the dialogue 
and might feel induced to euphemize the reality. As shown in Table 22, this likelihood for a bias can be either 
high, medium or low. If the evidence is coming from only one source types, the type I error is increased by 
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0.1 to account for the lack of triangulation. In case some pieces of evidence contradict each other, the type 
I error is increased by 0.15 to account for contradictory evidence. 
Table 22 Scale for assessing type I error 
 
High incentive for a bias Medium incentive for a bias 
Low incentive for a 
bias 
Likelihood of biased 
statements  
0.20 0.15 0.05 
 Some contradictory evi-
dence 
No contradictory evidence  
Contradictory evidence + 0.15 + 0.00  
 <2 source types >2 source types  
Triangulation + 0.10 + 0.00  
 
Source: own 
Example for the calculation of process tracing 
The hypothesis for the mechanism part is that donors exert control through conditionality linked to budget 
support payments (see Table 23). The first test assesses if conditionality is used. Since existing budget sup-
port documents strongly suggest that conditionality was used, the prior was set to 0.9 for the first hypoth-
esis. The sensitivity value is 0.85 because the interview partners (both donor and partner representatives) 
were expected to know the answer and have a low incentive to conceal the information since this infor-
mation is not controversial (0.9 + (-0.05) = 0.85). In comparison, the prior for the test ‘conditionality trig-
gered the intended action by the government’ is rated as 0.6 because conditionality has in other country 
cases not always triggered the intended action and it is therefore only somewhat likely (based on the theo-
retical intervention logic). The sensitivity value is composed as follows: the interview partners are somewhat 
likely to know the answer (mainly statements by donor representatives), but have a low incentive to conceal, 
which results in a value of 0.7 + (-0.05) = 0.65. The type I error is rated 0.05 for all three tests because there 
is only a low incentive for bias and neither low triangulation nor contradictory evidence are present. 
Table 23 Preparation of data to calculate the post value 
Mechanism Test Test type 
Prior – 
value 
Sensitivity 
– value 
Type I er-
ror – value
Post 
value 
Donors exert 
control 
through con-
ditionality 
linked to BS 
payments 
Conditionality was used Hoop 0.9 0.85 0.05 0.994 
Not fulfilling the conditions had 
consequences 
Hoop 0.6 0.85 0.2 0.864 
Conditionality triggered in-
tended action by the GRZ 
Smoking 
gun 
0.6 0.65 0.05 0.951 
Source: own 
Using the above formula, the three values – prior, sensitivity and type I error – give the post confidence of 
each test. The confidence in the mechanism part, which can consist of multiple tests, is calculated using a 
weighted average. This calculation is explained in the following section of the Annex (7.10). 
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7.10 Calculation of the weighted confidence per mechanism part 
A weighted average over the post confidence of the different tests per mechanisms was used to ac-
count for the fact that the different test types have different explanatory power. 
The weights were chosen (arbitrarily) in a way that should reflect the explanatory power of each test type 
(see Table 24). 
Table 24 Weight of different test types 
Test type Weight 
Straw in the wind  1 
Hoop test 2 
Smoking gun 4 
Doubly decisive 6 
Source: own 
We arrived at the values following a sequence of logical arguments. 
1 Straw in the wind is assigned a value of 1. 
2 While a hoop test has the same confirmatory power as a straw in the wind, it has much stronger 
disconfirmatory power. Therefore passing a hoop test has a higher weight. We assume it is twice as 
powerful. 
3 A smoking gun has confirmatory power but, just like the straw in the wind, no disconfirmatory 
power. We regard the confirmatory power of the smoking gun as more relevant than the discon-
firmatory power of a hoop test, i.e. greater than 2. Hence, we assign the value 3 for the confirmatory 
power of the test. In addition, the test has weak disconfirmatory power for which we assign, follow-
ing the first assumption’ the value 1. Adding both values up gives us the overall weight of the test, 
which is 4. 
4 The doubly decisive is in a way a combination of a hoop test and a smoking gun. Thus, the sum of 
the weights for these two tests equals the weight for the doubly decisive, which is 6. 
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7.11 Mechanisms tests Malawi 
Hypothesis: Level of public expenditure for social sector declines 
Mechanism part Test Test type Prior 
Sensitiv-
ity 
Type I 
error 
Post 
value 
Updating 
weighted 
updating 
Confidence 
(weighted)84
Confidence  
The donors suspend 
GBS but signal willing-
ness to relaunch BS 
BS is suspended Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.907 0,946 
Donors signal that sus-
pension can be lifted … 
Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94
… subject to condition-
ality on GoM spending 
in poverty sectors 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.500 0.850 0.150 0.850 0.350 0.70
Donors have fewer 
possibilities for policy 
dialogue  
The technical level dia-
logue has weaker lever-
age 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.050 0.889 0.389 0.78 0.838 0,846 
The quantity and quality 
of policy dialogue is 
lower compared to BS 
times 
Smoking gun 0.600 0.400 0.150 0.800 0.200 0.50
The donors’ access to 
decision makers dimin-
ished 
Smoking gun 0.500 0.850 0.150 0.850 0.350 0.70
The donors continue 
to financially support 
PE in social sectors 
through off-budget 
support 
After exiting BS, donors 
supported emergency 
and humanitarian pro-
jects (2014-2016) 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.150 0.727 0.227 0.45 0.885 0,815 
Donors continue to fi-
nance development 
through off-budget mo-
dality (on poverty re-
lated) 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.900 0.600 0.050 0.991 0.091 0.91
 
84  For information concerning the weighting procedure, see Annex 7.10. 
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The joint funding is lim-
ited 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.150 0.727 0.227 0.45
GoM doesn’t have suf-
ficient resources to 
sustain or improve PE 
levels  
The GoM external (do-
nor provided) resources 
diminish 
Hoop test 0.700 0.400 0.300 0.757 0.057 0.19 0.803 0,776 
The relative and abso-
lute budget allocation 
into social sectors de-
clined after the exit  
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.600 0.900 0.250 0.844 0.244 0.61
The internal revenues 
don’t cover the gap 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.150 0.727 0.227 0.45
Hypothesis: PFM reform dynamics are robust  
Mechanism part Test Test type Prior 
Sensitiv-
ity 
Type I 
error 
Post 
value 
Updating 
weighted 
updating 
Confidence 
(weighted) 
Confidence  
Suspend BS, but signal 
willingness to re-
launch BS or similar fi-
nancing modalities … 
BS is suspended Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.965 0,964 
Donors earmark funds 
for further disburse-
ment 
Hoop test 0.700 0.850 0.150 0.930 0.230 0.77
Donors show willing-
ness to relaunch pay-
ments if conditionality 
is met 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.700 0.650 0.050 0.968 0.268 0.89
...conditional to re-
launch of (IMF) struc-
tural reform pro-
gramme 
The IMF presents a 
structural reform pro-
gramme 
Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.816 0,860 
Other donors signal 
availability to involve 
only if IMF involves 
Smoking gun 0.500 0.400 0.150 0.727 0.227 0.45
GoM addresses Cash-
gate scandal issues 
through PFM Action 
Plan 
GoM drafts PFM Action 
Plan 
Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.994 0,994 
 
The PFM Action Plan is 
agreed and signed 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94
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IMF provides sugges-
tions on further PFM 
reforms and monitors 
performance of IMF 
structural benchmarks 
regarding PFM to as-
sess relaunch 
IMF provides sugges-
tions for further PFM re-
forms 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.500 0.600 0.250 0.710 0.389 0.78 0.753 0,753 
IMF monitors the 
benchmarks 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.500 0.600 0.150 0.800 0.350 0.70
GoM implements PFM 
Action Plan and exerts 
higher budget disci-
pline 
GoM applies the 
measures agreed in the 
PFM Action Plan 
Hoop test 0.700 0.400 0.300 0.757 0.057 0.19 0.892 0,858 
GoM implements 
agreed benchmarks 
Smoking gun 0.900 0.400 0.150 0.960 0.060 0.60
GoM exerts higher 
budget discipline com-
pared to previous 
years 
Budget execution im-
proved compared to 
previous years 
Smoking gun 0.500 0.400 0.250 0.571 0.071 0.14 0.586 0,593 
Budget control mecha-
nisms are improved 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.250 0.615 0.115 0.23
NAO provides a higher 
number and detail of 
audits 
NAO receives annual 
statements from the 
ministries 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.250 0.615 0.115 0.23 0.710 0,650 
NAO has improved ca-
pacities and resources 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.350 0.533 0.033 0.07
NAO produces a higher 
number of internal au-
dits reducing backlogs 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.600 0.400 0.150 0.800 0.200 0.50
Hypothesis: Budget transparency and domestic accountability are improving  
Mechanism part Test Test type Prior 
Sensitiv-
ity 
Type I 
error 
Post 
value 
Updating 
weighted 
updating 
Confidence 
(weighted)  
Confidence  
Suspend BS, but signal 
willingness to re-
launch BS or similar fi-
nancing modalities if 
conditionality is met 
BS is suspended Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.965 0,964 
Donors earmark funds 
for further disburse-
ment 
Hoop test 0.700 0.850 0.150 0.930 0.230 0.77
Donors show willing-
ness to relaunch pay-
ments if conditionality 
is met 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.700 0.650 0.050 0.968 0.268 0.89
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GoM is motivated to 
secure future financ-
ing [external incen-
tive] 
GoM is interested in do-
nor support 
Smoking gun 0.600 0.650 0.150 0.870 0.267 0.67 0.867 0,867 
DAI and CSOs demand 
budget information 
from GoM [domestic 
incentive] 
DAI and CSOs demand 
budget information 
from GoM 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.500 0.600 0.150 0.800 0.300 0.60 0.800 0.800 
GoM provides more 
and high quality 
budget information to 
the public and allows 
DAI to participate in 
the budget process 
Provides more and high 
quality budget infor-
mation to the public 
Smoking gun 0.700 0.850 0.150 0.930 0.230 0.77 0.870 0.870 
Allows DAI to partici-
pate in the budget pro-
cess 
Smoking gun 0.500 0.850 0.200 0.810 0.310 0.62
DAI conduct budget 
scrutiny and provide 
policy recommenda-
tions to GoM 
DAI conduct budget 
scrutiny 
Hoop test 0.700 0.850 0.200 0.910 0.208 0.69 0.834 0,859 
DAI provide policy rec-
ommendation to GoM 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.500 0.850 0.200 0.810 0.310 0.62
GoM reacts positively 
to these recommenda-
tions and changes its 
policies 
GoM provides platform 
for DAI to present rec-
ommendations 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.050 0.890 0.389 0.78 0.617 0,710 
GoM implements parts 
of the recommenda-
tions 
Doubly deci-
sive 
0.500 0.850 0.200 0.810 0.310 0.62
GoM does not imple-
ments recommenda-
tions 
Contradictory 
doubly deci-
sive 
0.500 0.400 0.200 0.330 - 0.167 - 0.33
Source: own 
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7.12 Mechanisms tests Zambia 
Hypothesis: Public expenditure for social sectors remains stable due to elective mode 
Mechanism part Test Test type Prior 
Sensitiv-
ity 
Type I 
error 
Post 
value 
Updat-
ing 
weighted 
updating 
Confidence 
(weighted)85
Confidence  
Donors exert control 
through conditional-
ity linked to BS pay-
ments  
Conditionality was used Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.940 0,936 
Not fulfilling the condi-
tions had consequences 
Hoop test 0.600 0.850 0.200 0.864 0.264 0.66
Conditionality triggered 
intended action by the 
GRZ 
Smoking gun 0.600 0.650 0.050 0.951 0.351 0.88
GRZ increase social 
spending due to do-
nor pressure/ control 
Social spending is in-
creased 
Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.150 0.981 0.081 0.81 0.890 0,917 
Donors influence budget 
allocations 
Smoking gun 0.600 0.650 0.050 0.951 0.351 0.88
Increased social spending 
as a result of donor pres-
sure 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.450 0.150 0.818 0.218 0.55
Donors exit from BS 
due to insufficient 
government’s reform 
commitment 
Performance of the gov-
ernment was rated as low 
or insufficient 
Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.941 0,958 
Donors lost trust in GRZ 
commitment and exit BS 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.400 0.050 0.923 0.323 0.81
GRZ keep high levels 
of social spending 
due to elective mode 
Social spending is still high Hoop test 0.700 0.850 0.200 0.908 0.208 0.69 0.811 0,842 
Elective mode is influenc-
ing public expenditure 
Smoking gun 0.500 0.400 0.050 0.889 0.389 0.78
Social spending is high be-
cause of elective mode 
Doubly decisive 0.500 0.400 0.150 0.727 0.227 0.45
Hypothesis: PFM reform dynamic collapses  
 
85  For information concerning the weighting procedure see Annex 7.10. 
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Mechanism part Test Test type Prior 
Sensitiv-
ity 
Type I 
error 
Post 
value 
Updat-
ing 
weighted 
updating 
Confidence 
(weighted) 
Confidence  
Donors reduce 
amount of BS 
Revenues increased for 
the GRZ 
Hoop test 0.700 0.850 0.050 0.975 0.275 0.92 0.984 
 
0,977 
Graduation to lower-mid-
dle-income country made 
donor funding less afford-
able/attractive 
Hoop test 0.600 0.850 0.050 0.962 0.362 0.91
Share of donor funding in 
the budget decreased 
Doubly decisive 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94
Donors lack leverage 
to push for PFM re-
form 
Initially BS was able to lev-
erage reforms 
Hoop test 0.600 0.650 0.050 0.951 0.351 0.88 0.907 0,899 
Unattractive cost-benefit 
relation reduced motiva-
tion of the GRZ  
Smoking gun 0.500 0.400 0.050 0.889 0.389 0.78
Conditionality was set too 
ambitiously by donors 
Hoop test 0.500 0.700 0.150 0.824 0.324 0.65
Decreasing share of BS in 
the budget reduced the 
leverage 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.450 0.050 0.931 0.331 0.83
Reduces reform ef-
forts regarding PFM, 
accountability and 
other conditionality 
PFM reform dynamics de-
teriorated  
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.200 0.050 0.857 0.257 0.64 0.857 0,857 
Donors exit from BS 
due to insufficient 
government’s reform 
commitment 
Performance of the gov-
ernment was rated as low 
or insufficient 
Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.941 0,907 
Donors lost trust in GRZ 
commitment and exit BS 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.400 0.050 0.923 0.323 0.81
Increase fragmenta-
tion of the aid budget 
(decrease harmoniza-
tion) 
Donor agendas / objec-
tives are diverging  
Hoop test 0.700 0.650 0.050 0.968 0.268 0.89 0.867 0,817 
Harmonization deterio-
rated / vanished 
Doubly decisive 0.700 0.650 0.050 0.968 0.268 0.89
Aid budget is fragmented 
since exit 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.650 0.150 0.867 0.267 0.67
Sector harmonization still 
exist 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.350 0.467 - 0.033 - 0.07
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GRZ does not sustain 
joint dialogue about 
major causes of 
budget deficit with 
development part-
ners 
There is no dialogue to the 
same extent as during BS 
Doubly decisive 0.700 0.600 0.150 0.903 0.203 0.68 0.903 0,903 
GRZ further decrease 
efforts on budget 
credibility and disci-
pline 
Budget discipline de-
creased 
Doubly decisive 0.700 0.600 0.050 0.966 0.266 0.89 0.834 0,703 
Corruption and misappro-
priation is prevalent 
Smoking gun 0.700 0.600 0.050 0.966 0.266 0.89
In some areas there are im-
provements 
Hoop test 0.700 0.400 0.200 0.176 - 0.524 - 1.75
GRZ – lack of budget 
credibility and disci-
pline is fuelled by 
elective mode 
Elective mode increases 
pressure on budget 
Doubly decisive 0.700 0.650 0.150 0.910 0.210 0.70 0.910 0.910 
MoF diverts with the 
executed budget from 
the planned budget  
Budgeting systems are in-
sufficient 
Hoop test 0.700 0.700 0.150 0.916 0.216 0.72 0.929 0,925 
Budget execution is not 
the same as planned 
budget 
Doubly decisive 0.500 0.700 0.050 0.933 0.433 0.87
Hypothesis: Budget transparency and domestic accountability are further reduced 
Mechanism part Test Test type Prior 
Sensitiv-
ity 
Type I 
error 
Post 
value 
Updat-
ing 
weighted 
updating 
Confidence 
(weighted) 
Confidence  
Donors reduce 
amount of BS  
Revenues increased for 
the GRZ 
Hoop test 0.700 0.850 0.050 0.975 0.275 0.92 0.984 0,977 
Graduation to lower-mid-
dle-income country made 
donor funding less afford-
able/attractive 
Hoop test 0.600 0.850 0.050 0.962 0.362 0.91
Share of donor funding in 
the budget decreased 
Doubly decisive 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94
Initially BS was able to lev-
erage reforms 
Hoop test 0.600 0.650 0.050 0.951 0.351 0.88 0.907 0,899 
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Donors lack leverage 
to push for PFM re-
form  
Unattractive cost-benefit 
relation reduced motiva-
tion of the GRZ  
Smoking gun 0.500 0.400 0.050 0.889 0.389 0.78
Conditionality was set too 
ambitiously by donors 
Hoop test 0.500 0.700 0.150 0.824 0.324 0.65
Decreasing share of BS in 
the budget reduced the 
leverage 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.450 0.050 0.931 0.331 0.83
Reduces reform ef-
forts regarding PFM, 
accountability and 
other conditionality 
PFM reform dynamics de-
teriorated  
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.200 0.050 0.857 0.257 0.64 0.857 0.857 
Donors exit from BS 
due to insufficient 
government’s reform 
commitment 
Performance of the gov-
ernment was rated as low 
or insufficient 
Hoop test 0.900 0.850 0.050 0.994 0.094 0.94 0.941 0,907 
Donors lost trust in GRZ 
commitment and exit BS 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.400 0.050 0.923 0.323 0.81
Increase fragmenta-
tion of the aid budget 
(decrease harmoniza-
tion)  
Donor agendas / objec-
tives are diverging  
Hoop test 0.700 0.650 0.050 0.968 0.268 0.89 0.867 0,817 
Harmonization deterio-
rated / vanished 
Doubly decisive 0.700 0.650 0.050 0.968 0.268 0.89
Aid budget is fragmented 
since exit 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.650 0.150 0.867 0.267 0.67
Sector harmonization still 
exist 
Hoop test 0.500 0.400 0.350 0.467 - 0.033 - 0.07
GRZ does not sustain 
joint dialogue about 
major causes of 
budget deficit with 
development part-
ners 
There is no dialogue of the 
same extent as during BS 
Doubly decisive 0.700 0.600 0.150 0.903 0.203 0.68 0.903 0.903 
GRZ conducts no per-
formance assessment 
about the budget and 
Reporting quality de-
creased due to exit 
Smoking gun 0.600 0.400 0.150 0.800 0.200 0.50 0.594 0,537 
Mechanisms of perfor-
mance assessment still ex-
ist 
Smoking gun 0.500 0.850 0.300 0.261  – 
0.239
- 0.48
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no donor/ CSO con-
sultations about the 
budget 
Consultation with CSOs 
decreased or disappeared 
Smoking gun 0.600 0.650 0.050 0.951 0.351 0.88
CSOs provide recommen-
dations and are consulted 
Hoop test 0.600 0.850 0.200 0.136 - 0.464 - 1.16
CSO cannot exert 
control because for-
malized participation 
in budget process is 
absent 
CSO participation in 
budget process decreased 
Hoop test 0.600 0.600 0.050 0.947 0.347 0.87 0.843 0,739 
CSOs ability to dissemi-
nate message declined 
Hoop test 0.500 0.650 0.050 0.929 0.429 0.86
CSO cannot effectively ex-
ert control 
Doubly decisive 0.500 0.400 0.050 0.889 0.389 0.78
CSO provide policy advice
Straw in the 
wind 
0.500 0.850 0.200 0.190 - 0.310 - 0.62
DAI have no formal-
ized leverage to en-
force/follow up on 
recommendations  
Parliament has no leverage 
in the budget process 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.650 0.050 0.951 0.351 0.88 0.818 0,791 
The OAG has little power 
and is dependent of the ex-
ecutive 
Doubly decisive 0.500 0.650 0.050 0.929 0.429 0.86
Corruption cases are not 
prosecuted 
Hoop test 0.500 0.650 0.050 0.929 0.429 0.86
The anti-corruption com-
mission lacks power and 
independence 
Doubly decisive 0.600 0.700 0.050 0.955 0.355 0.89
Parliament still has some 
influence 
Smoking gun 0.500 0.850 0.200 0.190 - 0.310 - 0.62
GRZ reduces budget 
transparency 
BT fulfils formal require-
ments and reforms are un-
der way 
Hoop test 0,500 0,650 0,150 0,235 -0,265 -0,53 0,741 0,573 
BT with practical relevance 
declines/remains low  
Doubly decisive 0.700 0.650 0.150 0.91 0.21 0.70
GRZ reduces budget 
accountability  
DA is deteriorating 
Doubly decisive 0,700 0,400 0,150 0,862 0,162 0,54
0,705
0,548 
DA reforms are under way
Hoop test 0,500 0,650 0,200 0,235 -0,265 -0,53
Source: own 
Note: Tests revealing contradictory or disconfirming evidence are marked in orange. 
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7.13 Commitments and gross disbursements of SBS and GBS by country 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
  
Malawi 
(2000-
2013) 
General budget support Sector budget support 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of to-
tal 
million 
USD 
% of to-
tal 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
Total 704.84 100 633.10 100 424.05 100 378.29 100
Belgium - - - - 2.81 0.66 2.81 0.74
Germany 38.06 5.40 26.70 4.22 - - - -
Ireland - - - - 0.31 0.07 0.31 0.08
Norway 30.39 4.31 50.62 8.00 22.44 5.29 14.77 3.90
UK 223.28 31.68 216.67 34.22 19.20 4.53 119.61 31.62
EU 354.95 50.36 280.95 44.38 82.10 19.36 17.79 4.70
AfDB 58.16 8.25 58.16 9.19 - - - -
World 
Bank 
- - - - 297.19 70.08 223.00 58.95
Rwanda 
(2000-
2013) 
General budget support Sector budget support 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
Total 755.22 100 772.37 100 1089.54 100 1154.63 100
Belgium - - - - 34.39 3.16 40.35 3.49
Canada - - - - - - 0.86 0.07
Germany 47.68 6.31 46.28 5.99 - - 8.51 0.74
Nether-
lands 
20.86 
2.76 
-
-
- - 24.01 
2.08
Sweden 21.76 2.88 22.07 2.86 - - - -
UK 360.22 47.70 360.68 46.70 19.57 1.80 150.21 13.01
EU 241.75 32.01 269.02 34.83 125.84 11.55 96.86 8.39
AfDB 62.95 8.34 74.32 9.62 - - 4.29 0.37
World Bank - - - - 909.74 83.50 829.54 71.84
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Uganda 
(2000-
2013) 
General budget support Sector budget support 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
Total 545.14 100 744.88 100 1575.07 100 1469.24 100
Austria - - - - 21.57 1.37 19.80 1.35
Belgium - - - - 16.14 1.02 18.15 1.24
Denmark - - - - - - 20.36 1.39
France 1.91 0.35 2.87 0.39 - - - -
Germany 59.48 10.91 45.10 6.05 2.35 0.15 - -
Ireland - - - - 27.19 1.73 27.19 1.85
Nether-
lands 
57.06 
10.47 
49.79
6.68
25.18
1.60
21.52 
1.46
Norway 36.90 6.77 46.94 6.30 - - - -
Sweden - - 4.69 0.63 - - 11.41 0.78
UK 180.69 33.14 387.39 52.01 8.07 0.51 18.56 1.26
US - - - - 21.28 1.35 21.28 1.45
EU 209.11 38.36 208.11 27.94 0.01 0.00 6.68 0.45
World 
Bank 
- - - - 1453.30
92.27
1304.31 
88.77
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
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Zambia 
(2000-
2014) 
General budget support Sector budget support 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
Commitments Gross disburse-
ments 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
million 
USD 
% of 
total 
Total 957.24 100 1038.60 100 411.96 100 296.67 100
Finland 59.00 6.16 44.51 4.29 - - 3.82 1.29
Germany 73.56 7.68 66.90 6.44 - - - -
Ireland - - - - 2.42 0.59 2.42 0.82
Japan - - - - 5.13 1.24 5.13 1.73
Nether-
lands 
52.16 
5.45 
51.10
4.92
-
-
- -
Norway 128.02 13.37 128.70 12.39 - - - -
Sweden 16.32 1.71 33.38 3.21 - - - -
UK 190.77 19.93 349.55 33.66 15.99 3.88 32.22 10.86
US 4.35 0.45 1.10 0.11 6.84 1.66 6.78 2.28
EU 387.42 40.47 317.72 30.59 - - 24.97 8.41
AfDB 45.65 4.77 45.65 4.40 20.98 5.09 20.85 7.03
World 
Bank 
- - - - 360.60
87.53
200.49 
67.58
Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
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7.14 Disbursements of ODA donors by instrument type and year 
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Source: CRS (OECD, 2018a) 
Note: GBS disbursements from the IMF have been excluded because the IMF does not provide GBS that is linked to political out-
comes as its disbursement decisions are based on macroeconomic performance.
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7.15 Overview of country and aggregate results 
 Overall 
result 
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Zambia 
Policy dialogue 
  
Harmonization 
  
Public  
expenditure 
   
Public financial 
management 
     
Domestic  
accountability  
  
Service delivery 
  
Non-income pov-
erty   
Macroeconomic 
performance 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own 
  
Moderately positive trend after the exit
No change or opposing trends after the exit 
Slightly negative trend after the exit 
Moderately negative trend after the exit 
Strong negative trend after the exit
Good evidence base
Poor evidence base 
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